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The gradual regulatory orientation of law towards the sphere of medicine is generally
believed to have led to the occurrence of a new legal discipline, namely medical law.
Although the sociological study of law has revealed the complex repercussions of
regulation, the emergence of medical law during such a process has attracted very little
attention. This inevitably calls into question its precise identification.
My argument begins from within the discipline of medical law. First, I consider
the doctrinal propositions regarding the subject matter of medical law and then the
content of the legal norms that belong to it. As far as the question of the constitution of
medical law is concerned both perspectives are problematic: the former because the
conceptualisations it proposes are themselves contested or contestable and the latter
because the relevant legal norms reveal a field of intense complexity that requires further
analysis.
These problems make it necessary to theoretically re-assess questions of
definition and delineation. Based on insights from systems theory, especially from the
work of Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, I argue that the most fruitful way to
conceptualise medical law should be based on an understanding of law as an autopoietic
social system. This understanding challenges the way that medical law is traditionally
perceived, defines the link between law and medicine in terms of structural coupling and
highlights the problems that the regulatory exposition of law to medicine generates for
the new discipline.
Within this framework, this thesis claims that medical law is constituted
internally, in the process of the legal involvement with medicine; also, that its
constitution is ingrained with disintegrative effects that threaten the normative potential
of this new branch of the law.
Introduction
2
Hardly a week passes without the announcement of something new from the field of
medicine. The public domain is in effect bombarded with the possibility of new therapies
and new drugs and with revelations regarding the future potential of medical research.
This is not to say that the public can easily draw a line between the real value of "good
news" and the possible exaggerations in its representation in the media.1 Yet, it cannot be
seriously disputed that advances in biology and information technology have indeed
enhanced very significantly the potential of medicine. This is especially the case in
particular areas, like infertility treatment, organ transplantation and what can be depicted
commonly as "gene therapy".2 More generally though, the whole apparatus of medicine
has been much benefited by a number of important scientific discoveries.
Yet, all is not bright in the realm of medicine. Its promise for human betterment,
highly intensified by the advances just described, is accompanied by a certain societal
uneasiness especially regarding the repercussions that a whole-hearted endorsement of
what medicine can achieve may entail. This is not necessarily a surprise: arguably, it is
just a particular instance of the scepticism that has accompanied science and its claims of
progress, referring in particular to the unanticipated consequences of specific
developments.3 It may even be an indication of the human tendency to treat with
suspicion and mistrust anything that appears as radically new.4 Whatever the reason for
this uneasiness, what is important is that it has generated a societal call for monitoring
medical progress. Modern medicine is not to be left alone; rather it should be monitored
by society. In practical terms, this call for control has taken the shape of a general
consensus that medicine must be regulated. It is exactly at this point that the law has been
brought into the picture as the most obvious means through which societal and political
influence over medicine can be achieved.
Now, the involvement of the law with medicine is not a new phenomenon.
During the course of the 20th century, the law was mobilised in a number of areas, most
' This point hints towards the interesting question of how the public perception of science is influenced by its
representation in the media. For discussion, see S. Allan, Media, Risk and Science (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 2002), A. Petersen, "Replicating Our Bodies, Losing Ourselves: News Media Portrayals of Human Cloning
in the Wake of Dolly" (2002) 8(4) Body and Society 71 and A. Irwin and B. Wynne (eds.), Misunderstanding
Science? The Public Reconstruction ofScience and Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2 This is a somewhat vague term that refers to a variety of different things. For a useful overview, see M.
Cavazzana-Calvo et al., "The Future of Gene Therapy" (2004) 427 Nature 779 and J. Kinderlerer and D. Longley,
"Human Genetics: The New Panacea?" (1998) 61 MLR 603, pp. 614ff.
3 For an introduction to this tendency, which is especially acute during the second part of the 20th century and is
ultimately linked with the sociological concept of risk, see M. David, Science in Society (New York: Palgrave,
MacMillan, 2005), pp. 38-50.
4 This can be further justified if one takes into account that at least some of the new developments appear able to
revolutionise the understanding of the very nature of the human species. The possibility of human cloning is an
obvious example here.
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notably in the protection of public health, in the establishment of a comprehensive
national health service and in the provision of remedies against medical malpractice.
Moreover, if one explores further into the past, it is obvious that a close connection
between law and medicine is by no means a novelty of our time. Still, it is striking that
historically their "relationship" was mainly complementary, in the sense that medicine
was often providing assistance to law - forensics is the obvious example.5 More recently
a qualitative shift has occurred: their relationship is more than often confrontational, since
the law is involved as a regulatory institution.
A crucial characteristic of this qualitative shift in the current situation is the sheer
quantity of legal interference. This is the most manifest indication of the major
intensification in the control of medicine through law. Legal prescriptions are now
relevant for almost everything that happens within the field of medicine and refer not
only to the aspects of medicine resulting from the scientific developments of the day, but
also to those that used to exist and were traditionally beyond the scope of legal
regulation/' Against such a background, it is unsurprising that a new, autonomous branch
of the law is deemed to have come into existence. This branch is usually depicted under
the term medical law and is the subject of specialised academic study and legal practice.
I will dwell on the mode of the academic study of medical law and it is here that
the initial trigger in writing this work can be found. Since the beginning of the
development of interest in the study of medical law (which can probably be traced back
to the late 1970s), the thrust of the relevant intellectual efforts has mainly been oriented
to the investigation of particular issues. These are either general "themes" that are
overwhelmingly significant for the field (like consent to treatment) or concrete instances
of medical practice that have generated a legal response (for example organ
transplantation). It is the accumulated outcome of such efforts that has gradually
"produced" the discipline of medical law. Yet, and with no intention to disregard the
very real significance of these efforts, something is missing from such a picture, namely a
coherent account of what exactly is the nature of medical law as an autonomous
discipline. Although it is well accepted that medical law exists as a distinct branch of the
law, it remains unclear exactly how or on what conditions this branch is constituted as
5 For a detailed discussion of the collaboration between law and medicine in the past, see M. Clark and C.
Crawford (eds.), Legal Medicine in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
6 It is instructive to contrast the current degree of law's interference with medicine with the following passage of
the dictum in Farquhar v. Murray (1901) 3F, 859, 862, in the beginning of the 20th century:
"This action is certainly one of particularly unusual character. It is an action of damages by a patient against a medical man. In
my somewhat long experience, 1 cannot remember having seen a similar case before."
(cited in the introduction in D. Giesen, International Medical Malpractice Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1988)).
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such. While it is acknowledged that it is a relatively new discipline, its autonomous
existence is deemed to be almost self-evident: it is somewhat assumed that medical law
acquires its distinct character as a result of the regulatory orientation of law towards
medicine and crucially because the law responds in a particular and highly complicated
way to a set of externalities emanating from the sphere of medicine. This general
assumption is apparent even in academic textbooks regarding medical law, where the
main focus lies consistently in the exploration of particular themes and much less on the
question of the constitution of the discipline.7
This under-theorising is unfortunate for a number of reasons. First, it undermines
the importance of the novelty of the discipline by taking its existence for granted.
Secondly, it conceals the fact that the unearthing of the constitution of the discipline as
something to be problematised, can very much enrich the extant theorising on particular
issues by providing additional dimensions to them. This becomes even more significant,
if one considers that the existing apparatus of medical law is a patchwork of norms that
did not develop in an orderly manner but rather as a result of essentially random
legislative interventions and judicial decisions. Thirdly, and in my view most importantly,
it is responsible for the lack of interest in examining whether the mere identification of
an external trigger that generates a legal reaction is enough to serve as an organising
principle for the constitution of any branch of the law — and this is exactly the case with
the identification of medical law so far. I insist that this issue is crucial because if this
assumption does not hold true, then our understanding of what medical law is becomes
wide open again and a general reassessment of the discipline in its entirety is necessary.
Within this framework, the primary aim of my thesis is to provide an argument
about the constitution ofmedical law, with a particular emphasis on questioning the premises
on the basis of which this has so far been understood. I will do this by taking into
account the extant proposals regarding the subject matter of the discipline, by assessing
whether or not these are plausible or not and by providing a different perspective on the
question. It goes without saying that this whole enterprise is based on a set of theoretical
tenets regarding the very nature of law as a social phenomenon.
The starting point of my analysis is indeed the idea that medical law is a new
discipline that results from the gradual intensification of the involvement of law with
medicine. Given that at least ostensibly tire emergence of medical law is an instance of a
7 It is interesting to note here that one of the few attempts to compile a history of how the discipline has come into
existence and how "medical" or "health" law has been so far defined can be found in a work that is not interested
in providing a comprehensive presentation of the discipline, namely in T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, Health Law
and the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1 Iff.
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phenomenon of legal growth, the concept that dictates the orientation of my thesis is
that of juridiftcation, and the treatment of my initial question derives from theories that
have dealt extensively with it. These theories acknowledge the importance of externalities
for the law, but handle them in a much more refined way than the assertion that the law
merely reacts to external events.
Juridification is a term coined with the aim of depicting the phenomenon of legal
expansion, in particular when this refers to the legal regulation of a social domain
previously unregulated. So, it is not only the proliferation of norms that is important but
also the respective novelty of the fact that these norms refer to a particular social area.
The relevant theorising is indeed broad, yet its most interesting insights treat
juridification as an indication of the general structural traits of the society within which
the phenomenon is identified.8 This means that juridification is seen as intrinsically linked
with the particular political organisation of a given society and the concept can be used as
a tool for exploring the transformation of the relationship between the legal and the
political domain as they co-exist and co-evolve in time.9 Along these lines, Jiirgen
Habermas has argued that in Western societies it is possible to identify four distinct
"juridification thrusts" that have occurred in accordance with different types of political
ordering, namely what he calls the bourgeois state, the Rechsstaat, the democratic state and the
welfare statef He effectively claims that the juridification phenomenon identified in the
last part of the 20th century can be explained in terms of the particular positioning of the
law within the remit of the welfare state. If one takes into account that the welfare state is
essentially characterised by interventionist tendencies,11 it is not difficult to conclude that
the law, which can be used as an instrument for affecting social change and
implementing policies, expands its regulatory gamut in accordance with the scale of the
policy choices of the welfare state. Such a formulation explains legal expansion through
the instrumental use of the law by the welfare state.12
8 See in details G. Teubner, "Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions" in G. Teubner (ed.),
Juridification ofSocial Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas ofLabour, Corporate, Antitrust and Social
Welfare Law (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), pp. 3-48 with many further references.
9 For a classic account of legal evolution along these lines see P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in
Transition: Towards Responsive Law (London: Transaction Publishers, 2001, originally published by llarber
Torch Books in 1978).
10 See in details, J. Habermas, The Theory ofCommunicative Action (Volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique
ofFunctionalist Reason) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 3 57ff.
11 For a short but informed analysis of the particular characteristics of the welfare state, see J. Tweedy and A.
Hunt, "The Future of the Welfare state and the Social Rights: Reflections on Habermas" (1994) 21 Journal ofLaw
and Society 292.
12 For an introduction to the widely discussed issue of legal instrumentalism, see R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of
Law: An Introduction (2nd edition, London: Butterworths, 1992), pp. 44ff.
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In linking legal expansion with the welfare state through the concepts of
juridification and legal instrumentalism, an initial platform for exploring the original aim
of my thesis emerges. This platform dictates that the constitution of medical law as an
autonomous discipline can be established only if one considers seriously the problems
that relate to legal instrumentalism. The implication here is that to understand the
constitution of medical law, it is necessary to investigate what are the repercussions for the
law by its instrumental use by the welfare state. If this point of view is further pursued, a
number of interesting questions come to the surface. Among them, three particular
issues are of primary significance:13 a) the impact of this instrumentality on legal
rationality and most importantly, on the exact balance between formal and substantive
elements in the law of the welfare state;14 b) the identification of the limits of what the
law can achieve when used in an instrumental way, since it is not necessarily the case that
the law can indeed bring forward any policy that the political domain defines as worth
pursuing and c) the identification of ways through which the regulatory potential of the
law can be enhanced, especially in the light of the possibility that this potential may be at
the outset limited in accordance with (b). Naturally, these are all open questions and the
answer that one is willing to provide depends very much on one's theoretical allegiances.
In what follows, I will tackle these issues using a version of systems theory that has been
proposed by Niklas Luhmann and further expanded by Gunther Teubner. This is not an
arbitrary choice. It is justified because systems theory insists on the importance of the
link between the law and its external environment, a link that is at the core of the
constitution of medical law, as this is hitherto perceived. Yet, it treats this link in a very
sophisticated way that reveals a number of exciting possibilities that have not so far
received any special attention. In anticipation of what will be discussed in detail in the
course of the thesis, let me just say that systems theory proposes a much more
complicated process of interaction between the different spheres of society. This does
not obey the logic of direct influence (that is consistent with the current understanding
of medical law), but is controlled by mechanisms that are internal to the spheres that
interact.
By incorporating these additional questions and this theoretical tradition into the
original aim of my thesis, I am now in a position to refine its scope. What I intend to do
13 For reasons that justify the choice of these particular issues see G. Teubner, "The Transformation of Law in the
Welfare State" in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas ofLaw in the Welfare State (Berling: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp.
3-10, passim.
14 For this issue, see the classic discussion in G. Teubner's, "Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law"
(1983) 17(2) Law and Society Review 239.
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is to reassess the constitution of medical law as it emerges as a discipline from the
interaction between law and medicine: although this should not be understood as a direct
interaction, it dictates exactly how the law responds to medicine and how it organises
itself when doing so. This reassessment is further determined by the parallel
understanding of what are the consequences for the law of the intensification of its
exposure to medicine, and of what its possible limitations are, when it seeks to provide
regulatory solutions to medicine. In a sense, the provision of an answer to these latter
questions constitutes the secondary aim of my thesis. However, this statement must not
lead to the false impression that we are dealing here with distinct issues: the constitution
of medical law ultimately depends both on the impact that medicine has on the law and
on the regulatory potential of the law towards medicine.
This thesis is organised along the following lines. The substantial discussion
follows a tripartite structure: the first two chapters consist in the "unpacking" of the
discipline of medical law as it now stands and in accordance with the doctrinal
propositions regarding its subject matter. Then, the third chapter provides the theoretical
tools in terms of which the discipline should be reassessed. Finally, this reassessment
appears in the fourth chapter where the theoretical conclusions reached in chapter 3 are
applied to the discipline of medical law as this has been described in the first two
chapters.
To be more precise, in the first chapter of the thesis, I will discuss the doctrinal
aspect of medical law and I will focus especially on the doctrinal attempts to define the
scope and the subject matter of medical law. I will explore the preconditions of these
doctrinal propositions and through them I will identify two as the most dominant,
namely one that defines medical law in terms of medical ethics and one that does so in
terms of human rights. I will discuss in some detail the relevant propositions and I will
provide a critique of their insights. On the basis of this critique, I will argue that the
doctrinal delineations of the field of medical law are not satisfying for a number of
reasons and that the question of how the field is indeed constituted remains open.
In the second chapter, I will focus my attention explicitly on the legal norms that
have so far crystallised the legal regulation of medicine. In presenting them in detail, I do
not simply intend to show the empirical reality of the norms, the proliferation of which is
linked with the emergence of medical law. Rather, I will make use of this presentation to
reach a number of preliminary conclusions regarding the regulatory orientation of the law
towards medicine that these norms reveal.
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In the third chapter, I will present the theoretical framework in terms of which I
will reassess the field of medical law. It is here that I will heavily rely on systems theory
and on the concept of juridification and that I will clarify my own position regarding
several contested issues within this theoretical tradition. In particular, I will insist on the
idea that the interaction between law and medicine, on which the emergence of the
discipline of medical law depends, should be understood as a relationship between
autonomous and, crucially, self-referential., autopoietic systems. This core idea provides the
opportunity to be aware of the fact that the relationship between systems should not be
taken for granted and accordingly to investigate in detail both the exact conditions of the
constitution of autonomous branches within the law and law's limitations whenever it is
mobilised as a regulatory agent. In this latter task, the concept of the regulatory trilemma
will be particularly useful.
In the final chapter, I will proceed in the reassessment of the field of medical law,
making use of the insights provided by systems theory, as these will have been explored
in chapter 3. In doing so, I will also revisit the conclusions reached in the discussion in
chapters 1 and 2. Through the combination of these insights, I will make clear my own
proposals regarding the constitution of medical law and the regulatory potential of the







The aim of this chapter is in effect quite clear. What I intend to do here is to take into
consideration the doctrinal aspect of medical law and to investigate what, if anything, this
source can contribute to the main question of my project, namely the constitution of
medical law. In the general introduction to the thesis, I have identified the resort to the
doctrine as the first step in unpacking the discipline. This is indeed a self-evident choice.
My claim that it is necessary to reassess how medical law is constituted cannot be
sustained without considering how this question has already been tackled within the
discipline. Even though I have implied that the academic study of medical law has under-
theorised the issue (an implication that will hopefully be justified in the course of this
chapter), it is at the doctrinal level that one must start.
Before engaging in any substantive discussion, it is necessary to take a moment
and reflect on the notion of doctrine. This is vital, because although the term "doctrine"
is ever-present in any kind of legal analysis, its exact meaning remains ambiguous.
Arguably, the term signifies the theoretical work that legal scholars, judges and lawyers
are undertaking when analysing or investigating legal norms, but this very loose definition
leaves a range of questions unanswered, basically the main "function" of the doctrine and
the methodology on the basis of which doctrinal work takes place.
For the purposes ofmy discussion, I maintain that the role played by the doctrine
is one of "gathering" already existing legal data, with the aim of assessing them
theoretically and of projecting the relevant conclusions into the future.1 This process is
not arbitrary, but it takes the form of a rational reconstruction of legal data.2 This means that
whoever is engaged in doctrinal analysis, does so in conformity with a simple or complex
rational ideal (whatever this may be) on the basis of which her particular analysis of legal
data becomes meaningful. The exact criteria in terms of which such work is conducted
are irrelevant here. What is relevant is that they are often determined in accordance with
the particularities of the field of law within which doctrinal work takes place and that
they reflect a set of principles or values that are deemed compatible or highly significant
for this field. This assertion is simply the logical consequence of the idea of rational
reconstruction: the rational ideal that sustains such a doctrinal reconstruction is not
arbitrary but is already embedded in the branch of the law that the legal data under
1 See in more details A. Peczenik, On Law and Reason (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), pp. 143ff.
2 For a thorough discussion of what the methodology of rational reconstruction entails, see N. MacCormick,
Rhetoric and the Rule ofLaw: A Theory ofLegal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 29ff.
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analysis belong to (or at least is believed to be embedded by the theorist that is engaged
in doctrinal analysis).3
The idea that the doctrine entails a rational reconstruction, which proceeds on
the basis of a set of principles or values, is rather redundant when the theorist is dealing
with a "stable" branch of the law. This is because in areas of the law that are persistently
seen as autonomous and self-contained (for example tort law), at least some value
orientations are solidly embedded. So, these are constantly and implicitly present in any
doctrinal work that is relevant for this branch of the law.4 This is not necessarily the case
in novel areas of the law (such as medical law), the distinct character of which is still
under development. Here, the value orientations of the relevant growing doctrine are
much more important, since it is these orientations that will ultimately determine how the
new legal branch will eventually be "constructed".5 This should not come as a surprise.
Doctrinal work always focuses on the interpretation of legal norms and in doing so it
often filters out and defines the crucial factors on the basis of which concepts embedded
into norms become legal institutions.6 From then on, and in order to sustain the
interpretation of norms further, the doctrine explicitly or implicitly systematises legal
institutions into sub-systems or branches of the law.7 This is exactly what has happened
with medical law. Through the interpretation of legal norms that have been the outcome
of the regulatory orientation of law towards medicine, legal institutions (like the
autonomy of the patient or medical confidentiality) have emerged; then, these institutions
have been combined in a manner that sustains the new discipline ofmedical law.8
It follows that to understand how the relevant doctrine has constructed medical
law as a new branch of the law, one has to identify the basic value orientations that have
been utilised in this process. Since it must be clear by now that these orientations are
3 This point is very much compatible with the idea that each branch of the law has a value orientation or that
particular branches of the law are "locally" coherent exactly because of a set of principles or values that sustain
them. For the former view see N. MacCormick, 2005, p. 114; for the latter see B. Levenbook, "The Role of
Coherence in Legal Reasoning" (1984) 3 Law and Philosophy 355.
4 This does not mean that these orientations are uncontested; still, because of their existence, even attempts to
challenge them are framed in response to them.
5 For further discussion of the idea that doctrinal legal study constructs legal "subsystems" on the basis of rational
reconstruction of legal material see N. MacCormick, 2005, p. 229 and J. Bengoetxea, "Legal System as a
Regulative Ideal" (1994) 53 ARSP Beiheft 66.
6
Here, 1 use the term "legal institution" in the technical sense employed in N. MacCormick's, "Law as
Institutional Fact" (1974) 90 The Law Quarterly Review 102.
7 This point is consistent with the idea that in modern legal systems norms tend to link together in a purposive
manner, an idea that is more clearly expressed in Lon Fuller's view about law as a purposeful enterprise. For
further discussion, see L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd edition, London: Yale University Press, 1969),
especially chapter 3.
8 In this respect, the doctrine works in a reflexive manner, it abstracts principles from legal norms, it uses these
principles to interpret the norms and ultimately feeds back these principles into the normative horizon of the law as
organising structures.
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usually implicit, the problem is to find a way to unearth them. In this chapter, I will do
that by focusing on the doctrinal attempts to define a subject matterfor medical law. This is
because the definition of a subject matter for medical law captures in a very
straightforward way what is deemed to be important for the discipline; in effect, it
represents a very concise embodiment of the basic orientations that run across the whole
of the discipline. Accordingly, by focusing on the definitional aspects of the relevant
doctrine, it becomes much clearer how medical law has so far been constituted as an
autonomous branch of the law.
In order to discuss in a constructive way this definitional aspect of the doctrine
of medical law, it is indispensable to be clear on the methodological preconditions of any
definitional enterprise. This is going to be my focus on the next part of this chapter. In
addition, I will clarify the perspective on the basis of which I will assess these definitional
attempts. As soon as this is established, I will move on to the substantive analysis and I
will discuss in details the two most dominant doctrinal accounts regarding the subject-
matter of medical law. I will introduce their main tenets and I will provide a critical
account of their merits and disadvantages. Finally in the concluding part, I will
summarise my findings and I will provide a final evaluation of the doctrinal constitution
ofmedical law.
B. On doctrinal definitions.
1) The methodological preconditions of doctrinal delineation.
In order to define doctrinally what the subject matter of medical law is, a twofold
assumption -common to any definitional endeavour- must be made. In our case, this is
that medical law exists as a distinct, identifiable phenomenon within the law, and that this
"existential identification" is justified in the sense that it is neither false nor arbitrary.
These two aspects are inherently interwoven into a fundamental problem of
conceptualisation, which imparts the necessary backbone of any definitional inquiry in such
a significant degree that the need to sort it out holds in any case. Although this is a vital
problem, the solution to it seems self-evident and, therefore, beyond scrutiny, whenever
the phenomenon under investigation is easily identifiable in terms of time and
experience. Whenever one feels that it is absolutely clear what one is talking about, the
need to consider the conceptualisation problem is very often neglected. To provide a
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layman's example: we know what the police force is, or at least we feel that we know
what it is. We do not doubt that the police force exists, nor do we feel compelled to
justify our perception of its existence. Its presence as a societal institution has endured in
time and although we can problematise its societal functioning we are hardly ever
sensitive to the conceptualisation problem.9
This is not the case, however, for medical law as a phenomenon under
investigation. In the general introduction to the thesis I explained that medical law is still
a new and probably unstable discipline, which has emerged as a potentially autonomous
legal branch in the late 70s or so. Even if it is a distinct discipline, it remains in a process
of fluid and quite unpredictable development, still being constituted by an amalgam of
diffused legal categories, which are often oriented to arguably different stakes. This is
why Derek Morgan has argued that "...the framing of responses properly lying within
medical law is ... an intellectual responsibility that lies at the heart of academic
obligation". 10 What is important here is that this "instability" of the discipline in
question, can often amount to a kind of ontological contestability, which brings forth the
problem of conceptualisation in a very acute way.
So, how can we deal with the problem of conceptualisation? This is a question
that has been present ever since it was understood that the object of any enquiry is
always constituted and that pure description is not possible as such." Rather, the need to
identify a phenomenon through a particular conceptualisation is necessarily an evaluative
process. Conceptualisation can take place only when an evaluative perspective is at work,
on the basis of which it becomes possible to identify what are the salient features of the
phenomenon under scrutiny. Description does not stand without evaluation: they
constitute a mutually dependent pair, in such a manner that the sophistication of the
latter determines the depth of the former and vice versa.12 Yet, it is evaluation that is of
primary importance and that is why it is vital to clarify how it happens.
Any attempt to evaluate presumes a process of selection, and any selection is
organised according to a focal point. This is usually exemplified as the central case of the
enquiry that has necessitated the evaluation. By locating a central case, main and
peripheral issues can be distinguished and further selections and conceptual distinctions
9 This is not to say that this problem is irrelevant for my example, but only that we usually neglect it. The
significance of the problem can be easily seen if one considers the complex academic efforts in the field of the
sociology of policing.
10 See D. Morgan, Issues in Medical Law and Ethics (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 3.
11 For a very concise analysis of this hugely discussed fundamental thesis, see amongst many others, J. Finnis,
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 3.
12 For traces of the same argument within the context of medical law, see I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law
(3rd edition, London: Butterworths, 2000), p. 3.
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can be drawn. Therefore, in order to define what something is, it is indispensable to
identify its focal point. This identification is also based on an evaluative process and,
thus, it also depends on the application of evaluative criteria. Now, the selection of these
criteria depends on the viewpoint from which the relevant investigation departs. Since all
investigations are oriented to the achievement of a particular aim, this viewpoint is
usually a practical one, interwoven with the raison d' etre of the investigation.13 Having
established a particular practical viewpoint, and through that a central case and thus a
focal point, more relevant features can be settled and ultimately a "phenomenon" can be
delineated as something distinct. To put it in a summarised way, in order to identify
something, it is necessary to consider its focal point, in terms of which specific selections
unfold. This focal point emerges according to the practical viewpoint that informs the
relevant definitional enquiry.14
This "formula" illuminates the necessary preconditions of any effort to identify
an object of investigation, but reveals only the formal features of providing definitions.
Now, how exactly these features unfold in actual scenarios, depends on the nature of
what is to be defined and on the context from within which definitions occur. Since it is
the doctrinal definition of a subject matter for medical law that is of interest here, what
must be further examined is how these features have informed the relevant doctrinal
analysis.
Before doing this, a word of caution is necessary. Although the doctrine of
medical law has been generally sensitive to the conceptualisation problem presented
herein, the reader should not assume that clear solutions can be traced easily. We should
recall that the doctrine focuses on the assessment of legal norms and does not theorise in
a vacuum, but only in close connection with them. Accordingly, the proposed definitions
of the subject matter of medical law, and especially the premises that sustain them, must
be "distilled" from a general body of academic work that only rarely provides explicit
statements regarding the essence of medical law. So, what follows should be understood
as the conclusion of my investigation on how definitions about the subject matter of
medical law emerge from the relevant doctrine and not as unequivocal doctrinal claims.
Let me start with the practical viewpoint that the doctrine of medical law
endorses. This is shaped by the idea that there exists a strong link between law and
medicine, which is viewed in basically evolutionary andfunctional terms. The premise here is
13 For an analysis of the concept of "practical view point", see J. Finnis, 1980, p. 12.
14 For a much more detailed presentation of this argument, which goes back to the Aristotelian tradition, see J.
Finnis, 1980, chapter 1, with further references.
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that medical law emerges as part of an evolutionary process, during which the law
expands its scope responding to external, societal influences. Unsurprisingly, the initial
stimuli that have generated the birth of medical law are to be found within the sphere of
medicine. Since medicine is the pool of events that has generated a legal response, the
orientation of law towards medicine is cast in terms of an interaction that (from the point
of view of the law) is either reactive or proactive, but that in any case positions the law at
the receiving end of medical signals. In mm, this interaction is further refined according
to a functional perspective. The signals emanating from medicine typify instances of
conflict, which "require" resolution. It is exactly this need that ultimately justifies the
instrumental involvement of the law, which is to function as a mechanism for the
resolution of problematic situations within medicine.15
In close connection with this duality of evolution and function, doctrinal
propositions regarding possible focal points for medical law can then be identified. These
focal points appear exactly as propositions regarding the subject matter of medical law and
they substantiate the underlying practical viewpoint, by referring to the actual interaction
between law and medicine. A crucial point here is that the existence of this interaction
cannot in itself be taken as a focal point: this would be too crude, not least because the
realm of medicine is itself a dynamic and ever-changing plateau. A simplified deference
to the link between law and medicine would not provide evaluative identification, but
only unqualified description by begging the question of what is really meant by the link.
This means that ultimately (albeit again implicitly), the doctrine of medical law is based
on a set of assumptions regarding the state of affairs within modern medicine and takes a
view on the issues that have acquired central significance for medicine. Therefore, a
conceptual account of medicine itself is present in a shadowy form in many instances of
doctrinal work and this account is itself liable to selections in accordance with which
medicine is described. In this respect, the doctrine of medical law depends very much on
particular agendas regarding medicine, determined by the theoretical and political
allegiances of the individuals that engage in doctrinal theorising. What is crucial, thus, is
that the doctrinal conceptualisations of medical law tend to mirror particular
conceptualisations of medicine: it is the latter that determine the main medical "themes"
that invite legal response and trigger a doctrinal process of analysis that ultimately
constitutes medical law as a distinct branch of the law.
15 Therefore, it can be argued that the doctrinal practical viewpoint coincides with an explicitly liberal account of
law, according to which the law is essentially an instrumental regulatory device outside the realm of medicine. For
this point, see, in details, J. Montgomery, "Time for a Paradigm Shift: Medical Law in Transition" (2000) 53
Current Legal Problems 363, at pp. 363-364.
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On the basis of these premises, two main propositions have emerged from the
doctrine of medical law that identify a subject matter/focal point for the discipline. They
are both shaped by the same practical viewpoint; however, being informed by different
conceptualisations of medicine, they reach different conclusions as to what this subject
matter is and they define medical law in a different way. The first proposition is based on
a perception of modern medicine as a social sphere that constantly generates ethical
dilemmas. Therefore, the subject matter of medical law is the law's involvement with
medical ethics and the discipline is organised as something distinct according to this
subject matter. The second proposition conceives of medicine as a field of intense power
imbalances that open up the possibility of abuse of patients; this necessitates their
protection and, accordingly, the subject matter of medical law is the protection of
patients through the mobilisation of a shielding mechanism. This has been found in
human rights apparatus. As a coda, let me stress the following point that is probably
already clear: both these doctrinal propositions16 do not merely delineate an area of
interface between law and medicine. More crucially, through the definition of a subject
matter for medical law, they provide the initial basis for the development of a derivative
set of concrete orientations that are necessary for sustaining and ultimately constituting
medical law as an autonomous branch of the law.
2) The aim and methodology ofmy critique.
It is time to conclude this part of the chapter by identifying more clearly what I intend to
do from now on. In the substantive discussion that follows in the next part, I will
examine at length the two conceptualisations of medical law already identified and I will
expose their respective merits and shortcomings, focusing specifically on a set of
objections that diminish their plausibility. This examination is the necessary first step for
my own reassessment of how medical law is constituted: it represents the evaluation on
whether the doctrinal constitution of medical law as an autonomous discipline holds. If
indeed it holds, then no further effort is necessary. If it does not, as I contend, then the
issue opens up again.
As far as the methodology of the subsequent discussion is concerned a number
of caveats must be clearly stated in advance. The first is that I will accept the premises of
the doctrinal definitions as they stand. In particular, I will not challenge at all the practical
16 For reasons of brevity, in the course of this chapter I will refer to the first proposition as "the medical law and
ethics approach" and to the second as "the human rights approach".
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viewpoint that underlies the relevant doctrine, namely the dual premise of legal evolution
and function. This means that in what follows I will treat as correct the view that medical
law is constituted as a result of law's response to external events emanating from
medicine and that these events are also the matrix of organising principles for medical
law. So, I am accepting here that in the constitution of medical law there is a strong
correspondence between what is happening in medicine and the main orientations of
medical law, exactly as the relevant doctrines concede. This being the case, my objections
will take the form of an essentially internal critique that will challenge the doctrinal
propositions on their own methodological terms. More precisely, these objections will
focus on whether the underlying conceptual understanding of medicine is itself accurate
as a definitional basis for medical law, and on whether the proposed link between law
and medicine on the basis of medicine's conceptualisation is plausible in real terms (since
once again the doctrine is constantly determined by the actual legal material). This is just
a very general categorisation of my objections, which, in addition will concentrate on a
number of ostensibly different issues. Indeed, what follows can be challenged as uneven.
However, my objections are designed to be compatible with the particularities of each of
the propositions and I concede that they do not constitute a coherent schema as such.
The second caveat is that in the development of my objections, I will respond
not only to explicit arguments that sustain the relevant propositions, but also to the
logical consequences that these propositions entail if explored further. This may invite
against my arguments the criticism that I challenge views that are not necessarily shared
by those that support the relevant definitions. However, in developing, for instance, the
idea that the subject matter of medical law is the regulation of medical ethics, it is
important to consider the repercussions of this argument as far as possible, even if
advocates of the proposition are not aware of its consequences. In my view this
investigation is crucial for the final evaluation of the merit of their argument,
notwithstanding whether they do or do not accept its consequences. This strategy is
further justified because of the primarily implicit nature of doctrinal delineations: exactly
because the propositions that I am discussing here are distilled from analyses of
particular norms and judicial decisions, my attempt to assess them must go beyond the
original intentions of their "promoters".
With these remarks, the exposition of my methodology is concluded. It is now
time to turn to the substantive discussion.
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C. A critical portrayal of the main doctrinal delineations.
1) Medical law and ethics.
a) The core of the argument.
The high stakes of medical practice and the intimate character of the doctor-patient
relationship have traditionally attached a high degree of moral concern to medicine. This
concern has been explicitly manifested in the drafting of guidelines of professional
ethics17 for doctors and in the constant reoccurrence of public debates regarding the
ethical significance of a variety of medical procedures.18 Within this framework, the
emergence of a distinct sub-category of general ethics, the so-called "medical ethics" or -
more recently- "bioethics"1'7 comes as no surprise.
In the course of history, significant moral dilemmas have emerged because of
particular scientific and socio-political occurrences. Such occurrences tend to stimulate
the moral debate, often resulting in calls for immediate moral resolution and an increase
of public feeling that medicine is a morally sensitive enterprise. For instance, during the
19th century, the advent of palliative care and the discovery of ether transformed to such
a degree the delivery of care that a whole range of new moral issues came to the surface.
More recendy, the unprecedented medical atrocities that the world witnessed during the
Second World War20 also triggered a very intense moral debate. The more apparent post¬
war response was the radical transformation of the whole area of medical research and
experimentation, which became the subject of detailed scrutiny and regulation.21
17 Let me briefly clarify here the difference between "morality" and "ethics" so that confusion is avoided: morality
is a first-order concept that refers to the need to distinguish between what is right and wrong in practical situations.
"Ethics" is a second-order notion that refers to the justification process according to which morally relevant
choices are made. For further analysis, see J.K Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith's Law and
Medical Ethics (7th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 4.
18 For example, see documents as the Declaration ofHelsinki, adopted by the World Medical Assembly, Helsinki,
Finland 1964 (as amended in Edinburgh, 2000), and the International Code of Medical Ethics, as amended in
Venice, 1983.
19 For an analysis of the differences between the two terms, and for a presentation of the historical course of the
ethics ofmedicine, see A. Jonsen, The Birth ofBioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
20 For a detailed presentation of the issue, see R. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987) and J.R. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of
Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986). However, it is interesting to note here that the medical atrocities of
Nazi Germany were not a unique policy of a particular totalitarian regime; rather they were the tragic apex of
widespread social policy developments in the whole western Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. For a historical
analysis, see M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (London: Penguin Books, 1998), chapter
3; also, J. Rifkin, The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World, (London: Victor Gollanz,
1998), pp. 107ff., especially regarding the popularity of the "eugenics" movement in USA in the same period.
21 The first document that tackled the issue was the Nuremberg Code of 1947.
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Arguably, the rapid development ofmedical technology throughout the latter half
of the 20th century and beyond, and the variety of new potentials and possibilities that
have enriched the medical arsenal has generated new and ongoing moral concerns. The
intensification of medical interventions during the process of procreation, the gradual
decoding of the human genome with its potentially radical therapeutic capability, the
realisation of organ transplantation and even the possibility of postponing the end of life
when the organism itself is unable to survive independently are all new developments
that raise various moral problems, some of them unthinkable only 30 years ago. Indeed,
it appears that medicine has acquired the potential to re-address issues of elementary
moral and philosophical importance,22 issues that challenge our fundamental beliefs
regarding the nature of the human species and even touch upon the metaphysical realm.
It seems that we have entered a new era, or, as Jeremy Rifkin has declared, a "biotech
century".23
The difficulties in tackling and in providing plausible positions on moral
dilemmas are intensified given the moral pluralism of modern western societies. In such
an atmosphere, it is not surprising that the law has been brought into the picture as a
societal mechanism that can contribute to the alleviation of this problem. To understand
what this legal involvement implies, let me provide the following distinction: the law can
either be seen as a normative edifice, the content of which mirrors the main moral
assertions of a given society and thus re-enforces them whenever they face a challenge or
as vehicle for the provision of morally relevant answers in the sense that either directly or
indirectly it provides justifications or reasons for action that are ethically sound. The
difference here is that in the first case the law is ethically informed whereas in the second
it is a forum that shapes the ethical domain in accordance with its content and procedural
structures.24 In both cases, though, the law is intimately connected with ethics. In implicit
harmony with this view, authors like Kenyon Mason and Michael Davies,25 treat medical
law as a valuable forum for exploring normatively the moral difficulties of modern
medicine. Accordingly, the regulatory horizon of medical law is invested with a
22 See the very thorough analysis in T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, (5th edition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); also, L.M. Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New
World (London: Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 1998).
23 See in details his 1998, passim.
24 This distinction does not exhaust the possibilities of the link between law and ethics: a further option comes
from the point of view of ethics and can be expressed as the ethical evaluation of legal norms.
25 See J.K Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, especially chapter 1 and M. Davies, Medical Law, (2nd edition,
Blackstone Press Limited, 1998). Other authors also advocate this idea albeit more implicitly: for instance, see J.
McHale and M. Fox, Health Care Law: Text and Materials (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997).
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significant moral responsibility,26 since the orientation of law towards medicine is
essentially linked with medical ethics. This does not mean that the exact degree of legal
intervention is at the outset defined; however, even this remains an open question,27 it
very much depends on the particularities of the moral situation of the day. The logical
consequence of this view is that medical law is to a very significant extent constituted as
the sum of the legal responses to the moral questions emanating from the sphere of
medicine and that as a distinct legal discipline it represents an efficient way of balancing
conflicting individual interests within a community of moral pluralism.28 It goes without
saying that this "moral responsibility" of the law is expressed differently in accordance
with the concrete issue that is under regulation. Sometimes, the law becomes involved
directly with scenarios that are obviously complex from a moral point of view and when
it does so, the legal solutions that are provided very much resemble ethical justifications;
the decision in ReA,Z} where a court had to decide the tragic fate of two Siamese twins is
an obvious example here. In other scenarios, the moral sensitivity of the law is much
subtler. Yet, even cases of medical negligence can be read in the tight of ethics, if one is
ready to accept that the formulation of the relevant legal rules represents an ethically
sound solution to the question of how responsibility for negligence should be allocated.
Generally speaking, this proposition regarding the subject matter of medical law
is strengthened, considering that a significant number of legal principles (that
significantly shape the relevant legal norms) are very close to similar ethical principles.
For instance, values tike autonomy, beneficence (exemplified in the best-interests
principle), sanctity of life, dignity, privacy, solidarity and justice3" are all present in the
norms belonging to medical law. Indeed then, the argument that the organising
orientation of medical law is its close connection with the domain of medical ethics
sounds ostensibly plausible.
26 As a further indication of this tendency, let me stress that even judicial pronouncements often embrace one or
the other version of a strong link between law and ethics. For instance Hoffmann LJ, in Airedale NHS Trust v.
Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, at 858 explicitly stated that "... I would expect medical ethics to be formed by the law
rather than the reverse".
27 For this point, see in details J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 1-3 and 23ff.
28
However, it has been argued that there is no actual guarantee that the law can regulate within a context of moral
pluralism, on the basis that when there is no consensus about what is morally plausible, it is rather improbable that
the law will provide a "satisfying" solution. For this argument see T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, Health Law and
the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 13.
29 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 57 BMLR 1.
30 For this "list" see further J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 4; also the detailed analysis in T. Hope et al.,
Medical Ethics and Law: The Core Curriculum (Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 2003), chapter 3.
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b) The critique.
The conceptualisation of medical law with reference to medical ethics is undoubtedly a
very serious attempt to highlight the significance of ethics for modern medical practice.
The main force of this proposition is exactly that the ethical aspect of medicine is
important and becomes even more important as new technological achievements come
forward. This being the case, this proposition is crucial in opening up the relevant debate
and in proposing legal solutions to particular problems.
Nevertheless, this section investigates this argument solely in terms of the
plausibility of the conceptual orientation of medical law to medical ethics; in other words,
of the plausibility of the core proposition that medical law must be conceptualised as a
discipline in a strong connection with the domain of medical ethics. It seems to me that
at this level of analysis, the project of linking medical law with medical ethics is
problematic. In this section, I will analyse the reasons why I believe this is so, by
presenting two distinct objections; the first is conceptual in nature, whereas the second is
jurisprudential.
i. The conceptual objection.
The doctrinal proposition that I am discussing is based on a particular perception of
medicine, namely that medical practice is a social domain that generates moral conflicts
and dilemmas. This particular "conception" of medicine is of course selective, since it
focuses only on some aspects of its practice. I do not intend to challenge this selectivity,
since this is always necessary for any attempt to make sense of a complex social domain
and for locating a core theme within it. However, the very idea of selectivity leaves open
the question of its adequacy. This depends very much on whether the proposed
conceptualisation represents the actuality of the domain under investigation in a significant
degree, especially according to the way that this actuality is relevant for the aim of the
original enquiry generating the whole process. In our case, the original enquiry is the
constitution of medical law: it is in reference to this, that I will argue that this perception
of medicine is problematic.
Essentially, even the implicit idea that medicine is a social domain flooded by
morally significant issues does not easily accommodate those aspects of the everyday
routine of medicine that still invite legal interference although they are morally neutral.
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The point here is that medical practice is not always characterised by moral dilemmas,
irresolvable disagreements and contested possibilities. Although nobody explicitly
disputes this, the proposition that medical law is about medical ethics neglects that the
vast majority of the actual instantiations of medicine consists of settled practice and
established methodology. Within such a framework, conflicts that demand legal
intervention occur, but these are not necessarily moral in nature. By no logical necessity
should every conflict be construed as an ethically significant conflict or as a conflict the
moral resolution of which is inherently problematic. This being the case, the proposition
I am criticising treats the everyday routine of medicine as less significant and focuses on
rather marginal scenarios. This is not to say that I believe them to be unimportant, only
that by being marginal they cannot provide the basis for a comprehensive representation
of the field. To put it bluntly, the attachment of medical law to medical ethics fails to
integrate the interference of the legal system with the morally neutral aspects of medicine
and "suffers" from a displacement of the central case of medicine.31
At a further level of analysis, the insistence on highlighting the ethically
significant aspects of medicine tends to underestimate the complexity of different stakes
that shape medical practice. Martyn Evans has thoroughly argued32 that an exclusive
focus on the ethical aspect of medicine obscures the range of "values" that drive modern
medicine and take them out of the public domain. His point is that other values also exist
in medicine and that these are not necessarily linked with either morality or ethics. For
Evans, these values are shaped in accordance with socio-political, intellectual and even
aesthetic concerns. Consequently, the proposed focus on the moral aspect of medicine
alone, not only misrepresents the exceptional as regular, but also oversimplifies the
complicated value-horizon of medicine, by insisting on a single-dimensional account.
Finally, at a further level of sophistication, it can be argued that the proposition I
am challenging is based on a rather "crude" understanding of the exact nature of the
morally significant aspects of modern medicine. Essentially, it takes for granted that the
moral dilemmas, which supposedly generate a legal reaction, are truly there, that they are
easily identifiable as problems, and that they are well known but unfortunately
irresolvable without the help of the law, essentially because of the apparent lack of moral
31
Similarly, the proposition fails to explain those cases were existing moral issues do not generate a legal
response. For example, in the case of resource allocation within hospitals, which undoubtedly causes moral
concern, the law just accepts the exercise of discretion by the hospital authorities.
32
See in details, M. Evans, "Philosophy and the Medical Humanities" in E.M. Evans and I.G. Finlay (eds.),
Medical Humanities, (London: BMJ, 2001), with further references.
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consensus within a pluralistic society. However, this is not necessarily the case. Morgan33
has argued that modern medicine has been transformed in such a degree that traditional
moral stakes are no longer self-evident or ever relevant and that our conception of
medicine in accordance with traditional moral concepts is significantly mistaken.
Crucially, the very identification of the moral questions that are (or should be significant)
within medicine is itself a contested moral issue the resolution of which presupposes a
new ethical -or, more accurately, meta-ethical- justification. In other words, what is
nowadays problematic is not only the first-order resolution of moral questions in
medicine, but also the second-order identification of what exactly counts as a moral
question to be tackled. The second-order problem invites philosophical and
epistemological concerns that, once again, the proposition I am criticising neglects. This
is a significant omission, because a call for the intervention of the legal system, which is
ultimately based on the need to tackle moral questions must necessarily accept that at
least the relevant moral questions are firmly established as questions. If this is itself
contested, it does not follow that the law can fulfil the function that is ascribed to it. The
situation becomes much more complicated and the assumed link between medical law
and medical ethics becomes much more difficult to sustain.
In my view, all these arguments weaken the merits of the definition of the subject
matter of medical law in terms of the link between law and medical ethics. Evidently, this
definitional proposition correctly highlights the need to be alert to the morally significant
aspects of modern medicine, but by insisting on a conceptual understanding that tinges
medicine in a particular, morally oriented way, it misses other aspects of it, equally
significant as far as the law is concerned. This under-inclusiveness already diminishes the
validity of this definition ofmedical law. There is however another argument that further
challenges its plausibility.
ii. Thejurisprudential objection.
The main jurisprudential assumption that underlies this proposed definition of medical
law is that the legal and the moral sphere do (or at least can) indeed interface. So, the idea
that medical law is constructed as a discipline in close connection with the domain of
medical ethics, almost takes for granted that, notwithstanding what the exact content of
the degree of this connection is, law and morality contribute to their mutual shaping.
33 See, D. Morgan, 2001, pp. 18-20.
24
More importantly, in the case of medical law this "fusion" of law and morality seems to
be not only unquestionable but also normatively desirable.
A very strong objection, here, is that this close interface between law and
morality is not as self-evident and free of problems as this definitional proposition has to
believe in order to stand. In jurisprudential terms, the link between law and morality is a
thoroughly discussed and hugely contested theoretical matter34 that has given rise to a
variety of concrete issues, none of which enjoys a unanimously acceptable answer.35 For
my purposes, the most crucial question that has to be dealt with is exactly the plausibility
of the assumption that the law can in fact take on board and provide regulation for and
solutions to moral issues. Leaving aside the general question of the desirability of law's
involvement, what should be considered seriously is the very potential of the law to
respond to moral dilemmas and to provide authoritative guidance to the ethical domain.
If this possibility is contested (as is the case) the assumed coincidence between law and
morality that serves as the basis for conceptualising the discipline cannot be taken for
granted.
In order to evaluate the plausibility of the proposed coincidence, one needs to
take into account several complex issues like the exact nature of these two normative
orders, the essence of their inherent logic, the difference between the finality of law and
the open-endness of morality,36 the often particularistic character of morality against the
universalistic character of the law,37 their respective claims for validity, their actual social
function etc. Against such a complex background, it is fair to argue that an understanding
of medical law, which perceives its link with medical ethics as self-evident, ignores the
crucial theoretical difficulties that this link has to confront and ultimately fails to
appreciate that, perhaps, the link does not hold. Essentially, by not being based on a clear
account of how medical law truly interacts with medical ethics, this definitional
proposition falls short of credible, complete analysis and therefore its plausibility itself is
seriously undermined.
If these arguments hold, then, both at a conceptual and at a jurisprudential level,
this definitional proposition is inadequate in providing a plausible conceptualisation of
the discipline of medical law. Although the focus on medical ethics is important, it
34 The degree of the relevant theoretical complexity is such that it is very surprising that this particular
understanding of medical law only marginally discusses it. See, for example, the very brief account ofM. Davies,
1998, pp. 10-12.
35 The most controversial of which seems to refer to the problem of the validity of the legal system and has
initiated the well-known debate between positivistic and natural law theories.
36 For an analysis of the importance of finality for the law, see N. MacCormick, 2005, chapter 13.
37 For further discussion of this arguably contestable point see J. Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2004).
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cannot be that the subject matter of medical law is the legal tackling of problems of
medical ethics, for the reasons presented so far. As a result, further investigation is
necessary; the subsequent part of the chapter continues the inquiry by focusing on the
next major proposition regarding the subject matter of medical law.
2) Medical law and human rights.
a) Preliminary remarks.
Arguably, the most popular doctrinal proposition regarding the core of medical law
relates the discipline to the realm of human rights. Once again, the starting point is that
medical law should be perceived as a legal response to a morally "sensitive" context,38
which here takes a very specific form: it emanates from the realisation that the patient is
the weakest party of medical interactions and that she is actually sensitive to an array of
possible ways of exploitation.39 This specific concern differentiates this proposition from
the one advocating the general orientation of medical law to the domain of medical
ethics and confers on it a much more concrete character. Instead of a variety of ethical
considerations, the main stake here is the demand to protect the patient,40 a demand so
fundamental that necessitates a thorough exploration of the range of potentially
protective measures.
The first step towards securing protection is to ascertain that the power to
determine what will take place should rest with the patient. This could recompense for
her weaker status, since, being able to decide for herself, the patient acquires control over
her own fate. However, this idea represents simply a desirable state of affairs and an
actual protective mechanism must be invoked to secure it. At this point, the legal system
is summoned as the obvious protector and it is asked to validate this moral stake with its
particular prescriptive force. Since decision-making is the main issue, the obvious
tendency is to highlight the importance of the values of self-determination and
autonomy41 and to ensure that the law guarantees that patients ultimately decide for
38 For the argument that this approach can be seen as a particularised version of the general concern regarding the
ethics ofmedical practice, see T.K. Hcrvey and J.V. MacHale, 2004, pp. 23ff.
39 The description of the patient as "a vulnerable object of exploitation" is indeed quite old. See, for instance, T.
Parsons, The Social System (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951), p. 445.
40 1 refer here to the core of the proposition alone; this can be expanded towards the need to protect not only
patients, but also foetuses or even other parties.
41 The literature regarding autonomy and its connection with self-determination is immense; very thorough insights
can be found in A. McCall-Smith, "Beyond Autonomy" (1997) 14(23) Journal of Contemporary Health and
Policy 23; T.E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); G. Dworkin,
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themselves.42 It is exactly this need that justifies the appeal of an inherently protective
tool of the legal system, namely the human rights apparatus, and explains the recasting of
the issue as a quest for a right to self-determination.43 This is not a random choice; the
whole argument is based on the belief that the system of human rights can provide
significant protection because it has emerged, historically, as a shield against the abusive
power of the exploitative state and, thus, seems to guarantee a higher level of protection
than the ordinary correlations of rights and duties of private law,44 which of course
remain relevant.45
From this starting point, almost all the aspects of medical practice can be recast
as loci of potential infringements of the human rights of the patient. Authors like Ian
Kennedy, Andrew Grubb, Margaret Brazier and others46 have pursued this line of
argument and have identified, admittedly to different degrees of explicitness, medical law
as a sub-category of human rights lawf In other words, medical law is the organised
crystallisation of the application of the human rights apparatus on the practice of
medicine. In the course of time, the relevant arguments have gone beyond the original
focus, namely the right to self-determination, and have integrated human rights in a
detailed manner into the sphere of medicine, exploring in its generality the possibility of
human rights infringements and the significance of a wide set of specific rights. Within
this framework of expansion, Brazier has identified four potential loci of human rights
concern, namely the patients' entitlement to treatment, their involvement in the choice of
The Theory and Practice ofAutonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); C.M. Cluvert and B. Gert,
Philosophy in Medicine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
42 This is why J. Montgomery has argued that the proposition I am discussing has emerged as a response to a social
atmosphere of "highly rational ethical consumerism". In his view, and given that decision-making is the main
issue, the question is translated into who will have the power to rationally make a choice of ethical significance.
See, in details his "Medical Law in the Shadow of Hippocrates" (1989) 52 MLR 566.
43 The importance of self-determination as a plateau of significant tension regarding who has the authority and the
autonomy to make decisions within the doctor-patient relationship has been thoroughly discussed by J. Katz in The
Silent World ofDoctor and Patient (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, first published by First
Free Press, 1984), especially in pp. 85-86.
44 For the argument that the human rights apparatus has become so popular because it is something more than the
system of ordinary rights, see M. Brazier, Medicine, Patients and the Law (3rd edition, London: Penguin Books,
2003), p. 28.
45 For the protective remedies that can be found within private law, see J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (2nd
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 74ff.
46 See, amongst many others, I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), chapter 20,
again I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, 2000, pp. 3ff, M. Brazier, 2003 and S. McLean, Old Law, New Medicine: Medical
Ethics and Human Rights (New York: Pandora, 1999). Important contributions can also be found in B. Toebes,
"The Right to Health" in A. Eide et al. (eds.), Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001);
J. Mann et al., "Health and Human Rights" (1994) 1 Journal ofHealth and Human Rights 7; L. Westerhall and C.
Phillips (eds.), Patients' Rights: Informed Consent, Access and Equality (Stockholm: Nerenius and Santerus,
1994); M. Brazier, "Rights and Health Care" in R. Blackburn (ed.), Rights ofCitizenship (London: Mansell, 1993).
471 am not implying that these authors neglect in their work other possible aspects of medical law; whatever is said
in this section refers strictly to their proposal regarding the proper conceptualisation of the discipline.
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treatment, the role of the state and the commercial interests within modern medicine,48
which according to her summarise the key areas ofmedical law.
The attention of these authors rests on legal concepts overtly related with the
protection of the patient and, quite naturally, with legal provisions directly concerned
with human rights, like the Human Rights Act 1998 and a set of European and
International Conventions that also provide human rights protection.49 Additionally, they
investigate in general the apparatus of public law, which is also understood as a means
for achieving individual freedom and self-determination, against possible abuses.
Essentially, what matters for the whole argument is the combination of patients' rights
with the need to scrutinise intensely what doctors and other health professionals do,
since their actions can constitute a source of potential infringements. Through the
gradual realisation of the idea that the power of doctors is not beyond control, it is hoped
that the patients will be free of abuses and, more generally, of any kind of misconduct. In
this respect, this approach represents an essentially political agenda, which addresses a
particular imbalance of power.50 Ultimately, it is hoped that through the involvement of
the human rights apparatus, the fulfilment of the patients' reasonable expectations from
doctors and health care professionals will be guaranteed.51
In order to evaluate critically the validity of this complex argument, it is necessary
to take a step back, and to explore its sociological and political background in depth.
Having established that, it will be possible to further clarify not only the assumptions that
serve as the basis of the argument, but also its exact substance. My critique will follow on
that basis.
b) The socio-political background of the argument.
To a very significant extent, the occurrence of this definitional proposition "parallels" a
set of different, but interconnected social processes that refer to the social status of
professional medicine and to the general social atmosphere within which it is practised.
One could identify two main background developments, which inform this proposition:
48 See M. Brazier, 2003, p. 17.
49 For an analysis of the relevant provisions emanating from the institutions of the European Union, see T. K.
Hervey and J.V. MacHale, 2004, pp. 24ff; for the international framework of protection, see J. Mann et al., Health
and Human Rights: a Reader (London: Routledge, 1999), passim.
50 Let me stress once again that this is rarely expressed in explicit terms.
51
For the kind of expectations that develop within the doctor-patient relationship, especially in terms of the impact
that the status of the doctor has on them, see M. Brazier, 2003, p. 6.
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the first is the integration ofmedicine into the realm of science and the second is the rise
of individualism.
i. Medicine as science.
In the course of history, professional medicine has been the subject of various
"metamorphoses"52 that differentiated its scope, its practice and its social status.53 For
contemporary medicine the most defining of these transformations is its gradual
integration into the realm of science. To practise medicine is no longer a technical skill,
which only complements in various degrees of efficiency the eventualities of fate.54
Rather, it has become the actualisation of a particular domain of science, it is based on
scientific knowledge and it assumes that the practitioner, the doctor, is an expert
scientist. This integration of medicine into science has tied the fate of the latter to the
fate of the former to such a significant degree that the societal status of medicine
parallels completely the societal status of science, as this is defined by the public and
scholarly understandings ofwhat science is about.
To be more exact, the intricate linkage between medicine and science has
generated a set of effects, which have significandy altered the social standing of
professional medicine. For the purposes ofmy discussion, I am interested in particular in
a crucial "double effect". This effect is the tangible result of medicine becoming
ingrained into science and it is directly rooted in the steady differentiation of the status of
the domain of science that has occurred during the last quarter of the 20th century and
beyond. The transformation that I am talking about refers mainly to the perception of
science in society: it can crudely be defined as the gradual withering away of the idea that
science is a neutral enterprise that can undoubtedly contribute to human flourishing, in
favour of the idea that science is value-laden and that it has its dark sides, in the sense
that scientific developments also have negative consequences.55 Therefore, science
should not only be applauded but also scrutinised as any other human enterprise. The
52 I borrow the term from D. Morgan, 2001, pp. 13ff.
53 For an introduction to the history of medicine, see J. Katz, 2002; T. Amundsen, "Physician, Patient and
Malpractice: An Historical Perspective" in H. Engelhardt and S. Spicker (eds.), The Law-Medicine Relation: A
Philosophical Exploration (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1978) and E. Freidson, Profession ofMedicine: a Study
ofthe Sociology ofApplied Knowledge (New York: Harper Row, 1970).
54 This differentiation is usually depicted as the transformation of medicine "from art into science". See, S.
McLean, 1999, pp. 5ff and for further analysis J. Katz, 2002, p. xlvii. Also, regarding a more thorough
philosophical foundation of the difference between art and science, see J. Finnis, "Natural Law and Legal
Reasoning" in R.P. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp.
134-157, at pp. 139ff.
55 For this transformation, see in details M. David, Science in Society (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2005),
especially chapter 3 with many further references.
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mirroring of this transformation into the realm of medicine takes the following form:
whereas the "traditionally" positive social perception of "objective" science had very
beneficial consequences for the social status of medicine and especially for the power
that the profession enjoys, the recent and ongoing intensification of science's scrutiny
has also put the practice ofmedicine under scrutiny.
Both aspects of this effect are very significant for the definitional proposition
that I am discussing here and especially the accumulation of power by the medical
profession.56 Accordingly, I will first investigate the issue of power in depth and then I
will come back to the issue of scrutiny.
In order to investigate how scientific medicine is linked with power one needs to
clarify the possible loci of power within the practice of medicine. Arguably, two such loci
can be identified. The first is situated in the actual interaction between a doctor and a
patient. The second refers to the general social status of the two parties. In both cases the
key concept is control; in both cases the doctor is able to exercise control over the
patient and, thus, she is in a position of power. Additionally, in both cases this control is
linked with knowledge, in the sense that it is the scientific nature of the doctor's knowledge
that generates her power to control the patient, as it is the lack of such knowledge that
ultimately weakens the patient. To be more specific, in the first case the doctor has direct
power over the patient, by being able to interfere, often in a very intrusive manner, with
the "physical" aspect of human nature, namely with the physiological and anatomical
status of the body.57 In the second case, the situation is subtler and the power indirect,
although no less significant: the doctor, by defining the condition of the patient and by
opining on how she is supposed to behave in order to recover, generates a particular
status for her, essentially transforming her into a patient. It is after the intervention of a
doctor that an individual, who until this point of time simply suffers from certain
symptoms, becomes a patient and has to face the social consequences that this new role
invites.58 These consequences vary according to the exact condition of the patient and to
56 Although in the course of the discussion it would be more accurate to distinguish between the power that the
medical profession enjoys as a profession and the power that individual doctors enjoy as individuals, I prefer, for
simplification reasons, not to deal with this distinction.
57 Obviously, this is not the case with recent developments on the provision of medical services, where medical
diagnosis and advising can occur through the Internet.
58 The idea that to be ill and identified as being a patient is not simply a biological state, but essentially a social
state has been thoroughly analysed by T. Parsons, 1951, pp. 428ff. and in his "The Sick Role and the Role of the
Physician Reconsidered" (1970) 53 (3) Health and Society 257. Also, see A. Radley, Making Sense of Illness: the
Social Psychology ofHealth and Disease (London: Sage, 1994), E.L. Idler, "Definitions of health and illness and
medical sociology" (1979) 13A Social Science and Medicine 723 and L. Eisenberg, "Disease and Illness:
distinctions between professional and popular ideas of sickness" (1977) 1 Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 9.
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lay perceptions,59 but in any case it is the doctor who has defined this new status and has
been in charge of this socially significant transformation.
So, what is the impact of the emergence of scientific medicine on these power
structures? Regarding the first plateau of power, two issues are crucial. The first is that
scientific medicine takes on board the pace of the development of science in general; it is
informed and shaped by rapid scientific innovations, which become part of medical
practice by augmenting both the scope and the potential of the technical apparatus of
medicine. Scientific developments have given doctors the opportunity to act in a much
more complicated, multi-dimensional and sophisticated manner, and have enabled them
to deal with the human body in a much more substantial way. Additionally, they have
undoubtedly increased the possibility of achieving the desirable aims, by enhancing the
chances of success through multiplying the quality of techniques and the possible
alternatives/" The second point is that the doctor has gradually become an expert
practitioner, namely a privileged professional who deals with a particular subcategory of
scientific knowledge. This kind of knowledge is perceived as a terrain of expertise that only
professionals, being carriers of expert knowledge and skill, can turn into action.61
Accordingly, doctors acquire at least a moderate monopoly in delivering health-related
services and in practising medicine, which now becomes an area of socially significant
practice designated almost exclusively for them.62 Naturally, this achievement is
conditioned upon a set of social strategies on the basis of which professional monopoly
is indeed established. One can refer to several examples like the use of technical expertise
on the basis of which the profession itself defines the standards that judge the
competence of its members,63 even when institutional arrangements that attempt to
59 See C. Herzlich and J. Pierret, Illness and Self in Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
60 I am not implying here that it is self-evident that modern medicine can be proud for achieving a high level of
success alone. On the contrary, it has been plausibly argued that medicine is not the only source of the benefits that
it claims as its own. For arguments that stress factors like sanitation, lifestyle changes and environmental concerns
as importantly contributing to the amelioration of the health of populations, see T. McKeown, The Role of
Medicine (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), I. Kennedy, The Unmasking ofMedicine (London: Allen and Unwin,
1981), pp. 19ff and J. Gray, Beyond the New Right (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 162ff. Even within these lines
though, my point is that the emergence of scientific medicine increased the chances of success.
61 This does not mean that a claim of expert knowledge totally immunises the profession from public control.
Especially when medical "scandals" become public knowledge, a crisis in public trust occurs that has deleterious
effects for the status of the profession. For such an implication see in detail, J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p.
14.
62 This monopolisation of medical expertise is a key factor in understanding the social perception related to the
exact status of the professions linked with medical practice. For analysis of the question of professional monopoly
see the classic discussion in M. Weber, Economy and Society, (London: University of California Press, 1978), pp.
341-343. For further analysis from the perspective of the sociology of the professions see D. Blane, "Health
Professions" in G. Scambler (ed.), Sociology as Applied to Medicine (4th edition, Edinburgh: W.B. Saunders
Company, 1997), pp. 212-214; M.S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: a Sociological Analysis (Berkeley:
University ofCalifornia Press, 1977), pp. 31-39 and R. Murphy, Social Closure (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
63 For this strategy, see in details, E. Friedson, 1970.
31
enhance external scrutiny are in place;64 the establishment of a system of specialised
education and training;65 the particular significance of certification and credentials for the
practice of medicine etc.66 In any case, what is crucial is that as to the first plateau of
medical power, scientific medicine has increased what doctors can do and has vested
them with the advantage of being the professional group that enjoys a privileged position
regarding the relevant practice.
Without ignoring the analysis of the intensification of the direct power of
doctors, it is the impact of science on the second plateau of medical power that has
attracted much more attention and scepticism, namely the indirect power of the doctor
to define the "sick status" of the patient. Far from being simply a biological condition,
health and illness are socially significant statuses, which have a direct effect on the
individual's social experiences.67 This being the case, the transition from a state of health
to a state of illness is an important social transformation that raises questions of how and
under what conditions it happens. Sociological approaches to medicine focus exacdy on
this transition and, stressing again the more-than-biological nature of health and illness,
conclude that it is the outcome of a process of constant evaluation and decision-making,
according to which symptoms, diseases and treatments are classified and perpetually re¬
examined under particular conceptions of what counts or should count as pathological.68
The main issue here is that the individual in control of this process of evaluation is the
doctor who by exercising this evaluation assumes the power to define the social status of
the patient.
The integration of medicine into science has increased further this already
significant power. To begin with, one has to consider the socially legitimate, self-
validating nature of the realm of science. Especially during the domination of traditional
notions of "objective" science, there existed a general assumption in favour of its
64 For the most recent developments regarding these arrangements in the UK, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie,
2005, pp. 15ff.
65 See R. Murphy, 1988 and M.S. Larson, 1977, p. 68.
66 For this point, see K.M. MacDonald, The Sociology ofthe Professions (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 161-162.
67 It is interesting to notice here that the World Health Organisation defines health as a "state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of infirmity". See World Health Organisation, The
Constitution (Geneva: WHO, 1948).
68 For the "evaluative" nature of the concepts of health, disease and illness, see I. Kennedy, 1981, pp. 2-7. This
point is simply an aspect of the debate regarding the conceptual ambiguity of these notions; for an introduction to
the debate, see C. Boorse, "On the distinction between health and disease" (1975) Philosophy Affairs 5; K.W.M.
Fulton, Moral theory and medical practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 25ff; G.W.
Bradley, Disease, Diagnosis & Decisions (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), pp. 1-22; C. Nordenfelt, "On the
relevance and importance of the notion of disease" (1993) 14 Theoretical Medicine 15; also the contributions in
note 58. For arguments against the practical usefulness of this understanding of health and illness see S. Fluss,
"The Development of National Health Legislation in Europe: The Contribution of International Organisations"
(1995) 2 European Journal ofHealth Law 193 and L. Gostin and Z. Lazzarini, Human Rights and Public Health in
the AIDS Pandemic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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(nowadays hugely contested) value-free nature, whereas its status was based on a kind of
"pure", scientific knowledge.69 Science was supposed to deal solely with the "objective
reality" by investigating concrete physical phenomena, and existed beyond the impact of
contextual experiences.70 Thus, its high significance was essentially sustained on the basis
that it does not entail processes of subjective evaluations, but only instances of expert
competence. Within this framework, the gradual assimilation of medicine into science
has attached to medicine all these postulations and has vested medicine with a kind of a
mainstream scientific ideology;71 traditionally, scientific medicine is also seen as a value-
free enterprise, which deals only with the biological and physical aspects of health72 and
which is ultimately based on the scientific competence of the expert doctor. This
ideology although already under challenge, still persists and obscures the social aspects of
health and illness. As a result the potential for scrutinising the evaluative decisions of
what counts as pathological remains in a significant degree hindered.73 Thus, the power
of doctors to define the social status of patients is still very real, but because of the
founding assumptions of scientific medicine it is often a neglected power that possibly
may escape scrutiny: doctors are even now much more free from the constraints of
accountability, at least in comparison with other professions, especially in terms of non-
scientific criteria of competence.74
This assertion becomes even more significant if one considers the rapid
expansion of what counts as medically significant into areas that were traditionally
understood as being outside the medical domain. The most obvious example is that of
procreation: although infertility was always understood as an eventuality attributed to
fate, nowadays it is perceived as a treatable pathological condition, which calls for
medical involvement. Other examples include the focus on life choices, the aesthetics of
69 For a presentation of arguments against this traditional view, see S. McLean, 1999, chapter 1, with additional
references and also R. Murphy, 1988, pp. 246-247 where he discusses the problem of scientific knowledge more
generally.
70 For these points, see U. Franklin, "New Threats to Human Rights Through Science and Technology: The Need
for Standards" in K.E. Mahoney and P. Mahoney (eds.), Human Rights in the 21s' Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1993); also, I. Kennedy, 1981, p. 22.
71 This is why it has been argued that the growth of the professions is contingent upon the advent of an "objective"
type of knowledge, which appears to be independent from its socio-cultural context. For this point, see E. Gellner,
Plough, Sword and Book (London: Collins Harvill, 1988), pp. 51-52.
72 This is usually referred to as the "mechanical" or "engineering" model of health and illness, which is based on
the idea that the human body is healthy when it functions properly, whereas illness is a state of malfunction,
emerging due to a specific breakdown (disease) that has to be treated. For an analysis of the main elements of this
model, see S. Nettleton, The Sociology ofHealth and Illness (Polity Press, 1995), pp. 3ff.
73 It has been argued that this is because the idea of scrutiny is attached to particular contexts, whereas science was
linked with pure, non-contextual general knowledge. See in details S. McLean, 1999, p. 15.
74 See S. McLean, 1999, p. 7. Additionally, this lack of accountability could further be explained in terms of
lingering elements from the pre-scientific status of medicine, like faith, silence etc. For this point, see J. Katz,
2002, p. 45.
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the human body, giving rise to the advent of cosmetic surgery, and even the exploration
of genetic identity for various purposes.75 This process, usually referred to as
"medicalisation", is the outcome of a general social transformation, and can be explained
in terms of a variety of reasons, like the professional need to define expansively a medical
market76 and the modernistic tendency to use the flexible concepts of health and illness
as governmental strategies, by which populations and individuals are monitored and
managed.77 The emergence of scientific medicine was also an important development in
this respect, since it allowed medicine to gain from the pace of scientific developments
and to become enriched with new techniques. This facilitated the process of
medicalisation, by increasing the range of options that constitute the modem apparatus
ofmedicine and with it the possibility of its expansion.
To summarise the point so far, the integration of medicine into science has
increased the power that doctors already enjoyed, in a variety of ways that refer both to
the direct and the indirect aspects of this power. Yet an interesting question emerges
here: given the arguments regarding the self-legitimating ideology of science in
accordance with its traditional status, how is it possible to recognise the power of the
doctors and also to make sense of it as problematic? The answer to this question brings
us back to the second aspect of the double effect that I identified at the beginning of this
section. Exactly because science steadily loses its very privileged societal status, its
ideological structures also lose their impact. Especially as the idea that science as such
must now be scrutinised gains in popularity and becomes part of a novel understanding
of what science is about, the fate of professional medicine also changes. The power that
doctors enjoy is still there; however, the possibility of challenging this power is now
socially registered and therefore voices in favour of the need to scrutinise the practice of
medicine can proliferate. In this respect, the double effect of the integration of medicine
into science is intimately linked with the definitional proposition that I am discussing,
since it is connected both with the power of doctors and with the need for control over
this power.
75 In a sense, these examples demonstrate that gradually even the speculative risk of facing an illness, or just an
undesirable event have become medically relevant. For this point, see I. Kennedy, 1981.
76 Which of course happens in parallel with developments in the relevant industries, like the market created by
pharmaceutical companies.
77 This point is linked with the concept of "governmental ity", primary developed by M. Foucault in
"Govermentality" in G. Burchell et al (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Hemel Hempstead:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); see also his The Birth of the Clinic: an Archaelogy of the Medical Profession
(London: Tavistock, 1976); I.K. Zola "Medicine as an Institution of Social Control" (1972) 20 Sociological
Review 487; B.S. Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowledge, 1987.
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Nevertheless, the advent of scientific medicine is not the only social development
that has inspired this definition of medical law. Of equal importance was the gradual
occurrence of a social tendency in favour of individualism to which I will now turn my
attention.
ii. The rise of individualism and the emergence ofthe human rights discourse.
No social transformation takes place in a vacuum; whatever happens is shaped by the
general social context within which it happens, and which both determines and is
determined by this environment. In the case of medicine, its linkage with science came
about during the course of modernity and had to co-exist with all the significant features
of this historical period. Therefore, it exists within a network of influences and develops
only in relation to those influences.
From all the possible aspects of the network of ideas and events that constitutes
modernity, the approach I am discussing is primarily inspired by individualism; especially
by particular understandings of this notion, which have determined, to a very significant
extent, fundamental perceptions of western, post-war capitalist societies.78 The use of the
plural here is not mistaken: the matrix of ideas that are linked with individualism belongs
to a number of traditions (the most prominent of which is liberalism),79 that co-
determine what individualism is about. For instance, traditional notions of modernity
insist on a sharp distinction between the individual and the state, whereas theories of late
modernity rework this distinction in accordance with the particularities of risk society.80
However, and leaving the perplexities of this debate aside, a "core" of individualism can
be identified: this is the assumption that the basic unit of the social is the individual. This
latter has to be understood as an autonomous agent, abstracted from any particular
historical and social circumstances at the outset. From this premise, a whole edifice of
ideas develops, primarily oriented to the assertion that social progress can only be
achieved through individual flourishing. Consequently, the individual assumes intrinsic
78
Individualism is a very complex philosophical theory, which comprises a huge variety of trends and arguments,
not always coherent and non-conflicting. The relevant analysis escapes the purposes of this chapter, but a useful
introduction can be found in N. Barry, An Introduction to Modern Political Theory (4th edition, London:
MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000), pp. llff and in S. Aniveri and A. De-Shalit (eds.), Communitarianism and
Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also, very informative is the discussion of J. Rawls in his
classic work ,4 Theory ofJustice (revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
79 For an analysis of the current views on liberalism, see N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and
Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chapter 3.
80 For further analysis, see Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 30ff.
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value, her interests must be respected and her well-being within the social network is of
crucial importance. What matters primarily is the individual.
Within this framework, power, and especially its concentration in specific agents,
has unsurprisingly been regarded with suspicion, as it carries with it the potential of
abusive use and ultimately of exploitation of individuals. The obvious reaction is that the
individual must be protected from constellations of power, through a process of constant
scrutiny. Since in the course of modernity the state became the major holder of power,
this sensitivity was transformed into a general concern of protection against possibly
abusive state activities and the primary aim was to develop mechanisms to counter state
power.
Against this background, ideas emanating from the tradition of natural law and
from the humanistic premises of the Enlightenment were combined with the rigid,
conceptual categorisations of the codified continental legal systems and paved the way to
the rise of the system of human rights.81 To be more precise, the combination of the
concept of a legal right (namely someone's claim that correlates with someone else's
duty),82 with the primary significance that the abstract individual has acquired as this has
become expressed in developing humanistic values and principles, gave rise to the new
concept of "universal", "human" rights. These are rights special in character, which aim
at protecting the individual against the state, by designating particular areas of individual
freedom, within which the state cannot interfere, or at least not without justification.
That is why these rights were characterized as negative or protective rights. Yet, in the course
of time this original conception of human rights developed into a much more general
system, which defines the relationship between the state and the individual in its entirety
and which focuses not only on the issue of protection, but also on the more general
problem of the well-being of the individual, especially since in modern societies it is very
much the state that co-determines the living conditions of individuals. Therefore, it is no
longer the case that human rights are simply negative rights. A new generation of rights
has emerged, the so-called social rights, in terms of which it is demanded from the state
not only to abstain from interference, but also positively to act in order to enhance the
81
Obviously, the length of the literature regarding the emergence of human rights is immense. For a very compact
presentation, I will refer to M. Freeman, "The Philosophical Foundations of Fluman Rights" (1994) 16 Human
Rights Quarterly 502. See also J. Waldron, Theories of Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); C.
Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chapter 2; J.
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: Cornell University Press, 1989).
82 I borrow this definition of a legal right by the classic analysis of W. Hohfeld, especially in Fundamental Legal
Conceptions (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1923); for further analysis, see F.M. Kamm,
"Rights" in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 476ff.
36
life conditions of individuals. This happens in a twofold way: by providing particular
services to the citizens and by allowing their participation in the decision-making
processes through the realisation of political rights, this being a third step in the gradual
expansion of the human rights apparatus. Accordingly, the system of human rights
consists nowadays of negative, social and political rights.83
The most important outcome of this historical expansion of human rights is that
it transformed a special legal structure into a much wider system of perception of reality,
quite dominant in modern societies. Human rights have become a discourse, namely a
complete conceptual system, according to which problems are framed and reality is
defined. Being a discourse, it is something beyond mere legal categories; it is expressed in
a plurality of ways,84 which naturally include normative provisions of even constitutional
status, but also political declarations, projects of action, and, quite often, lay perceptions.
Its rhetorical force is enormous; and although, its actual significance can be contested, it
seems that currently almost everything is or can be recast in terms of human rights.
Within such an atmosphere it is not surprising that a wide range of events has come to
be understood as human rights infringements. To summarise, the modern system of
human rights, originating from particular individualistic concerns, currently consists of a
plurality of elements and structures, and has become a "culture" on its own,85 a kind of a
"vernacular language",86 which insists on protecting individuals and groups from abusive
power and on cherishing positively certain fundamental, humanitarian values.
c) Refining the human rights argument.
On the basis of the socio-political background just described, it is not difficult to see why
the human rights discourse was employed to counter the advent of scientific medicine
83
For the emergence of three generations of human rights, see the analysis in C. Tomuschat, 2003, chapter 3; C.
Wellman, "Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights" (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 639 and J. Donelly,
"Human Rights, Democracy and Development" (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 608. Also, although from a
different theoretical perspective, see J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
84 For an introduction to this point, see R. Bcddard, Human Rights and Europe (Cambridge: Grotius Publications,
1993); A. Robertson and J. Merrils, Human Rights in Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); L.
Betten and N. Grief, EU Law and Human Rights (London: Longman, 1998); T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, 2004,
pp. 24-25.
8 The idea that the system of human rights has become a particular culture, within which specific ideals are
actualised has generated a very sophisticated debate regarding the ideal context of this culture, especially in the
light of those rights that promote values like mutuality, interdependency, community etc. For a helpful overview,
see I. Ward, "The Echo of a Sentimental Jurisprudence" (2002) 13 Law and Critique 107, pp. 116ff; F. Klug,
Values for a Godless Age: The Story of the United Kingdom's New Bill of Rights (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
2000); C. Wellman, 2000; S. Sedley, "Human Rights: A Twenty-First Century Agenda" (1995) Public Law 386.
86 1 borrow this term from M. Loughlin's, The Idea ofPublic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), where
it is used to describe a similar effect of the public law.
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and thus to inform significandy the proposition I am discussing.87 Since in the era of
scientific medicine the power vested in doctors is increased, the individual patient runs a
true risk of becoming a victim of exploitation and abuse. Given that the view that power
in general must be scrutinised constitutes now a dominant political ideal, it follows that
the power of the medical profession must also be scrutinised. That is why human rights
are called upon. As the apparatus of human rights (both as a legal category and as a
discourse) seem to be an efficient mechanism in countering the assimilation of abusive
power and in generally enhancing the general well-being of individuals, it makes sense to
maintain that the same apparatus should be the corner-stone for the regulation of
medical practice, even though the "danger" here emanates not from the state directly but
from a professional group. From the point of view of the doctrine, a plausible conclusion
is that medical law is indeed a sub-category of human rights law.
Essentially, this conclusion can be read as a "political" claim: it endorses the
tradition of liberal individualism, accepts the primacy of the interests of the individual
patient, highlights the potential perils of medicalisation and provides an understanding of
medical law compatible with the project of liberating patients from possible abuses, using
human rights as a protective device. It is based very much on the rhetorical force of the
human rights discourse and insists on a higher level of protection than the one possible
according to the "ordinary" rights of private law. Also, in tune with the expansion of the
human rights discourse, it goes beyond the original idea of negative rights alone and
gradually takes on board social rights too. In this respect, it examines how the human
rights apparatus can be fused in the context of medical practice and it does so with a
twofold orientation: namely to explore how protection can be achieved within the direct
interactions between doctors and patients, and also to consider how the state conditions
the delivery of health services on the basis of which medical practice is essentially
substantiated and direct doctor-patient interactions are very much determined.88 To do
so, it investigates the normative provisions that promote human rights in the particular
context of health and focuses on instruments such as domestic legislation, international
treaties and political declarations that promote negative and social rights.89
87 This is not to say that other factors did not contribute to it: as with the previous definitional proposition, what
happened during the Second World War (which significantly influenced the European Convention of Human
Rights in 1950) was also immensely important.
88
So, both negative and social rights are significant, although the latter function on the periphery of the main focus
that remains the doctor-patient relationship with its possibilities of abusive power.
89 The normative sources that relate the system of human rights with the sphere of medicine have rapidly grown.
For a presentation of these sources, their provisions, and ultimately the particular rights that are significant in the
context of health, see amongst others G. Annas, "The Function of Legal Rights in the Health Care Setting" in H.
Engelhardt and S. Spicker (eds.), The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration (Dordrecht: Reidel
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So far, I have identified the general characteristics of the argument that medical
law is a sub-category of human rights. Nevertheless, this still remains a crude statement.
It seems to me that this general proposition may have two possible meanings, which in
turn may establish two different versions of it. I will call the first one the hard version and
the second the soft version.
Taking on board the gradual sophistication of the human rights discourse and the
constant emergence of normative, legal pronouncements that directly regulate human
rights issues, the hard version would take the following form: medical law would be
identifiable as exactly the area of the legal system that crystallises this normative output.
To be precise, medical law can be understood as the sum of human rights regulation that
refers to medical scenarios; it is in essence human rights law as applied to medicine. This is
a hard version of the proposition as it is faithful to a direct and explicit orientation to
human rights law. As a result, it is a concrete and purely legal version, since it essentially
refers to the legal categories that constitute medical law and to the rhetorical force of the
human rights discourse. That is why in considering its plausibility it is necessary to
engage in a technical, essentially legal, analysis. Accordingly, it is simultaneously a hard
and narrow version of the general proposition
On the contrary, a soft version of the account would not insist so much on legal
categorisations. Rather, it would focus on the system of guiding principles that the
human rights discourse entails, and would highlight that this system serves as the basic
conceptual component of medical law both in terms of identifying the actual problems
that fall within the discipline and in terms of running across the solutions that the legal
system produces. The aspirations of the human rights discourse should serve as a
prevailing "ethos" for medical law,90 as a guiding orientation that renders the discipline
meaningful and as an organising principle of all the relevant material. This is a more
conceptually-oriented version of the general proposition that is moderate in the sense
that it does not limit itself only to the specific categorisations of human rights law; also, it
is a wide one, since it allows for diversity and flexibility as to the precise way in which the
law gives content to human rights aspirations.
In the next section, I am going to provide a critique of both these versions. All
the arguments that I am going to present are significant to both of them. However, what
I am calling constitutional and empirical objections are more important for the hard
Publishing, 1978); J.M. Mann et al., 1994 and T.K. Hervey and J.V. McHale, 2004, where they particularly
discuss the impact of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 and of the Fluman Rights Act 1998.
90 1 am borrowing the term "ethos" from the analysis in J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 45.
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version, because they primarily advance some explicidy legal and empirical
considerations. By the same token, the conceptual concern refers primarily to the soft
version of the account, since it challenges the conceptual background of the human
rights ethos within medicine.
d) The critique.
i. The constitutional objection.
This objection originates from a particular characteristic of the human rights system,
namely the fact that notwithstanding its particular content, human rights have
traditionally been understood as rights against or in reference to the state and its agents.
In this respect they describe a "vertical" relation, which includes the individual on the
one hand, and the state on the other.91 The constitutional objection, here, is that this
verticality has to be taken seriously. Any attempt to apply the human rights apparatus in
the particular context ofmedicine has to consider that verticality entails that the patient is
to be protected against the state. This would not be problematic only if medical practice
was totally within the control of the state. However, in modern western societies this is
rarely the case. The reality of medical practice assumes both state related and private
providers ofmedical services, the exact balance between the two being determined by the
political, social and fiscal particularities of each country. In the UK, a mixed system is
achieved through the combination of public institutions related to the NHS, which
substantiates the government's obligation to provide medical services,92 with a rapidly
augmenting private sector, which is comprised of a variety of agents, ranging from
individual health care professionals to large private hospitals.93 Leaving aside the exact
structure of the whole system,94 the problem remains that, because of verticality, the
human rights apparatus can be involved only when a patient is treated within the
framework of the NHS, since only then the state is involved. On the contrary, whenever
medical services are provided within the private domain, the appeal to human rights
seems to be unfounded, since there is no state involvement. Along these lines, the main
91 The idea of "verticality" essentially invokes some version of a political philosophy of classical liberalism, and is
also linked with individualism. For a further exploration of this point, see D. Dyzenhaus, "The New Positivists"
(1989)39 UTU361.
92 For further analysis of this point, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 51-53.
93 For a detailed presentation of the how the delivery of medical care is structured within the UK, see J.
Montgomery, 2003, pp. 8Iff, with further references.
94
Especially in the UK, one can identify further perplexities, given that privatisation gradually "penetrates" the
NHS. For this process, see A.M. Pollock, NHSpic: The Privatisation ofOur Health Care (London: Verso, 2004).
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constitutional objection that the human rights argument is bound to answer is the
potential exclusion from the definition of medical law of all the instances of medical
practice that do not involve the state.
It goes without saying that this is an over-simplified statement. It is based on the
premise that human rights are only capable of vertical application and have no impact
whatsoever when the private domain is involved. Although this was the traditional
position, the gradual accumulation of power by private bodies and institutions has
generated a tendency towards the possibility of utilising the human rights apparatus also
in private, "horizontal" relations. The possibility takes the human rights system away
from the citizen/state relationship and locates them to any relationship that structurally
integrates the possibility of abusive power, even though it is still the state the is ultimately
responsible for the protection of individuals.95
The debate regarding the horizontal application of human rights is still very acute
and a range of contested options is presented. Essentially, the possibilities range from a
rigid insistence on verticality96 to an unqualified acceptance of horizontality,97 the
underlying issue being the accepted degree of preserving the integrity of the private
sphere. Within these two extremes, several moderate versions of a mixture of the two has
been proposed,98 the most popular of which seems to be the so-called "indirect"
horizontality, according to which the human rights apparatus has direct effect only in
vertical relations, but can also indirectly affect horizontal relations, by providing
interpretative tools and conceptual influences.99 To be more precise, this idea means that
the system of human rights may provide normative guidelines even for the private
domain, on the premises that the law that governs private relations is applied as
consistently as possible with the underlying principles of the human rights apparatus. It is
exactly this assertion that captures the core of the idea of indirect horizontality.100
The significance of the need somehow to refine the rigid verticality of human
rights is apparent for the legal regulation of medical practice, especially if one considers
the private aspect of it. According to the approach that one endorses, the problem of
95 For an introduction to the relevant debate, see A. Clapham, Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993) and D. Friedmann and D. Barak-Erez (eds.), Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Ftart
Publishing, 2001).
96 For this view, see in details W.P. Marshall, "Diluting Constitutional Rights" (1985) 80 NWULRev 558.
97 For advocates of this view, see B. Slattery, "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Does it bind Private
Persons?" (1985) 63 CanBarRev 148 and A.S. Butler, "Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation: A Critique and
Comparative Analysis" (1993) 22 Anglo-American Law Review 1.
98
See, in details, M. Hunt, "The "Horizontal Effect" of the Human Rights Act" (1998) PL 422, at pp. 426ff.
99 At this level, the argument very much approximates the soft version of the doctrinal approach I am discussing.
100 In this respect, the notion of indirect horizontality is very important for the soft version of the proposition I am
discussing.
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excluding the private domain from the core of medical law can or cannot be solved. If
one is inclined to verticality the problem is irresolvable; on the contrary, if horizontality
seems more plausible, the constitutional issue can be more easily setded.
What should be kept in mind, here, is that what has been said in this section so
far simply tackles a founding issue about human rights and opens a range of theoretical
possibilities. Nevertheless, the actualisation of these possibilities has to be investigated in
particular jurisdictions, in terms of their internal point view and of their particular
normative and probably constitutional provisions within their legal system. So, the
problem cannot be practically solved by simply choosing the most plausible idea at the
theoretical level. One needs to take into account the specificities of the jurisdiction that
provides human rights protection. It is at this level only that the balance between
verticality and horizontality must be investigated, along with its outcome regarding the
actual impact of human rights on the private sphere and, for the purposes of this thesis,
on the private provision ofmedical services.
In the case of the legal system of the UK, the answer to the issue must be traced
to the legal provisions that establish the UK human rights system. Within the particular
constitutional setting of the country, these provisions are primarily to be found in the
Human Rights Act 1998. The Act incorporates the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundament Freedoms 1950 into domestic law and explicitly designates the
framework of human rights protection in the UK.101 The main effect of the Act is that all
primary and secondary legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is
compatible with convention rights (section 3(1)), and that it is unlawful for public
authorities, including courts and tribunals (section 6(3)), to act incompatibly with a
convention right, unless it is impossible to do so because of legislation (sections 6(1) and
(2)). In this respect, the Act primarily designates an obligation for public authorities and
provides that in the case of a relevant infringement, individuals can ask for judicial review
of the unlawful act, provided that they are "victims", according to section 7(1).102
Regarding the problem of vertical or horizontal application of the Human Rights
Act, the key concept is the notion of "public bodies" employed in section 6. This
provision seems to highlight that the act is primarily concerned with vertical relations and
does not allow for any direct horizontal effect. However, the absence of a definition,
101 For a detailed presentation of the Act, see J. Wadham and H. Mountfield, Blackstone's Guide to the Human
Rights Act 1998 (London: Blackstone, 1999).
102
Alternatively, the individual "victim" can rely on any other appropriate procedure.
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within the Act, of what is to be considered as a public body103 obscures the situation
especially if one considers the whole structure of the Act. As far as the context of
medicine is concerned, two issues have to be explored. The first refers to the nature of
the bodies within the NHS and their possible classification as public bodies. The second
refers to private providers of medicine and explicitly raises the issue of the potential
horizontal impact of the Act.
The first issue seems to be easily resolvable, since the idea that NHS bodies are
public bodies for the purposes of the Act is widely uncontested, on the premise that they
provide a public service and that they are essentially controlled by the state.104 Therefore,
the actions of doctors attached to the NHS in general fall within the ambit of the Act.
On the contrary, the second issue is much more problematic and is informed by the
general debate regarding the horizontal effect of the Human Rights Act. This debate is
still in the process of framing a setded account of the exact effect of the Act, with the
possibility of consensus being so far reduced only to the assertion that direct
horizontality is excluded. In an attempt to summarise this debate, it can be said that the
majority of arguments push forward one or another version of indirect horizontal
application,105 which allows, under different prerequisites, a certain expansion of the
normative horizon of the Act into the domain of private relations. For instance, Murray
Hunt argues106 that the Act must be interpreted as applying the Convention to all law,
and therefore it is not only indirectly applicable to horizontal relations, but also creates
new rights directly affecting the private sphere; G. Philhpson rebuts Hunt's arguments,
opting instead for a traditional indirect horizontal effect;1"7 relevant arguments have also
been presented by W. Wade,108 B. Markezinis,109 R. Singh110 and others.
Although the academic interest on the exact effect of the Human Rights Act
1998 is still very intense, especially from the point of view of the public law scholarship it
103 Instead of a definition, the Act simply provides some general guidelines in section 6(3)(b).
104 See the argument in I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, 2000, p. 28, J. Montgomery, 2003, p. 11 and further, the more
general analysis in N. Bamforth, "The application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to Public Authorities and Private
Bodies" (1999) CLJ 159. However, the situation seems to become much more complicated because recent
developments in the NHS point towards the gradual intensification of private contracting.
105 It must be stressed here that the very notion of horizontal application is not in itself free of ambiguity. For
instance, I. Leigh, in "Horizontal Rights, the Human Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth?"
(1999) 48 ICQL 57, has identified six possible types of horizontal effect!
106 In 1998, pp. 435ff.
107 In "The Human Rights Act, "Horizontal Effect", and the Common Law: a Bang or a Whimper?" (1999) 62
MLR 824.
108 See "The United Kingdom's Bill of Rights" in Hare and Forsyth (eds.), Constitutional Reform in the United
Kingdom: Practice and Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998).
109 See "Privacy, Freedom of Expression and the Horizontal Effect of the Human Rights Bill: Lessons from
Germany" (1999) 115 Law Quarterly Review 47.
110 See "Privacy and the Media after the Human Rights Act" (1998) EHLR 712.
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is rather surprising that the issue has been essentially neglected from the point of view of
medical law scholars. Even proponents of the linkage between medical law and human
rights have only marginally dealt with the issue, providing peripheral and under¬
developed arguments. For instance, amongst many others, Kennedy and Grubb argued111
that since the courts are themselves public bodies for the purposes of the Act, they have
a duty to act compatibly with the Convention; therefore, in dealing with a private
provider of medical services, this judicial obligation would presumably lead to an
unqualified application of convention rights, leaving aside the question of horizontality.
It seems to me that this argument begs the question, because it is exactly the range of the
impact of this judicial obligation regarding the private sphere, which is contested. Brazier
has proposed an indirect solution to the problem,112 by implying that patients may claim
that their right to a fair trial has been infringed, if the courts refuse to redress an original
claim because of the private status of the original violator. However, her argument does
not really address the issue of horizontality, but simply represents a proposal for a by¬
pass, which still remains to be tested.
This neglect in dealing essentially with the problem of horizontality, not only
leaves the sphere of private medicine in darkness at the outset, but also fails to appreciate
whether a version of indirect horizontality in this context would be enough to sustain the
original claim, that medical law is a sub-category of human rights law, as a plausible
conceptualisation. This is crucial for an additional reason: the very fact that there is not a
setded answer regarding the question of the Act's horizontal impact diminishes the very
possibility of providing a definition on this basis alone. As I argued in part (B), any
definition is based on focal points and central cases. This means that at the core of any
definitional proposition, its premises must be setded otherwise the proposed definition
cannot be sustained. This is not the case with the problem of horizontality; thus, the
contestability of the relevant views harms the relevant definition of medical law in a
fundamental way.
In any case, by not taking the constitutional objection seriously, the approach I
am discussing has singularly failed to consider the private aspects of medicine and their
expansion. By unqualifiedly assuming that the human rights apparatus is indeed a
relevant regulatory device, it has to be based on the view that medical practice is
essentially controlled by the state. It was the purpose of this section to show that this
111 In 2000, pp. 28-29.
112 See 2003, pp. 22-23.
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presupposition is, at best, unfounded and as such, a very real problem for the
identification of medical law as applied human rights law.
ii. The empirical objection.
The aim of this section is to bring the human rights argument down to earth and to
examine whether it is really the case that the actuality of medical law is shaped by the
human rights apparatus.113 Especially for the strong version of the proposition this is a
pragmatic necessity, since, for the claim to hold, it must be the case that patients have at
their disposal enforceable human rights against the providers of health services and that the
courts truly cherish these rights.114 The issue of enforceability is of primary significance,
because the initial involvement of human rights is justified exactly in terms of the actual
protection that they can offer. That is why the real operation of the system is important
for this conceptualisation of medical law. If the enforceability of human rights is
problematic in the medical context, so is the relevant delineation ofmedical law.
As far as negative human rights are concerned, it seems that any view that they
are actually enforced to protect patients would be implausible. The grievances of patients
are usually redressed through the path of private law, within which tort law (in the form
of battery and negligence) is of primary significance.115 As previously mentioned, the
ordinary rights of private law are essentially different from human rights and originating
from the pool of private relations obey the different rationality inherent to the system of
private law.116 Indeed, even the quickest of glances into the principles and concepts that
shape modern medical law, like consent to treatment as a defence to battery, the "best
interests" test when dealing with incompetent patients, over-deference to the profession
in defining what counts as best interests etc., indicates that considerations of human
rights law are not significantly present. Interestingly, even when these principles are being
re-assessed from a human rights perspective, they are usually deemed to be compatible
1131 need to stress, here, that this section refers exclusively with what happens at the level of domestic courts.
114 For further arguments regarding the importance of enforceability see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 67ff and also J.
McHale, "Enforcing Health Care Rights in the English Courts" in R. Burchill, D. Harris and A. Owers (eds.),
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Their Implementation in the United Kingdom (Nottingham: University of
Nottingham Human Rights Law Centre, 1999).
115 Even A. Grubb, one of the main proponents of the human rights argument agrees that the main vehicle in
protecting the right of self-determination is the tort of battery. See his "Problems of Medical Law" in B.S.
Markezinis and S.F. Deakin, Tort Law (4th edition, 1999).
116 For the specific rationality of private law, see E. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (London: Harvard
University Press, 1995).
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with human rights.117 This means that it is still private law that is used as the main
protective "device" for patients and that the additional involvement of the human rights
apparatus does not change the setting dramatically.118 In turn, this is very problematic for
the definitional proposition that I am discussing, since if human rights simply reinforce
private law there is no reason to assume that the core of medical law must be
conceptualised in accordance with them.
It may well be the case, of course, that because of the constitutional setting of the
UK, which was characterised by the absence of a clear legal protection of fundamental
human rights and the rather delayed incorporation of the European Convention through
the Human Rights Act 1998, this is a natural state of affairs, which will gradually pave the
way to a complete operationalisation of the human rights apparatus.1" Nevertheless, this
is not so self-evident. To begin with, it is not clear at all if the Act truly establishes
enforceable rights at the disposal of individuals or even if it establishes new rights at
all;120 rather, as we saw, the provisions of the Act are explicitly creating a set of
obligations for the public bodies to act in accordance with the Convention, obligations that do not
correlate necessarily with directly enforceable human rights. At a further level, it is still
very contested whether the Act will have a very significant actual impact in the medical
context. It has been claimed that this is not the way according to which the situation is
evolving and that the courts still remain reluctant in changing the principles emanating
from the common law in favour of a radically different human rights approach.121 For the
time being, it seems that this point is correct and that the occurrence of the Act has
changed very little in terms of the empirical aspect of medical jurisprudence. Of course,
this is just the present state of affairs; ultimately, it is only with the passing of time that
the issue will be concluded.
The lack of enforceability is even more apparent when one considers the case of
social rights, which refer to the state-controlled provision of medical services. Since the
main public provider of medical services in the UK is the NHS, for the human rights
argument to hold it is necessary for patients to be able to claim human rights
infringements and to scrutinise decisions regarding the provision of medical services. In
117 For instance, see Glass v. United Kingdom [2004] 1 FCR 553, [2004] 1 FLR 1019, where it was held that the
"best interests" principle as applied by British courts is compatible with human rights protection.
118 This is not to say that nothing has changed, only that the impact of human rights law is rather limited. For more
recent developments see J.K. Mason and G. Laurie, 2005, pp. 4Iff.
119 For this argument, see amongst others M. Brazier, 2003, p. 18 and 24ff.
120 See G. Phillipson, 1999, pp. 835, 838-840, where it is argued that the Act does not create new rights, but simply
adds depth to the interpretation of previously existing common-law rights.
121 See G.T. Laurie, "Medical Law and Human Rights: Passing the Parcel Back to the Profession" in A. Boyle et
al., (eds.), Human Rights and Scots Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 244-274, and A. MacLean,
"Crossing the Rubicon of the Human Rights Fery" (2001) 64 MLR 775.
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the case of the NHS, the most common scenario of this kind is the possible complaint of
a patient regarding a particular decision not to authorise a specific course of treatment, or
to deny access to available treatment. To put it differently, the main question here is the
possibility of scrutinising decisions regarding the allocation of resources, emanating from
the administrative structure and the managerial concerns of particular health providers
within the NHS.
Within this framework, again it is not some kind of human rights protection that
is mobilised, but a specific legal concept emanating from public law, namely judicial
review. Still, even when judicial review is used in order to challenge decisions that
allocate resources, the courts are extremely reluctant to interfere with the decision¬
making process,122 preferring to argue that this falls within the almost authoritative
discretion of the provider. In effect, judicial decisions hardly interfere with the allocation
of resources and relevant claims usually fail. To be more specific, the courts almost never
challenge the substantial aspect of the decisions to allocate recourses. Only when the
patient's complaint refers to a procedural aspect of the decision-making process, there is
a chance that her claim would be successful.123 Accordingly, as far as social rights are
concerned, it remains problematic to argue in favour of the human rights approach,1"4
not only because, again, another legal path is frequendy used, but also because the courts
are not in practice willing to interfere with NHS decisions.125
To summarise, it seems that at this empirical level, the hard version of the human
rights argument cannot capture the actuality ofmedical jurisprudence, especially in terms
of enforcement of rights at the domestic courts. This being the case, the only possibility
to sustain the argument is to opt for its soft version, to which I will now turn my
attention.
122 This was firmly established in a set of cases, involving different scenarios, the most significant of which seems
to be R v Cambridge HA, ex p. B [1995] 2 AUER 129 (CA). For a thorough analysis of the case, see C. Ham and S.
Pickard, Tragic Choices in Health Care: The Case ofChild B (London: Kings Fund, 1998); for further case-law,
see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 68ff.
123 For a presentation of the relevant cases, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 72-73.
124 Unless one hopes for a political change that would influence the way courts decide cases, as Brazier, 2003, p.
29 seems to imply.
125 This is a rather interesting state of affairs, because it would be expected that the bureaucratisation of the NHS
structure would have led to the intensification of scrutiny of its decisions through judicial review. For this point,
see I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, 2000, pp. 9ff and J. Montgomery, 2003, p. 52, 62ff and 104 where he claims that the
counter tendency here is to intensify the possibility of internal accountability.
47
Hi. The conceptual objection.
In this section, I will focus my attention on the conceptual premises that determine the
argument that medical law is a sub-category of human rights law. In essence, I will
investigate the conceptual understanding of medicine that gave rise to this argument and
I will challenge some of the major assumptions regarding the nature of medicine that the
argument entails. In this respect, the critique herein is more significant for the soft
version of the human rights argument, since this is a conceptual version, based on the
importance of a prevailing human rights culture.
My conceptual objections are located at three distinct levels. The first refers to
the understanding of the power that doctors enjoy; the second refers to the
understanding of the doctor-patient relationship in adversarial terms, which underlies the
invocation of human rights; the third one refers to the institutional character of modern
medicine. I will present these levels in turn, but beforehand I must insist on a crucial
point, namely that they just typify problematic conceptions regarding medicine that the
human rights argument has to accept in order to be plausible. It does not follow that in
rebutting them, I propose a more proper conceptualisation of medicine, but rather that I
intend to spell out specific conceptual misunderstandings.
To begin with, the whole human rights argument is ultimately based on the
assumption that a) the power vested in doctors has to be exceptionally scrutinised
because of their expert status and that b) the imbalance of power between doctors and
patients is such that abusive exploitation is constantly ante portas. It seems to me that
both these assumptions are mistaken. As to the first issue, it has been argued126 that even
though the power that the doctors enjoy is indeed significant, this does not lead to the
conclusion that it is so beyond scrutiny that an exceptional protective device must be
employed. Because of the gradual downgrading of the private and mystic character of
pre-scientific medicine, of the interdependence of modern health care professionals, of
the incorporation of commercial elements in the practice of medicine, which entail that
the success of the profession is evaluated according to the quality of the "product" that it
provides and crucially of the general intensification of science's scrutiny, modern
medicine is essentially an open social field, which is already constantly monitored from a
variety of perspectives. Especially the insistence on the final product, namely on the
126
Especially by J. Ladd, "Physicians and Society: Tribulation of Power and Responsibility" in H. Engelhardt and
S. Spicker, (eds.), The Law-Medicine Relation: a Philosophical Exploration (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1978),
pp. 33ff and M. Davies, 1998, pp. 19-20.
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saved or cured patient, delineates a particular version of success, which is visible and
easily understood by almost everyone, without the requirement of professional
qualification. The conclusion is that if the practice of medicine is so scrutinised,127 then it
does not seem necessary to involve a particular mechanism like human rights in order to
provide a specialised type of scrutiny.
As to the issue of abuse, a similar critique can be put forward. It is true that a
relationship of imbalance of power exists between doctors and patients. However, this
does not necessarily imply that this will result in abuse and exploitation. It may well be
the case that exactly because a power structure exists, a particular therapeutic context
becomes stabilised, with specifically defined roles and well structured expectations.
Although an imbalance of power is integrated in this structure, the structure itself designs
the options that are available to the parties and, in this respect, spells out alternative
options, including the possibility of abuse, which is itself countered because of the
internal constraints of the structure. It follows that by neutralising a set of possibilities
within the doctor-patient interaction, a stable context of power and expected practice
ultimately minimises the potential for abuse, at least in terms of the usual course of
events.
This latter point can be better understood when linked with the second level of
my conceptual concerns, namely on the delineation of the doctor-patient relationship as
an adversarial one. The very tradition of human rights, especially when we consider
negative rights, is based on assumptions of adversarial relationships: if this is taken into
the medical context, it must mean that the doctor and the patient interact as adversaries,
in the quest for different and probably conflicting interests. This repercussion for the
human rights argument, in terms of which the only way out is to insist on interpreting
the situation as a constellation of (patients') rights and (doctors') obligations, seems to
misinterpret the actual practice of medicine as a zero sum game. This picture ignores
other, equally significant aspects of the practice, namely the intimacy of the doctor-
patient relationship that generates feelings of trust and collaboration128 and the caring and
therapeutic nature of the relationship that contradicts adversarial accounts. More
importantly, it underestimates the real community of interests within which modern
medical practice is better delivered, as well as the very long tradition of professional
ethics that support the idea of beneficence through mutual respect and inter-
127 It seems to me that the intensification of scrutiny can be easily proven, if one considers the significant rise of
claims again doctors, especially in terms of civil liability.
128 For the importance of trust and collaboration, see H. Teff, Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives on the Doctor-
Patient Relationship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp. 71 and 117ff J. Ladd, 1978 and J. Katz, 2002.
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dependency129 and not through conflict. The fact that a professional tradition focusing on
the well being of the patient is in place is crucial in realising that cooperation, interaction
and in essence solidarity between doctors and patients are present, actual elements of the
everyday practice of medicine. Consequently, a definition of medical law that probably
unconsciously has to insist on the adversarial aspects of medical practice, fails to
recognise a more general part for the law. It neglects the social positions and bonds
around the practice of medicine and undermines the crucial collaborative and intimate
aspects of it.130
Here, an additional point must be stated: my attack on the adversarial nature of
the doctor-patient relationship is explicitly a conceptual claim. It does not deny that law
is primarily oriented to the management of conflict, both in terms of regulation (which
prevents conflict) and adjudication (which addresses particular conflicts); it does not even
imply that the doctor-patient relationship does not generate conflicts, in terms of which
the law is involved. My point is that it is problematic to make sense of this relationship as
adversarial per se, at a conceptual outset. This would be a conceptual mistake, which
would obscure both the actuality of the relationship as previously described and the exact
nature of the possible conflicts that this non-adversarial (again, at the conceptual level)
setting may produce.
At a final conceptual level, the human rights argument fails to recognise that the
doctor-patient relationship does not exist in a vacuum, but rather in a specific institutional
and administrative dimension. J. Montgomery has plausibly argued131 that modern medicine
takes place usually in the complicated environment of the modern hospital, which is
shaped by a variety of considerations, being substantially more complex and subtle than
any face-to-face interaction. It is an environment that integrates professional
competence, administrative decision-making, financial distribution of resources, political
ideals etc. This complicated environment must be integrated into any conceptual account
of medicine, and ultimately, of medical law. At a further level of analysis, this institutional
dimension must also be taken into account when the organisation of the medical
profession is concerned. The doctors are not simply competent individuals that exercise
skill in particular cases, but members of an institutionalised profession.132 Therefore, they
129 See A.V. Campbell, "Dependency: the foundational value in medical ethics" in K. Fulford et al. (eds), Medicine
andMoral Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 184-192.
130 For a much more expanded presentation of this line of thinking see, amongst others, A. McCall-Smith, 1997
and D. Morgan, 2001, pp. 8-9.
131 See J. Montgomery, 2003, passim.
132 For an elaborate presentation of this point, see U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London:
Sage, 1992), pp. 208ff.
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operate in accordance with the institutional setting of their professional affiliation and
carry with them all the features of this setting.133 As a result, any attempt to define
medical law would require one to evade the narrow scope of the direct interaction
between doctors and patients and to investigate seriously the institutional dimension of
medical practice, even when the focus remains on the emergent culture of human rights.
To summarise these points, I am arguing that even at the conceptual level, the
human rights argument has either misinterpreted or failed to take into account several
crucial aspects of the actuality of modern medicine. Adding this to the constitutional and
empirical objections previously presented, it seems to me that this proposition also
provides an implausible account of the subject matter of medical law.
D. Conclusion.
The aim of this chapter was to identify and evaluate the main doctrinal propositions
regarding the subject matter of medical law. In the course of the analysis, two such ideas
were presented: both deemed unsatisfactory, even in terms of their own underlying
premises. The first, which identifies as the subject matter of medical law its orientation to
the domain of medical ethics, is problematic on the basis that it misrepresents medicine
in a conceptual level (by overstressing the significance of medical ethics and by being
under-inclusive in terms of other aspects of medicine), and that it underestimates the
jurisprudential problems of linking law with ethics. The second, which prefers to
perceive medical law as a sub-category of human rights law, has also been discarded for a
variety of reasons, which include the complexity of the fundamental constitutional
problem of applying human rights in horizontal relations, the rather limited significance
of human rights in terms of the actuality of medical jurisprudence (especially considering
the question of enforcement) and more importantly the conceptual misrepresentation of
several significant aspects ofmodern medicine.
Of course, by arguing that these propositions are unsuccessful in delineating
plausibly the discipline of medical law, I do not imply that they are unnecessary or
insignificant. On the contrary, they do highlight crucial issues regarding the link between
law and medicine and their very existence contributes to the particular substantiation of
this link, since they shape the understanding of several issues. Nevertheless, their failings in
achieving the aim of a plausible conceptualisation, is crucial for my own project, for an
133 I will come back to this point in the next chapter of the thesis.
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obvious reason. By discarding them, I am arguing that the orientation of law to medicine
is not substantiated according to them and, thus, the question of how the discipline is
constituted remains open.
This being the case, the next step of my project is to continue with the
"unpacking" of the discipline, and to have a very close look at the empirical reality of
medical law, namely at the legal norms that operate within the body of the discipline. So,
in the next chapter I will examine how the law has so far registered the orientation of law
towards medicine, in terms of actual legal practice. In anticipation of what will be said, I
can already hint that this discussion will expose a domain of complexity, which is of course
intensified by the presence and the impact of the definitional propositions discussed in
this chapter. The notion of complexity will be of crucial importance and will guide the
analysis of the subsequent chapters of the thesis, since it would have to be theoretically
reassessed later on. For the time being though, let me leave this as a pending question:
the norms that belong to medical law have important lessons to teach us regarding the






Having focused extensively on the doctrinal propositions in the previous chapter, I turn
my attention here to a different line of enquiry. In this chapter, I take into consideration
the existing empirical "data" of medical law and I will investigate what they reveal for the
constitution of the discipline. It should not come as a surprise that this empirical aspect
merits a detailed discussion in its own right: especially during the last 30-odd years, the
law has dealt with many issues emanating from the sphere of medicine and arguably its
intervention is still expanding. In the beginning of the 21st century, it can be said
confidently that the urgent call of Ian Kennedy in the early 80s,1 for the need to legally
scrutinise medicine has been truly heard: the law has actually intervened. As a result, there
exists now a large body of legal material that constitutes the empirical aspect of the link
between law and medicine.
Although it would be theoretically puzzling to ask what one means by the term
"empirical" or "raw" legal material,2 in this chapter I take this to refer to legal norms,
whatever their possible source. To put it more accurately, I intend to take into account
both legislation and adjudication as the two terrains within which the legal regulation of
medicine is carried forward through the generation of legal norms. A fundamental
postulation here is that the orientation of law towards medicine should not be
understood solely either in terms of parliamentary or governmental initiatives or in terms
of judicial interventions triggered by litigation of any sort. Rather, I insist that legal
regulation originates from both and thus that any relevant enquiry must take both into
consideration,3 especially since they seem to coexist in a context of mutual influence and
co-development.
In discussing the empirical material, the character of this chapter is mainly
descriptive. In what follows, I do not intend to criticise the legal position, to distinguish
between right and wrong legal arguments and to provide normative proposals regarding
what the proper legal answers should be. Instead, I will present the empirical data as only
a marker of how the law has dealt so far with medicine. In addition, what I am about to
embark on is not a detailed examination of the totality of the extant legal regulation of
1 See especially I. Kennedy, The Unmasking ofMedicine (London: Allen and Unwin, 1981).
2 I borrow the term "raw" from N. MacCormick's, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: a Theory of Legal Reasoning
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 29.
3 Of course, this is not to say that there are no differences between legislation and adjudication. For a very
thorough discussion of the issue, see D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication {fin de siecle} (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), especially chapters 1&2 where he introduces the main themes of
the relevant debate.
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medicine, but a much more modest presentation of only some of its main themes.4 To
provide a further caveat, what follows refers almost exclusively to the UK jurisprudence,
with a particular emphasis on English law. The reason for this choice is that a
presentation as confined as mine is bound to focus only on the most significant issues
and the sheer quantity of English regulation guarantees that this is the easiest source in
unearthing them. This is not to say that I will totally ignore the Scottish position or the
impact of EU legislation, but that I will refer to them only when this is necessary for a
clearer understanding of the wider picture.
A final introductory point is also necessary. Although the perspective of this
chapter is descriptive, I still need to select somehow the data that I will present. As I
discussed at length in the previous chapter, any description is based on a selection
process, in terms of which what counts as relevant is established. Given the complicated
nature of the field I am about to explore (as this will be revealed in the course of the
analysis), I need to start by discussing the premises of my own selection. I will perform
this task, briefly, in the following section of this chapter (section B). Nonetheless, what I
have to stress in advance is that my claims as to what empirical data are relevant should
not be understood as an attempt to provide another doctrinal theory. In justifying my
selection, I am not implying anything about the possibility of framing these data as a
unified whole. Naturally, general principles and tendencies can be identified in the
selected framework and since this is the case, one could be tempted to use them as
guiding orientations for doctrinal purposes. Yet, this would require an analysis of a
different order and this is not what I intend to do here. To put it more succinctly, my
claim refers only to the identification of some basic criteria of relevance. The arguments
of the next section amount to a moderate, non-doctrinal statement that serves a simple
aim: this is to delineate the scope of my empirical inquiry by locating the basic normative
"space" within which the link between law and medicine can be detected.5
From then on, the structure of the chapter is rather simple. In section (C), I will
present the relevant legal norms, based on a broad distinction between case law and
legislation.6 Then, in section (D), I will focus on the judicial terrain and explore the
4 In this respect, I admit that I am liable to the criticism of arbitrariness; yet, I hope that my presentation covers the
material in a satisfactory manner.
5 This kind of basic, "pre-doctrinal" delineation is similar to what Ronald Dworkin has described as the
"preinterpretative stage" in any attempt to interpret a social phenomenon. At this stage, the only thing that happens
is exactly a basic selection of the admittedly very tentative content of the phenomenon under investigation. It
seems to me that this thesis stands even outside the premises of Dworkin's theory of constructive interpretation.
For further analysis, see his Law's Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1986), pp. 65-66.
6 Let me stress that I am employing this distinction in order to structurally simplify the presentation of the relevant
legal norms. Therefore when discussing the common law, I will occasionally refer to legislation that expands or
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modality of reasoning that the courts use when dealing with the relevant cases. Having
completed this exploration, the concluding section will assess what can be inferred from
the empirical legal data. This assessment will then be used in order to introduce the
theoretical analysis, which will be pursued in the next chapter of the thesis.
B. The selection of the relevant material.
Given that the general context of my thesis is the orientation of law to medicine, one
would assume that what counts as relevant ultimately depends on my understanding of
the notion of medicine. This is indeed true: the normative material that I will discuss in
the subsequent sections has been selected on this basis. Yet, although it is tempting to
conclude the discussion of relevance with this bold statement, the situation is not as
clear-cut as it seems. The main problem is that the concept of medicine is not free from
ambiguity and contestability. Therefore, I am obliged to justify my selection of the
relevant material by clarifying what the term "medicine" may entail.7
The ambiguities regarding the notion of medicine, spring from its essentially
social character. Medicine is a social phenomenon that allows for different interpretations
and that generates a set of complicated questions. Is it a social practice or a social
institution? Is it accurate to perceive it as just a matter of technical skill? Should it be
understood as a domain of applied scientific knowledge? What are its purposes and its
societal functions? How does it relate with those notions that are closely associated with
it, namely health, illness and disease, especially since these are themselves quite
contested?8 All these are significant issues that can be tackled according to a variety of
perspectives. Nevertheless, against this complicated framework there seems to exist a
kind of consensus, most easily identified in the use of the term "medicine" in ordinary
language. Naturally, one cannot hope for a comprehensive definition there, but still a
crude but popular delineation can be found along the following lines: medicine is what a
doctor practises when treating a patient.
modifies the position; similarly, when examining the statutory provisions, I will refer to the case law that interprets
them, if this is necessary.
7 I must warn the reader that the discussion of medicine in this section is effectively preliminary and that the
underlying assumption that the law "refers" to medicine is not self-evident as such. I will revisit both these issues
from a fresh theoretical perspective in the next chapters of the thesis.
8 For a discussion of the ambiguity regarding these notions the reader is referred to the previous chapter.
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In my view, this "lay" understanding of medicine provides a crucial insight that
has to be further pursued.9 What it shows is that medicine is inherendy linked with a
particular profession the members of which are identified as "doctor•/'. This linkage,
obvious as it appears, has important consequences, especially when understood from a
perspective focusing on the power of the medical profession. I discussed this issue in the
previous chapter, where I mainly referred to the power located within the doctor-patient
relationship. Nevertheless, a crucial aspect of professional power is the general status that
a profession enjoys within the societal structure. This status is not something given.
Rather, it is the outcome of an on-going process of competition and negotiation
primarily between different professions, but also between professions, the state and other
groups that have relevant, significant interests.10 In the quest for societal status, several
different strategies may be employed, all of which aim at consolidating professional
power.11 For the purposes of my present argument, the most significant of these
strategies is the securing of a particular area of practice, within which a profession
acquires a dominant position. Since this is the result of a struggle, it can be seen as a kind
of societal "victory", which is meaningful in the sense that the victorious profession
occupies the area at stake in as total a way as possible. The area becomes its own
"jurisdiction":12 it is a domain that is delineated as "belonging" to a profession, that is defined in
accordance to the way that the profession perceives itself and its practice and that has to be protected
against attemptsfrom otherprofessions (or more generally other societalgroups) to claim itfor themselves.
This latter assertion implies that even a consolidated professional jurisdiction13 is never
unchallenged. On the contrary, it is quite possible that what has been achieved may be
again open to challenge. Shifts in the exact delineation of jurisdictions are possible;
equally possible and probably more significant are shifts on the particular profession or
group that occupies the dominant position within a given jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in a
9 Effectively, I am using here this lay understanding of medicine as a "common place" or "topos" that sustains the
argument that I am about to develop. For a theoretical backing of such a methodology, see N. MacCormick (2005),
pp. 17ff. with further references.
10 The more comprehensive exploration of the idea that the professions are in a constant state of negotiation with
their institutional environment in their attempt to achieve higher societal status can be found in M.S. Larson, The
Rise ofProfessionalism: A Sociological Analysis (London: University of California Press, 1977). In this work, the
author conceptualises this as an essential part of the so-called "professional project", namely the social process
through which a group becomes a profession and ultimately consolidates a privileged position within a society.
11
For the strategies that the medical profession employs in its attempt to solidify professional hegemony the
reader is referred to the pertinent analysis in chapter 1.
12 For the notion of "jurisdiction" as an analytical tool crucial in understanding the social status and the power of
professions, see A. Abbott, The System ofthe Professions (London: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
13 Let me add here that this consolidation is often guaranteed through the intervention of the state that grants
substantial privileges to particular professions regarding concrete areas of practice. For an analysis of this intimate
relationship between the professions and the state, see T.C. Halliday, Beyond Monopoly (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987) and K.M. MacDonald, The Sociology of the Professions (London: Sage, 1995), pp. lOOff.
and especially pp. 105-107 regarding medicine in particular.
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particular moment in time,14 one can observe the state of affairs and reach a conclusion
regarding what is the jurisdiction of a profession, how this is defined and what are the
possible external threats.
Within these lines my claim is that medicine is the concept that denotes the
jurisdiction of the medical profession; it is the domain that a particular profession has
managed to secure for itself in almost exclusive terms. This statement does not entail a
tautology: I do not imply that medicine should be understood through the profession
and that simultaneously the profession is defined through medicine, the latter being its
area of practice. On the contrary, what I am claiming is that medicine is a concept that
makes sense only through a professional perspective. This is part of the very concept of
the jurisdiction, which is not only secured but also defined and conceptualised by the
profession that acquires monopoly in an area of practice: in addition to delineation,
jurisdictions integrate a discursive element, in terms of which they make sense as meaningful
domains of practice.15 This discursive element depends on the paradigm that is currently
determinative of the profession's perception of itself and its practice. Since in modern,
Western societies, this paradigm is based on the mechanical model of health, the medical
profession perceives itself as a community of experts that restore the proper function of
the human body, using allopathetic techniques and based on scientific knowledge. It
follows that medicine is the domain of practice within which this particular professional
paradigm is actualised, since medical practice is perceived exacdy in reference to this
paradigm.16
14 I borrow the idea that a social phenomenon can be meaningfully analysed as it stands in a particular moment in
time, by Joseph Raz in his The Concept ofLegal System: An Introduction to the Theory ofLegal System (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 34-35, where he argues that the legal system can be described as a momentary system,
namely as it exists in a certain moment. 1 see no reason why a professional jurisdiction like medicine cannot be
similarly analysed, especially if one considers a moment in time in a broad or thick sense, namely as something
that captures an extended perception of what is meant by "present". For a thorough analysis of this interesting
point, see N. MacCormick, 2005, pp. 215-219 with further references to the relevant literature.
15 This idea can be further supported by findings in organisational theory, especially if one takes into account the
organisational dimensions of the medical profession (for instance the existence of the General Medical Council
and the British Medical Association). From this perspective, it has been argued that organisations determine the
institutional environment within which they operate. For a classic exposition of this insight, see J.W. Meyer and B.
Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony" (1977) 83(2) American
Journal ofSociology 340, pp. 347-348.
16 One could go a step further and add that as soon as a jurisdiction is established, then it starts to produce
discursive "feedback" that in turn further sustains the way that a profession sees itself. In such a way, a process of
mutual influence is in place, which can be depicted as a cyclical discursive channel between a profession and its
jurisdiction. An analysis of the feedback aspect is particularly useful when one focuses on how the members of a
profession perceive themselves and what they are doing. Relevant research has show that individuals develop a
"working personality" that is determined by the professional practice within which they find themselves. This
research has classically focused on policemen (see J.H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in
Democratic Society (2nd edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975, chapter 3) and professional soldiers (see M.
Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964,
p. 175), but its findings can similarly apply to doctors.
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The idea that the discursive content of medicine as jurisdiction is determined by
the currendy dominant paradigm of the medical profession has two important
consequences. First, it shows that jurisdictional shifts in the exact balance of power
between different professions and groups do not necessarily change the way that a
jurisdiction is conceptually defined. For instance, it is arguably the case that the
monopoly of the medical profession on its jurisdiction is currently under attack.17 Just to
provide a few examples, other health-related professions have enhanced their position;
the authority of professional expertise is challenged through the gradual appreciation of
the importance of patients' choice; commercial entities and, crucially, pharmaceutical
companies have an increasing impact on the direction of modern medicine. Additionally,
even the negotiated terms between the medical profession and the state are in a state of
constant flux, in accordance with shifts in governmental policies that generate different
schemes for the regulation of the medical profession. Yet, these jurisdictional shifts do
not necessarily challenge how medicine as jurisdiction is defined: they mirror the exact
power position of different groups,18 but they all happen against a rather stable
conceptual background regarding what medicine is. In this sense, the discursive element
of the jurisdiction lingers in time and integrates shifts at the level of group positioning.19
This is why it is still the case that the perception of medicine remains defined by the
medical profession, even if the latter's monopoly is under threat.20
The second consequence is that the dominant paradigm allows us to make a
distinction that is crucial for understanding the regulation of medicine. Since doctors
treat patients with the aim to restore their proper natural state (at least in terms of what
can realistically be achieved), it follows that the jurisdiction refers essentially to the care of
the patient, as this is manifested in the direct doctor-patient relationship that comes into
17 For a detailed presentation of the reasons why this may be so, see J. Le Fanu, The Rise and Fall ofModem
Medicine (London: Abacus, 1999).
18 This list of examples regarding possible jurisdictional shifts is based on the idea that currently within medicine
there exist three distinct structural interests that are represented by different groups: the "dominant interest",
primarily represented by the medical profession against other professional groups; the "corporate rationalisers'
interest", which is represented by the state and by managers of health care provision; the "community interest",
which is represented by several groups that, for instance, may advocate patients' rights. All these groups attempt to
enhance their control over the jurisdiction. For further analysis of this classification (which can be expanded
through the incorporation of market interests), see R. Alford, Health Care Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1975) and N. North, "Alford Revisited: The Professional Monopolisers, Corporate Rationalisers,
Community and Markets" (1995) 23(2) Policy and Politics 115.
19
Naturally, radical shifts on the identity and the positioning of the groups that control a jurisdiction ultimately
influence its discursive aspect; however, for a discursive change to occur, the outcome of shifts has to be stable for
a significant period of time.
20 Similarly, it has been argued that although ostensibly the monopoly of the medical profession is dampening
down, it remains the case that the public still trust the profession and that its authority is in fact very significant.
For this line of argument, see R. Baggott, Health and Health Care in Britain (3rd edition, New York: Palgrave,
MacMillan, 2004), pp. 235-239. For further arguments in favor of the claim that medical power remains intact, see
B. Salter, Medical Regulation and Public Trust: An International Review (London: King's Fund, 2000).
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existence because of a particular medical condition. Of course this is not a simple
relationship: within its remit, several expectations develop that refer to a cluster of issues,
like accurate diagnosis, successful treatment, confidentiality, meaningful communication
etc.21 Leaving this complexity aside, the paradigm demands that this is the primary
dimension of medicine, since it is in this dimension that the aim of the profession
becomes actualised. To simplify matters, from now on I will refer to this as the
"technical" dimension of medicine. Nevertheless, care does not happen in vacuum. Its
environment is important, since the fulfilment of the relevant expectations depends not
only on the skill of the doctor, but also on a set of conditions that are determined by
external factors. It is not difficult to explain why this is so: a doctor will need the help of
other professionals; she will need drugs of a certain quality and therapeutic potential;
what she can do is limited by the particular resources that are at her disposal in a
particular hospital etc. At a more abstract level, care is influenced by the general
availability of doctors, the public or private source of funding for particular treatments,
the quality of medical education, the general level of scientific knowledge, the willingness
of the patient to follow instructions etc. Ultimately, all these factors are determined by
the particular arrangement of the provision of health services within a given society.
Effectively, these arrangements are embedded into the jurisdiction of medicine by
constituting its underlying conditions. From now on, I am going to refer to them as the
"institutional" dimension of medicine. My argument is that this dimension is equally
important in identifying how medicine is actually practised in a given society.
Within these lines, the legal norms that are relevant to my project refer both to the technical
and the institutional dimensions of medicine}2 This is admittedly a very wide statement,
especially because the institutional dimension is very open-ended, being determined by a
plurality of factors, the exact impact of which is difficult to measure. Yet, an
understanding of the orientation of law towards medicine only in terms of its technical
dimension would neglect the major practical importance of the institutional dimension.
Accordingly, in what follows I will take both dimensions into account and I will present
the legal norms that are apposite to both. I have already said that my presentation is
based on a broad distinction between common law and legislative provisions. I can now
complete this statement, by saying that the common law provisions seem to be more
21 The exact content of the expectations that develop within the doctor-patient relationship can be explained as the
result of the power struggles between different groups of healers in the history of medicine. For this point, see in
details J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, first
published in 1984), pp. 30ff.
22 The importance of the distinction between these two dimensions is not exhausted here; I will revisit the issue on
the last chapter ofmy thesis.
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pertinent to the technical aspect of medicine (by generally regulating the doctor-patient
relationship), while legislation refers both to the technical and the institutional aspect (by
regulating the management of specific conditions or categories of care and by
establishing a general framework of health care provision, within which medicine is
practiced).
Having established in such a way the relevant empirical data let me now turn to
their substantial analysis.
C. The normative content of medical law.
1) Case law.
a) Consent to treatment.
The concept of consent to treatment probably represents the corner stone of modern
medical law. As a legal norm, it embodies the principle that it is prohibited for any
person to interfere with the bodily integrity of another without consent, even if this
interference is of the slightest possible degree - in essence, mere touching is unlawful
without consent. In the absence of consent, the tort of battery is committed and damages
can be recovered. Given the usual intrusive character of medical procedures of any sort,
it is unsurprising that their lawfulness is based on the consent of the patient.23
Accordingly, the primary legal function of consent is to provide a defence against the tort
of battery,24 by negating the possibility of a doctor being held liable. Consent can be
explicit or tacit and although its exact content may occasionally be a source of
ambiguity,25 there is no doubt that a medical procedure without consent is generally
illegal.
23 This has been firmly established for many decades now. For a clear expression of the rule, see A-G's Reference
(No. 6 of1980) [1981] QB 715, [1981] 2 All ER 1057.
24 It does not follow from this that consent can always provide a defence. Crucially, one cannot normally consent
to an activity that may result to a serious injury, as it has been established in R v. Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, [1993] 2
All ER 75. More particularly, within the medical context Jonathan Montgomery has argued that policy reasons
demand that consent cannot function as a defence in a number of scenarios that include female circumcision,
euthanasia etc. For this point see J. Montgomery, Health Care Law (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), p. 232. Relevant provisions are included in several statutes as the Tattoing of Minors Act 1969, the
Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 etc.
25 It is possible that during an operation an additional medical condition is revealed that requires prompt action to
be taken. In this situation, it is unclear whether an initial, general consent renders the treatment of the additional
condition lawful. For an exploration of the problem, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith's
Law and Medical Ethics (7l edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 351-353, with many references
to the relevant case law and pp. 386ff. where the particular case of consent to HIV testing is analysed in details.
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In order to understand the legal subtleties regarding the concept of consent, one
has to keep in mind the inherent link between consent and autonomy. In effect, it is this
link that provides the justification for the legal requirement of consent. The patient has
to consent, because she is viewed as an autonomous agent, who is able to know what is
best for herself and, crucially, to make decisions about what should happen. This
understanding reveals that consent is an expression of the decision-making ability of the
patient, who exercises her autonomy exacdy through consent. From this it follows that
the decisions of patients must be respected. If the patient consents, a medical procedure
can proceed; if the patient refuses, this refusal must also be respected and the doctors are
not allowed to operate, even if they believe that this would have detrimental effects for
the health of the patient.26 Accordingly it is not only consent to treatment that is legally
important; refusal to treatment is of equal legal significance.27
The link between consent and autonomy, as exemplified through a process of
decision-making reveals that this general normative edifice works only if the patient is
indeed an autonomous agent. What if, for any reason, she is not? Logic requires that in
this case, the defence of consent is inapplicable, since it would not make sense to insist
on a notion that expresses autonomy, when autonomy itself is absent.28 In legal terms,
this issue is problematised as the patient's capacity to consent, an additional concept that
further elaborates the link between consent and autonomy.29 Accordingly, it is necessary
to develop a legal test in terms of which capacity can be assessed. Such a test has indeed
been developed, but in order to discuss it meaningfully one has to distinguish between
adult and minor patients.
In the case of adult patients, the law treats capacity as a relative concept. One is
not capable or incapable in general, but rather capable or incapable with reference to a
particular situation that gives rise to a particular decision-making process. This implies
that capacity is a matter of degree and that it is much more possible for someone to be
26 In support of this view see the very poignant reasoning in Re B (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) (2002) 65
BMLR 149, [2002] 2 All ER 449.
27 An opposite conclusion would be compatible with the ethos of paternalism, which is no longer prevalent in
medical practice, at least ostensibly. For an elaboration of the concept of paternalism, see C. Cluvert and B. Gert,
Philosophy in Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 126ff., G. Dworkin, "Paternalism" (1972) 56
The Monist 64 and H. Teff, Reasonable Care: Legal Perspectives of the Doctor-Patient Relationship (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 69ff.
28 In my view the most clear presentation of this thesis in the form of an argument in front of a court of law, can be
found in Freeman v. Home Office (No. 2) [1984] QB 524, [1984] 1 All ER 1036. There, a prisoner argued that
exactly because the prison environment is structured on the basis that the autonomy of prisoners is diminished
consent to treatment is no longer an appropriate concept in determining the legality of medical interventions.
Although his claim failed, the argument reveals the substantial link between consent and autonomy.
29 For a very detailed exploration of the notion of capacity to consent, see I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law
(3rd edition, London: Butterworths, 2000), pp. 596ff. and M. Gunn, "The Meaning of Incapacity" (1994) 2 Medical
Law Review 8.
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capable of making a simple decision than a complicated one. Within these lines, the test
for assessing capacity has been laid down in Re C30 where it is provided that a patient is
capable to decide when he is able to comprehend and retain information, believe it and
weigh it in balancing other relevant considerations. This formulation reaffirms and
further elaborates previous case law31 and establishes capacity as a presumption that can
be rebutted only when the test is not met. Additionally, it is completely in tune with the
definitions of incapacity that are included in the recent statutes that regulate several
issues regarding incapacitated adults, namely the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (s 2) and the
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (s 1(6)).
Although the test in Re C seems to establish comprehensive criteria regarding
capacity,32 its practical application has not been free of ambiguity and this has led to
some interesting results. Not surprisingly, the proposed test has itself been tested in
situations regarding refusals of treatment, especially when doctors feel that non-
treatment damages the health of the patient. Given that the refusal of a competent
patient must be respected and that it is the doctors that assess the capacity of the
patients, the only possible "by-pass" is to argue that the patient is incapable to consent.
In a number of cases this argument was presented and quite often it has been successful.
Even though the relevant case law cannot be exhaustively presented here, it seems that
the courts are often reluctant to assure the validity of refusals emanating from particular
religious beliefs. Especially in the case of Jehoba witnesses (a faith that essentially
prohibits blood transfusions), this tendency has been widely manifested. For instance, in
the previously referred Re T,33 where the test itself was initially laid down, the court
concluded that the patient's original refusal of blood transfusion should not be respected,
on the twin bases that it was caused by the undue influence''' of a third party (her mother)
and that it could not refer to the deterioration of her situation that occurred as time
gradually passed. Similar outcomes were reached in Re S35 and in Norfolk and Norwich
Healthcare (NHS) Trust v. W}6 Additionally, a tendency to overcome refusals on the basis
30 Re C (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819, (1993) 15 BMLR 77.
31 More importantly, the previous formulation in Re T (adult) (refusal ofmedical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649,
0992) 9 BMLR 46, CA.
32 For a critical perspective focusing on the vagueness of these criteria, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp.
376-377, A. Grubb, "Commentary" (1994) 2 Medical Law Review 92 and M. Stauch, "Rationality and the Refusal
of Medical Treatment: A Critique of the Recent Approach of the English Courts" (1995) 21 Journal ofMedical
Ethics 162.
33 This case referred to a pregnant woman that signed a refusal to receiving blood transfusion after being involved
in a car accident.
34 For further analysis of the concept of "undue influence", see Centre for Reproductive Medicine v. U (2002) 65
BMLR 92, [2002] Lloyd's Rep Med 93.
35 Re S (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671, (1992) 9 BMLR 69.
36
[1996] 2 FLR 613, (1996) 34 BMLR 16.
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of incapacity can be detected in several cases involved pregnant women in general.
There, incapacity is established on the basis of the mental state of the woman (for
instance, in Re MB37 an assessment of incapacity was justified in terms of needle-phobia),
although the importance of the refusal of the competent patient is constandy re-stated
and there is no doubt that in the potential conflict between maternal and foetal interests,
only the wishes of the mother are to be protected. What can be inferred from these cases
is that the reluctance of the doctors to affirm the capacity of patients who reach irrational
decisions (at least from a clinical perspective) is often sanctioned by the courts,38 even
though the relevant rhetoric insists on a strong presumption in favour of competence.39
When it comes to minor patients40 the situation is somewhat different. To begin
with, the presumption in favour of capacity is reversed: a minor is not presumed
competent to decide unless proved otherwise. Accordingly, the consent of the minor
cannot function as a defence and some other way must be found to render a medical
intervention lawful. Medical treatment usually proceeds on the basis of consent given by
the parents. However, this consent (often depicted under the term "proxy" consent) is
not as determinative as the consent of a competent adult. In some scenarios, it may be
the case that parental consent is not enough for rendering an operation lawful.41 Also, it
is conceivable that a patent may refuse to give consent. In both scenarios, a proposed
medical intervention would have to be justified in a different way: the alternative
possibilities constitute the subject matter of the subsequent section. Here, I will focus my
attention only to a particular complication that has emerged by the concept of the so-
called "mature minor". Let us see in some detail what this concept entails.
In the notorious Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,42 it was
decided that a doctor was allowed to provide contraceptives to a girl under the age of 16,
without previously informing her parents. The decision was based on the principle that a
child below the age of 16 can give valid consent to treatment, provided that she is mature
enough to understand fully the implications of what is proposed.43 This would be of
37
Re MB (an adult: medical treatment) [1997] 8 Med LR 217, (1997) 38 BMLR 175, CA.
38 An attempt to solve the collateral problem of whether (and under what conditions) the doctors should refer their
assessment of a patient's capacity to a court, can be found in St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. 5 (Guidelines),
R v. Collins, ex p S (No. 2) [1999] Fam 26, (1998) 44 BMLR 194, where detailed guidelines are provided by the
Court ofAppeal.
39 In this section, I am interested only on the problem of consent to treatment; that is why I do not discuss the basis
on which these cases were ultimately decided. This is the subject matter of the following section.
40 For the purposes of this section, a minor should be understood as an individual under the age of 16, according to
the Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 8(1) and the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(4).
41 For an introduction to the issue, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 302-303.
42
[1986] AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402, HL.
43 For a detailed presentation of all the aspects of this decision, see G. Williams, "The Gillick Saga" (1985) 135
NUW56.
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course a question of fact, but it is conceivable that a minor can reach the required level
of maturity (which will very much depend on the nature of the treatment proposed)
notwithstanding her age.44 Accordingly, the consent of a "mature" or "Gillick" minor can
be equally valid with the consent of a competent adult.
The affirmation of the possibility of a mature minor has generated controversy,
not only because of its substantial merit, but also because of the existence of section 8(3)
of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. The Act treats individuals between the age of 16
and 18 as able to consent, but in section 8(3) adds that "nothing in this section shall be
construed as making ineffective any consent which would have been effective if this
section had not been enacted". It can plausibly be argued45 that the meaning of this
section is that the parental right to consent on behalf of a child remains intact, even in
the ages 16-18. A fortiori then, this provision must also apply to "mature minors". This
being the case a problematic scenario may emerge: what if the mature child and her
parents do not take the same stance towards a proposed provision, that is to say what if
the child consents and the parents refuse or vice versa? Controversy has arisen mainly
referring to the latter possibility, in the event of a mature minor that refuses to be
treated. Should such a refusal be respected?
Although the decision in Gillick insists that parental rights cease as soon as the
minor reaches capacity, the validity of a refusal to consent remains an open question,
especially when this involves the possibility of a serious injury or death. In a series of
cases, the courts attempted to provide an answer to this issue, essentially assuming that in
the case of minors, consent and refusal are not and should not be considered as logically
equivalent alternatives.46 A combined reading of Re R47 and Re IT48 provides probably the
most accurate understanding of the position. In these cases, the courts insisted that the
wishes of the minor must always be taken very seriously. Yet, when a refusal may lead to
a severe deterioration of the minor's health, this refusal need not be regarded as
determinative. This being the case, the consent of the parents may provide the
justification necessary for performing a medical operation.
In this section, my aim was to show that consent functions as a defence against
the tort of battery. For this reason, I explained the conditions in terms of which consent
44 It is important to notice that the assessment of the capacity of a child is not exactly the same as that referring to
the capacity of an adult. For further analysis, see J. Montgomery, 2003, p. 385.
45 See in details, J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 369-370.
46 For this point, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 371-372. For a more critical perspective see L.
Edwards, "The Right to Consent and the Right to Refuse: More Problems with Minors and Medical Consent"
[1993] Juridical Review 52.
47
(1992) 7 BMLR 147.
48 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, (1992) 9 BMLR 22.
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to treatment is lawful and thus can perform its function. Yet, it must be clear by now that
doctors often treat patients that cannot validly consent. This does not mean that these
treatments are unlawful, only that they are justified on different bases. In the next
section, I am discussing the most significant of these justifications.
b) The best interests principle.
It is a basic tenet of both civil and criminal law that an otherwise unlawful act becomes
lawful, if one acts out of necessity. This idea constitutes the basis of an additional defence
against ostensibly tortuous behaviour, one that is very significant in the context of
medical law. Here, the general doctrine of necessity takes the form of the so-called "best
interests" principle, according to which a medical procedure is not unlawful when it is
performed in order to serve the best interests of the patient. Given that consent to
treatment is the only applicable defence when a patient has the capacity to decide for
herself, the best interests principle does not apply to competent patients. However, as the
previous section has already shown, in many situations doctors have to treat patients not
competent to make decisions. When this is the case, the best interests principle is the
normative device most often used to justify the lawfulness of medical procedures.49
In any attempt to understand how the best interests principle works in practice a
number of issues must be clarified. Although these can be expressed in different ways,
the main questions can be summarised as follows: what exactly is meant by the
ambiguous term "best interests", who is to make its assessment and, crucially, on what
criteria? In order to discuss these issues, it is necessary to keep in mind that the best
interests principle is being developed within the context of adjudication as a dynamic
concept and that, for this reason, it cannot easily be defined. In addition, the general
applicability of the principle renders this problem more difficult to tackle. Since the
principle applies to a very wide set of different medical scenarios, its exact
conceptualisation is very much dependent on the exigencies of particular cases.
Accordingly, it is more useful to begin with a general exposition of what the best
interests principle possibly means and then to explore a particular medical context as a
case study, where the principle is actually applied.
49 It is important to stress here that exactly because the best interests principle is, in law, a defence against the
possibility of liability, it works essentially in a one-way manner. A doctor can justify her actions in terms of the
best interests principle; yet, she cannot be forced to offer care against her clinical judgment, even if it is generally
understood that this care would actually be in the best interests of the patient. For the judicial acknowledgement of
this thesis, see R v. Ealing DA, ex p. Fox [1993] 3 All ER 170 and Re J [1992] 4 All ER 614.
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Generally speaking, one may distinguish between two possible versions of the
principle. The first is rather obvious: the term "best interests" can be understood as
referring to the medical interests of the patient, in which case a doctor acts lawfully,
when her acts serve the interests of her patient as these are defined by her medical
condition. From this point of view, any action that influences positively the health of the
patient is in her best interests; this formulation of the principle obviously covers
everything that has a therapeutic effect, no matter what this may be. Nevertheless, a
different version of the principle can also be sustained. The best interests test may refer
to the patient's general interests, namely to her general welfare given her life situation,
and not only to a particular medical condition. This is obviously a much wider
formulation of the principle that justifies any medical intervention that may have a
positive impact on the general welfare of the patient.
This fundamental conceptual distinction becomes particularly relevant, when one
considers the powers that the courts have in reference to the best interests of the
incompetent. These powers are linked in a very significant extent with the concrete
judicial procedure in terms of which the question of best interests has occurred. In turn,
this procedural aspect depends on distinguishing between adults and minor patients. In
the latter case, courts usually intervene within the auspices of the wardship jurisdiction:5"
when a child has been made a ward of court, she is in the care of the court and no
decision can be made or action be taken without the court's permission.51 In giving this
permission, the court in charge is to ensure that the welfare of the child is enhanced in
the best possible way and, thus, has the authority to sanction or prohibit anything that is
proposed (even the doctors' or the parental views)52 based on a wide range of criteria that
may exceed the strictly medical assessment of the situation. On the contrary, in the case
of adult patients the courts do not directly have such powers. After the abolition of the
parens patriae jurisdiction,53 the courts can only be involved indirectly when they are
50 The wardship jurisdiction is not the only route that may be followed in order to place a minor under judicial
protection. Other alternatives include the "inherent jurisdiction" and the issuing of special orders under section 8 of
the Children Act 1989.
51 See in details N.V. Lowe and R.A.H. White, Wards ofCourt (2nd edition, London: Butterworts, 1986).
52 It must be stressed here that when the doctors and the parents seriously disagree on the proper management of a
minor's health, judicial intervention must be sought for the conflict to be resolved. This is based on the reasoning
in Glass v. United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, (2004) 77 BMLR 120, where it was held that a health authority
that does not ask for judicial intervention to override a parental refusal to consent, is in breach of a child's human
right to privacy; also, on the guidelines included in Practice Direction (CAFCASS: Representation ofChildren in
Family Proceedings) [2004] 1 FLR 1190 and in Practice Direction (Family Proceedings: Representation of
Children) [2004] 1 WLR 1180.
53 For an analysis of this issue, see G.T. Laurie, "Parens Patriae in the Medico-legal Context: the Vagaries of
Judicial Activism" (1999) 3 Edinburgh LR 95.
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asked to issue a declaration of lawfulness in advance of a proposed medical interaction.54
In this scenario, they are called to opine on a medical course of action that the doctors
believe is in the best interests of their patient. It follows that the relevant assessment is
much more explicitly oriented to the medical interests of the patient and that a narrower
version of the best interests test is more apposite.
Having framed the background of the best interests principle in such terms, I will
now explore a particular medical context within which the principle has been intensely
applied. For this purpose, I have chosen the sterilisation offemales on the basis that here
many of the controversies that surround the principle are more easily identifiable.55 This
is because quite often the sterilisation of an incompetent patient (usually one with a
certain degree of mental health problems) is not always associated with a direct
therapeutic benefit, but rather with her general ability to cope better with life.
Accordingly, the distinction between medical and general best interests (which seems to
run in parallel with a distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic interventions)
appears in a very clear light here. In discussing the relevant case law, it is once again
useful to mobilise the distinction between minor and adult patients. It is also helpful to
keep in mind that in all these cases, either the doctors in charge of the patient's care or
members of her family claim that sterilisation is appropriate for at least one of the
following reasons: a) because the medical condition of the patient is such that a necessary
medical intervention will have the side-effect of sterilising the patient; b) because it is
difficult for the patient (or her carers) to cope with the management of her menstrual
cycle and c) because of the possibility of the patient becoming pregnant, when she (or
her carers) would be unable to deal with the pregnancy as such or with the upbringing of
a child.
In the case of minors the first apposite case was Re D (a minor).56 Here, Heilbron J
held that she could not authorise the sterilisation of a young girl for non-therapeutic
reasons, after having carefully scrutinised the medical evidence in favour of the
operation. This remained the dominant position until the decision in Re 13,57 in the late
80s. In this case, B was a severely handicapped 17-years-old with a mental age of five to
six years; the case proceeded on the assumption that it was likely that she would become
54
Things are somewhat different now, after the passing of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and the
Mental Capacity Act 2005. Since I am here discussing the common law position only, I will refer my comments on
the content of these Acts to subsequent sections of this chapter.
55 Once again, let me stress that the best interests principle is so widely applied that any other medical context
could also be used as an example.
56
[1976] Fam 185, [1976] 1 All ER 326.
57 Re B (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, [1987] 2 All ER 206, HL.
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pregnant and that she would not be able to cope with it. In order to avoid that, two
options were available according to the medical view: she would either have to take
contraceptives for the totality of her fertile years or she could be sterilised. On the basis
of the welfare of B, the House of Lords authorised the proposed sterilisation. This is an
important decision because a number of interesting points were explicitly raised.
Crucially, Lord Oliver argued that "the distinction between "therapeutic" and "non-
therapeutic" purposes of this operation... is irrelevant"58 and that it does not make any
sense to distinguish between preventive medicine and therapy as far as the interests of
the child are concerned. It follows that the assessment of the best interests of the patient
goes beyond what a purely therapeutic analysis of her condition may indicate and has to
be oriented to her general welfare.59 Yet, it seems that both in Re B and in the subsequent
ReM'° and Re R'\ the medical assessment of the children significantly contraindicated the
possibility of pregnancy, for purely medical reasons. Therefore, it seems to be the case
that the delineation of the general welfare of a child is closely linked with the medical
evaluation of her condition.
As far as adult patients are concerned, the most significant case is probably Re
F.62 The importance of this case is twofold, namely both in terms of the criteria that it
applies in dealing with the substantial question and in terms of the procedural analysis
regarding when it is necessary for a court to intervene in order to authorise a proposed
sterilisation. Regarding the latter issue, the House of Lords confirmed that in the case of
adults, an application for a declaration of lawfulness would be the only way to achieve
judicial intervention. Indeed, it would be a matter of good medical practice to ask for
such an authorisation.63 Currently, this "good practice" has become compulsory: the
existing Practice Direction declares that a decision to sterilise an incompetent person
requires the prior sanction of the High Court.64 Regarding the substance of the decision,
58 See [1987] 2 All ER 206, at 213.
59 For arguments in favor and against the merits of this decision, that arguably faced severe academic criticism, see
J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 133-134, with many references to a number of commentators.
60 Re M (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497, [1988] Fam Law 434.
61 Re P (a minor) (wardship: sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182, [1989] Fam Law 102. In both these cases the
outcome was similar.
62 Re F (mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, sub nom F v. West Berkshire Flealth Authority [1989] 2 All
ER 545.
63 Unless a sterilisation operation is to be performed for a genuine therapeutic reason. In this case, no prior
authorisation of the court is necessary as it was held in Re E (a minor) (medical treatment) [1991] 2 FLR 585,
(1992) 7 BMLR 117 (this case refers to a minor patient but it seems that its premises apply to adult patients as well
- see, amongst others F v. F (1992) 7 BMLR 135, where the conditions on the basis of which there is no need to
ask for judicial intervention are clearly laid down). Also, in Re H [1993] 1 FLR 28, it was held that prior
authorisation is not in general necessary as far as diagnostic procedures are concerned.
64 See in details Practice Notice (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and Welfare Decisions for
Adults who Lack Capacity) [2001] 2 FCR 158, (2002) 65 BMLR 72.
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its outcome is rather surprising. Once again, it is emphasised that the lawfulness of a
sterilisation is to be assessed in terms of the best interests of the patient. However, the
content of the principle is to be evaluated according to the "Bolam test": this originates
from the law of medical negligence and it provides that a doctor is acting lawfully, when
his actions are in accordance with a responsible body of medical opinion.65 In the present
context, this implies that the requirement that an operation is in the best interests of the
patient is met when the doctor in charge believes that this is the case and his assessment
finds support from a responsible body of medical opinion. This method for defining the
content of the best interests principle, effectively medicalises the issue, since it allows its
medical assessment to be totally determinative and minimises to a significant extent the
scope of judicial scrutiny. Quite unsurprisingly, the import of a norm emanating from the
law of negligence into a substantially different matter has been seriously criticised.66 Yet,
in a series of subsequent cases the judicial dicta of lower courts remained in line with the
decision in Re F; for instance, the sterilisation of the patient in Re IP*'7 was also authorised
on the basis of the Bolam test. However, this uneasiness regarding the combination of
the best interests principle with the Bolam test has been somehow dampened down
given the reasoning in Re ti.68 There, the Court of Appeal held that the Bolam test only
delineates a range of alternative possibilities that a responsible doctor could follow.
However, the best interests principle demands that only one of them, serves "best" the
interests of the patient. This implies that a double assessment is necessary, only the first
stage of which is defined in terms of the Bolam test. Its second stage, namely the
decision on what constitutes the "best" option depends on a variety of factors, not
necessarily controlled by medical expertise.
So, what conclusions can be reached regarding the conceptualisation of the best
interests principle? It seems to me that two tendencies can be simultaneously observed.
First, the courts are willing to perceive the best interests quite widely, as including more
than the strictly medical best interests of the patient. Indeed, it can be argued that when
it is obvious that from a therapeutical perspective a medical intervention is beneficial, it is
not even necessary to ask for previous judicial authorisation. Secondly, it seems that the
strongest factor in determining the exact content of the principle is the assessment of the
situation on behalf of the doctor. Especially the involvement of the Bolam test is a very
651 will discuss extensively the Bolam test in the next session of this chapter.
66 See amongst others D. Ogbourne and R. Ward, "Sterilization, the Mentally Incompetent and the Courts" (1989)
18 AngloAmerican LR 230.
67 Re W (Mentalpatient: sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381, [1993] Fam Law 222.
68 In re S (adult patient: sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 465, [2000] Fam Law 322, revisited [2001] 3 Fam 15, [2000]
3WLR 1288.
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strong indication of the lingering importance of the doctors' perception on what the
interests of the patient entail/'9 Although the impact of professional expertise is
moderated according to the reasoning in Re S, as well as in a series of recent cases
outside the context of sterilisation,70 we have not yet reached a stage where the principle
is significantly dissociated from professional assessments. This being the case, the best
interests principle counters the way that consent to treatment functions: whereas the
latter expresses the autonomy of the patient against the medical establishment, the
former restates the power of the benevolent, expert doctor in defining what should be
done.
c) Medical negligence.
Medical negligence is a particular instance of the general law of negligence. Accordingly,
for an action in negligence to be successful, the patient must show that the conditions
that any such action must meet are satisfied. These include that a duty of care exists, that
the doctor acted in breach of the standard of care integral to the duty, and that the
patient suffered some damage caused by the breach of the duty.71 Although all of these
conditions are determinative for the final assessment of a claim, in what follows I will
only deal with the standard of care and with the notion of damage. This is because the
affirmation of the existence of a duty of care is relatively straightforward within a usual
medical interaction,72 and because the problem of causation is no different in this context
than in any other type of negligence (although a significant number of medical negligence
claims fail because of lack of causation).
The clear identification of the exact standard of care, against which an alleged
breach can be evaluated, tends to be a rather latent issue in general negligence. The very
occurrence of an undesirable outcome in the interactions of everyday life is often enough
to indicate that a duty of care has been breached. The main question is only whether the
duty exists or not. If it does, then an undesirable outcome strongly suggests that the
defendant has been in breach of the standard related to this duty; what exacdy is this
standard remains obscure. In the medical context, the problem is that this "conflation"
69 For the general reluctance of the courts to counter the medical assessment of best interests, see J. Montgomery,
2003, pp. 400ff.
70 For an analysis of these cases see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 363-365 with further references.
711 assume, here, that usually an action in negligence is raised by a patient against her doctor (or against the health
authority that employs the doctor). In terms of the latter scenario, let me just say that the vicarious liability of
hospitals is well established.
72 See the reasoning in Barnett v. Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969J 1 QB 428,
[ 1968] 1 All ER 1068, [ 1968] 2 WLR 422.
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between an undesirable outcome and the affirmation that the duty of care has been
broken is not to be trusted. This is because medical practice is inherendy risky and
hazardous and therefore, an unfortunate occurrence is not necessarily attributable to
human error. It can equally be a matter of natural eventuality.71 Since the final outcome
cannot serve as such, as an indicator of a sub-standard performance, the need to define
clearly what is the standard of care required by the doctor (in other words what exactly
she is supposed to be doing) comes into the forefront in medical negligence claims.
The main rule regarding the proper standard of care has been laid down by
McNair J in Ho lam v. Friern HospitalManagement Committee as follows:74
"The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have
that special skill".
Effectively, this formulation dictates that the standard of care is defined by the degree of
competence that is reasonably expected by any ordinarily skilful doctor that performs
under the same circumstances as the defendant.75 Although this is a rather clear
formulation of a legal rule,76 and indeed one, which is compatible with the general trend
regarding the identification of the standard of care expected by members of
professions,77 it generates a significant practical problem for plaintiffs. It appears that in
real terms it is quite difficult to prove that the performance of the defendant falls short
of the standard.78 This problem is intensified, as further decisions made clear that this is
essentially a minimal standard and that the doctor needs only to prove that at least a
small number of respected professionals would accept what she did as proper.79
Furthermore, in Maynard v. West Midlands RFLA80 the House of Lords held that in the
case of disagreement between different schools of thought about the proper medical
conduct, the courts are not to choose one of them as the determinant of the standard of
73 For an analysis of the crucial distinction between professional errors, mistakes and natural eventualities, see A.
Merry and A. McCall-Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
74
[1957] 2 All ER 118, at 121, [1957] 1 WLR 582, at 586.
75 For the similar position in Scotland, see Hunter v. Hanley 1955 SC 200.
76 This formulation, usually depicted under the term "the Bolam test", became undoubtedly the crucial test for
medical negligence when it was adopted by the House of Lords in Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267.
77 The implication here is that when it comes to "professional negligence", the significance of the actual
professional practice is very intense. Whereas for non-professionals, the ordinary conduct relevant to the issue at
stake is just persuasive evidence for the standard of care, in the case of professionals this tends to be accepted as a
binding rule in itself. For further analysis and an attempt to explain the difference, see J. Healy, Medical
Negligence: Common Law Perspectives (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), pp. 63-64.
78
According to the National Audit Office (in Handling Clinical Negligence Claims in England), 76% of the
relevant actions fail for a variety of reasons.
79 For instance, in Hughes v. Waltham Eorest HA [1991] 2 Med LR 155 it was held that the very support from
eminent expert witnesses defies any allegation of negligence. In Defreitas v. O'Brien [1995] 6 Med LR 108 CA,
the court rejected the view that the body of medical opinion in favor of the defendant must be substantial (of
course it is of crucial significance that this case deals with very specialised doctors, the number of which is by
definition very small).
80
[1985] 1 All ER 635.
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care: it is enough for the defendant to show that at least one body of medical opinion
sustains her action, notwithstanding the fact that this may be seriously opposed by other
doctors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this normative edifice has attracted severe criticism as
being particularly lenient towards the medical profession.81 Indeed, the underlying
tendency appears to be an over-reliance on the assessment of other medical
professionals: a doctor's actions fall below the proper standard of care, only if her peers
think that this is the case. On the contrary, if the profession (even a small group from
within the profession) validates the performance of the defendant, the courts explicitly
reject the possibility that they may intervene and substantially scrutinise the alleged
breach of the standard.
Against such a background, the House of Lords was called to opine in Bolitho v.
City <& Hackney HA.i2 This was a rather complicated case, especially because it concerned
a hypothetical situation, regarding an incidence of non-attendance. A doctor did not
attend his patient, who ultimately suffered brain damage. That non-attendance was in
breach of a duty of care was not in dispute; however, and given that only intubation
could have saved the patient, the health authority argued that the doctor was not liable
for the damage, on the premise that even if the doctor was present, she would still not
have intubated the patient and this would have been in accordance with a responsible
body of medical opinion. In essence, this is a defence on the basis of lack of causation,
but the whole argument is based on the hypothesis that the (hypothetical) non-intubation
would not be negligent in terms of the Bolam test. In responding to this defence, the
House of Lords accepted the logical premises of the argument, but proposed a revision
of the Bolam test, according to which only a "responsible" medical opinion should be
relevant and therefore in a case where the medical opinion, proposed as providing the
basis for the standard of care, cannot withstand logical analysis, a judge is entided to
discard it.83 Interestingly, even this revised formulation of the Bolam test validated the
position of the health authority: on the facts of the case, it was held that a medical
opinion supporting non-intubation was indeed reasonable. Yet, and leaving aside the
81 See amongst others, K. Norrie, "Common Practice and the Standard of Care in Medical Negligence" (1985)
Juridical Review 145.
82
[1997] 4 All ER 771.
83
Yet, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explicitly accepted that "it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the
conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable" (ibid, at p. 779).
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outcome of the case, there remains no doubt that this was a significant step in the
development of the test of the standard of care.84
Arguably, an important shift can be detected here,85 even with the minimal
content of allowing the judiciary to disregard these medical dicta that cannot withstand
logical analysis. In the light of this shift, subsequent decisions were eagerly anticipated as
crucial for the clarification of the test for the standard of care after Bolitho.86 Yet, the case
law after Bolitho allows for different interpretations. It is clear that at least in some cases,
such as Sharp v. Southend HA*1 and Marriot v. WestMidlands RHA88 the reasoning in Bolitho
was followed and medical evidence was subjected to judicial analysis.89 On the contrary,
the decisions in cases such as Briody v. St Helen's & KnowsleyAHA,90 Hallatt v. NWAnglia
HA9X and Rhodes v. West Surrey and NE Hampshire HA92 seem to be in favour of the
traditional Bolam approach. Also, it is not necessarily the case that adhering to the test
accepted in Bolitho would make things easier for plaintiffs. For instance, in Wisniewski v.
CentralManchester HA93 the Court of Appeal accepted the premises of Bolitho but added
that "... it is quite impossible to hold that the views sincerely held by doctors of such
eminence cannot logically be supported at all".94 Indeed, it seems that the possibility of
an illogical medical opinion is very extreme.
So, what can be said as a conclusion regarding the standard of care? Although it
seems fair to claim that the courts are now in a position to scrutinise professional
expertise, the extent of this option is so limited that still we are dealing with a
professionally defined standard of care. This is not to say that the decision in Bolitho is
insignificant: on the contrary, it constitutes an explicit indication of the judicial reluctance
84
For a very explicit argument in favor of the decision as a step towards the right direction, see A. Grubb,
"Commentary" (1998) 6 Medical Law Review 378.
85
One should not believe that the decision in Bolitho appeared as a total surprise: in previous cases, more notably
in Smith v. Tunbridge Wells HA [1994] 5 Med LR 334 (a case that refers to information disclosure), traces of a
similar approach can also be found. For further examples, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 172-173.
86 Especially since not everyone was persuaded that the traditional Bolam test was now dead. See, amongst, others
M. Brazier and J. Miola, "Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?" (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85.
87
[1997] Med LR 299.
88
[1999] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 23.
89 It must be stressed though that in Marriott, the crucial factor seems to be the concept of "reasonableness"
instead of the concept of logic and thus it is possible to interpret this case as offering another alternative for the
formulation of the Bolam test.
9011999] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 185, CA.
91 [1998] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 197.
92
[1998] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 256.
93
[1998] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 223, CA.
94
[1998] Lloyd's Rep. Med. 223, CA, at p. 237 by Brooke LJ.
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to extend the significance of an unchallenged Bolam test.95 Yet, as far as the standard of
care is concerned, the impact of 13olitho is rather marginal.96
Let me now turn to the separate issue that I want to discuss in this section,
namely the notion of damages. Just to provide a reminder, in a negligence action the
plaintiff asks to be compensated on the allegation that she suffered damages as a result of
the defendant's conduct, in other words because she was harmed. Conceptually speaking,
harm is almost always unproblematic: undesirable outcomes are usually understood as
harmful. Yet, in a particular set of cases the very notion of harm (and accordingly, the
possibility of being compensated for damages) is itself contested, in the sense that what
the plaintiff perceives as a harmful outcome is not (or should not) be conceptualised as
such. Here, I have in mind two "types" of medical scenarios, where the possibility of the
contestability of the very notion of harm occurs:97 these are know under the technical
terms "wrongful pregnancy"98 and "wrongful birth".99
Actions for wrongful pregnancy commonly occur in connection with a failed
sterilisation operation. Usually, one of the partners in a marital relationship1"" is
voluntarily sterilised, this being a radical means of contraception. Such an operation may
go wrong for two reasons: either because it was performed negligently or because there
exists an inherent risk that the result of a successful operation is reversible and the risk
actually materialised. In the second scenario, it is possible that the doctor in charge has
been negligent in not informing the couple involved for the possibility of reversibility. In
any case, a couple that has bona fide believed that its procreative capability has ceased (in
effect this was exactly the desired outcome of the initial decision to be sterilised), may
end up with an uncovenanted child.101 Assuming, that the doctor in charge of the
operation has been in breach of her duty of care, a claim in negligence arises, which
usually includes two heads of damages: first, damages that derive from the pregnancy
95 For this point, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 317.
96 For further analysis, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 175-177.
97 Arguably, a third type of scenario, the so-called "wrongful life" cases raises the same problems. Yet, because of
its limited practical significance, 1 will not discuss it here. For a comprehensive analysis, although from a
philosophical perspective, see E. Haavi-Moreim, "The Concept of Harm Reconceived: a Different Look at
Wrongful Life", (1988) 7 Law and Philosophy 3.
98 Sometimes, the term "wrongful conception" is used to denote the same thing. For an analysis of why the term
used in the main text is preferable, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 168.
99 The complexity of these scenarios is such that they have triggered a rather broad and fruitful academic interest.
The relevant literature is quite extensive, but I think that a solid presentation of the main issues can be found in N.
Priaulx, "Joy to the World! A (Healthy) Child is Born! Reconceptualising "Harm" in Wrongful Conception"
(2004) 13(1) Social & Legal Studies 5; L. Hoyano, "Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception" (2002) 65(6)
Modern Law Review 883; J.K. Mason, "Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Terminology" (2002)
6 Edinburgh LR 46 and "Unwanted Pregnancy: A Case of Retroversion?" (2000) 4 Edinburgh LR 191.
100 More often than not, this would be the male partner.
101 I borrow the term from J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 168.
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itself and may include loss of earnings, personal discomfort etc; secondly, and more
importantly for my present purposes, damages that refer to the cost of bringing up the
child that has been conceived. I will not deal at all with the first head of damages, since
the normal rules of negligence apply there. On the contrary, the second head is
conceptually problematic, given that in essence compensation is asked for the birth of a
child. The question that occurs is straightforward: is the birth of a child a proper basis
for a claim of damages?
The courts in the UK have struggled quite a lot with this issue. A number of
cases have so far been decided with interesting, although rather complicated, results. In
order to understand the relevant dicta, one has to keep in mind that the courts usually
employ a distinction regarding the health of the child conceived as a result of wrongful
pregnancy; accordingly, there is an important difference between giving birth to a healthy
and to an unhealthy child.
In the first of the apposite cases,1"2 the claim was rejected, as Jupp J argued that
"it is an assumption of our culture that the coming of child into the world is an occasion
for rejoicing".103 Nonetheless, soon afterwards the Court of Appeal nullified this view: in
EmehWi it was held that there is no reason why the cost of raising a child should not be
perceived as a proper head of damage. This reasoning appeared as the final word on the
issue and a set of subsequent decisions105 followed it completely. However, this image of
settled precedent was to be radically changed due to the decision of the House of Lords
in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board}06 Following different and occasionally rather unclear
reasoning (which seemed to include arguments regarding reasonableness, distributive
justice, incommensurability and the idea of birth as a blessing),107 the Law Lords
unanimously held that the cost of raising a healthy child should not be recovered. In this
respect they significantly overruled the position that was held until then.108 Yet, since
their decision referred to healthy children, the position was unclear in reference to
unhealthy children. This was clarified in Parkinson v. St James and Seacroft University Hospital
NHS Trust,109 where it was held that it is fair, just and reasonable to compensate for the
102 Udale v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1983] 2 All ER 522, [1983] 1 WLR 1098.
103 Ibid, at p. 531.
104 [1985] QB 1012, [1984] 3 All ER 1044, CA.
105 See amongst others Robinson v. Salford Health Authority (1992) 3 Med LR 270 and Allen v. Bloomsbury
Health Authority [1993] 1 All ER 651, (1993) 13 BMLR 47.
106
[2000] AC 59, 2000 SC 1, HL.
107 1 will revisit the reasoning of this case in the penultimate part of this chapter, so there is no reason to be very
extensive here.
108 The decision faced significant academic criticism. See, amongst others, J. Thomson, "Abandoning the Law of
Delict?" 2000 SLT 43.
109
[2002] QB 266, [2001J 3 All ER 97.
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additional expenses of bringing up an unhealthy child (additional in comparison with the
expenses of raising a healthy child that are not recoverable). This reasoning was further
clarified by the House of Lord decision in Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS
Trust.U0 There, it was clearly held that the only disability that matters is the disability of
the child born. Accordingly, the possibility of a disabled mother is irrelevant:111 when a
disabled mother is to raise a healthy child, the reasoning in McFarlane persists and no
compensation is awarded. Therefore, as a coda, only the additional costs of bringing up
an unhealthy child are compensated in wrongful pregnancy, at least as things stand for
the time being.
An action for wrongful birth is similar, but conceptually distinct. Here, the
negligence occurs during pregnancy and more particularly during pre-natal screening.
Effectively, the claim is based on the allegation that the doctor failed to realise and
subsequently to inform the prospective parents about a foetal abnormality, either because
of negligently performed or of total lack of pre-natal screening. As a result, the parents
did not have the opportunity to consider a termination of pregnancy and ended up with a
heavily disabled child. Once again, a similar question arises: should they be compensated
for the cost of raising this child?
Leaving aside the fact that the relevant cases may fail because of problems with
causation (the parents have to prove that if they knew about the defect, they would have
decided to terminate the pregnancy),11" generally speaking the courts are willing to answer
the question positively. In a series of cases that include Anderson v. Forth Valley Health
Board,113 Nunnerley v. Warrington Health Authority114 and McLelland v. Greater Glasgow Health
Board,115 the courts awarded compensation in total.116 However, the decision of the
House of Lords in McFarlane also affected wrongful birth cases: the ultimate award is
now modified to exclude the cost of raising a healthy child, in accordance with the
parallel position in wrongful pregnancy. This modification is included in a series of cases
110
[2004] AC 309, [2003] 4 All ER.
111 This was a relevant issue in this case, because Mrs Rees was severely handicapped and the previous decision of
the Court of Appeal had accepted her claim, although it involved the birth of a healthy child. For the reasoning of
the Court of Appeal see [2002] 2 All ER 177, (2002) 65 BMLR 117 and the very similar arguments in Groom v.
Selby (2002) 64 BMLR 47, [2002] Lloyd's Rep Med 1, CA.
"2This is why the claim in Gregory v. Pembrokshire Health Authority [1989] 1 MedLR81 failed.
113
(1998) 44 BMLR 108, 1998 SLT 588.
114
[2000] Lloyd's Rep Med 170.
115 1999 SC 305, 1999 SLT 543.
116 To be precise, in these cases damages include the shock and distress the parents suffered from the birth of a
disabled child and the cost of upbringing the child.
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decided after McFarlane, most notably Rand v. Fast Dorset Health Authority^1 and Hardmann
v. Ammin}w
With this comment, I have concluded what is effectively the first part of my
exploration of medical negligence. A significant issue remains to be discussed. This is
exactly the subject matter of the following section.
d) Information disclosure and its relationship to negligence.
The discussion has so far dealt with negligence in the course of diagnosis and treatment.
Nonetheless, this is not the only context within which medical negligence may occur.
The interaction between a doctor and a patient involves also a stage of communication
between the two parties; this is necessary, not only in terms of sound medical practice
but also because of the legal requirement of consent. Consent cannot be given in a
communicative vacuum. At least some information must be disclosed from the doctor to
the patient, so that the latter can consent or refuse in an informed manner. Without
information the very concept of consent would be essentially redundant - hence the ternr
"informed consent",119 which implies that the patient has acquired some knowledge of
the nature and the possible risks of the proposed medical intervention.
It is possible that a negligence action may originate in this context. Since the
stake here is information disclosure, the complaint of the pursuer refers to what has
actually been disclosed. To be more precise, what matters is whether an inherent hazard
of the (properly performed on the basis of proper diagnosis) intervention has been
revealed or not before consent was given. If this had not been the case and during the
medical intervention the risk actually materialised, the patient may have a claim in
negligence. For reasons of clarity, let me say that this claim usually takes the following
form: "I was not told in advance that there was an inherent risk involved in the proposed
operation; this risk materialised and as a result I suffered damages; if I had known about
the risk that was not disclosed to me, I would not have consented to what was proposed
and the operation would not have been performed; therefore I ask compensation for the
damages I suffered".
117 [2000] Lloyd's Rep Med 181, (2000) 56 BMLR 39.
1,8
[2000] Lloyd's Rep Med 498, (2000) 59 BMLR 39.
'19 The use of the rather odd term "informed consent" is not without its critics, especially from the point of view of
medical ethics. See, amongst others, O. O' Neil, "Some Limits of Informed Consent" (2003) 29 Journal of
Medical Ethics 4 and O. Corrigan, "Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent" (2003) 25 Sociology of
Health and Illness 768.
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This is clearly a negligence claim:120 the doctor is blamed for misconduct during
the process of information disclosure and therefore the general law of medical negligence
applies. However, two particular issues potentially distinguish cases of informed consent
from those that relate to diagnosis and treatment. The first issue refers to the exact
delineation of the standard of care; the second to the problem of causation. As to the
former, the troubling question is whether the test that substantiates the standard of care
in diagnosis and treatment is also relevant here, since information disclosure is not
necessarily a matter of professional expertise alone. As to the latter, the problem is that
the plaintiff has to prove that if she had known about the undisclosed risk, she would not
have consented to the operation: the need to sustain this assertion is fraught with
difficulty. I will explore these issues in turn.
As to the standard of care, the first cases that dealt with the problem assumed
that negligence in the context of informed consent is no different than negligence in
diagnosis and treatment. Both in Chatterton v. Gerson121 and in Hills v. Pottern2 the court had
no difficulty in applying the usual test regarding the standard of care, namely the Bolam
test. In this view, what a doctor has to disclose is determined by what a responsible body
of medical opinion would deem reasonable to disclose in a similar situation. This test
(usually depicted under the term "professional standard") treats disclosure as a matter
that essentially falls within the domain of professional expertise, being part of the general
clinical management of the patient. Yet, at least in theory, the opposite test is equally
conceivable. This alternative test, often know as the "patient standard", would treat
disclosure as a matter referring to the quality of the communication between a doctor
and patient, that helps the latter to reach an informed decision. In this view, it is
inherently linked with the patient's right of self-determination. As such, the standard of
what should be disclosed escapes the domain of professional expertise and is determined
solely by what the patient would need to know under the circumstances.123
120
The fact that the complaint refers to the process of acquiring the consent of the patient, which was allegedly
flawed, does not negate the fact that consent was actually given to an intervention of the general nature of that
which was ultimately performed; therefore, there is no doubt that negligence and not battery is the appropriate
cause of action. The more clear reasoning regarding the circumstances in which each of these actions is available
can be found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl v. Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3rd) 1, per
Laskin CJ at p. 10. The legal position is exactly the same in the UK, as it was later acknowledged in Chatterton v.
Gerson [1981] QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257.
121 Ibid.
122 [1983] 3 All ER 716, [1984] 1 WLR 641.
123 A strict adherence to this standard implies that the doctor can only exercise a minimum of clinical judgment in
the context of information disclosure, since she must reveal all the relevant information to the patient. This is quite
problematic in real terms, especially given the limitations of time in heavily institutionalized environments. In the
light of practical problems, professional guidelines regarding the proper conduct of doctors in obtaining patients'
consent are of crucial significance. In this respect, see Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent for
Examination or Treatment (London: Department ofHealth, 2001).
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Some concessions towards the direction of a patient standard were accepted in
the seminal case of Sidaway,124 which still constitutes the main authority in the context of
informed consent.125 Although the main test to be followed was again in tune with the
professional standard,126 as was clearly accepted by Lord Diplock, some caveats were
simultaneously introduced.127 First, it was accepted that whenever a patient is facing a
"material" risk, this risk must be disclosed. What exactly should be understood as a
material risk is indeed quite ambiguous; yet, Lord Bridge provides us with some
assistance saying that, "a judge might... come to the conclusion that the disclosure of a
particular risk... was so obviously necessary on the part of the patient that no reasonably
prudent medical man would fail to make it".128 More generally, it seems that a risk can be
defined as material either when a reasonable person in the patient's condition would
consider it to be significant or when a reasonable doctor would conclude that the
particular patient would find the risk to be significant, had she known about it.
Furthermore, it was accepted that special questions and requirements on behalf of the
patient must always be answered, although it remains unclear on what basis answers
should be given.129 Yet, although these caveats that ostensibly undermine the professional
standard must be observed, they are to be set aside whenever the doctor feels that a
particular disclosure could be psychologically detrimental to the patient, especially if it
could give rise to the possibility that the patient will refuse to consent to an absolutely
(from the clinical point of view) necessary medical intervention. In such a scenario, the
doctor enjoys a "therapeutic" or "professional" privilege that allows her to withhold the
disclosure of information.
In subsequent cases,130 the courts tried to strike a balance between the strict
application of the professional standard, based on the Bolam test, and the caveats that
124
Sidaway v. Board ofGovernors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Mauldsay Hospital (HL) [1985] 1 All
ER 643, [1985] AC 871, [1985] 2 WLR 480, 1 BMLR 132.
125 In Scotland the seminal case is Moyes v. Lothian Health Board 1990 SLT 444, [1990] 1 Med LR 463, where
the professional standard is strongly affirmed.
126 With the exception of the essentially dissenting opinion by Lord Scarman, who argued in favor of the patient
standard, at least as this can be assessed from the point of view of a prudent person in the position of the particular
patient.
127 Since the precise terms of the ruling are somehow confusing, there remains a controversy regarding what
exactly it was decided. For a glimpse on the relevant debate, see M. Brazier, "Patient Autonomy and Consent to
Treatment: The Role of the Law?" (1987) 7 Legal Studies 169; C. Newdick, "The Doctor's Duties of Care under
Sidaway" (1985) 36 NILQ 243; H. Teff, "Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-determination or
Therapeutic Alliance?" (1985) 101 LQR 432 and more recently, M. Jones, "Informed Consent and Other Fairy
Stories" (1999) 7 Medical Law Review 103.
128 [1985] 1 All ER 643 at 663.
129
Interestingly, in Blyth v. Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 151, CA it was held that it is again the
Bolam test that determines what a doctor should disclose in answering a patient's enquity.
130
Amongst others, see Smith v. Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 334 and Newell v. Goldberg
[1995] 6 Med LR 371.
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were accepted in Sidaway. Still, in probably the most important of those, Pearce v. United
Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,131 the Court of Appeal essentially reiterated the decision in
Sidaway. Lord Woolf MR argued that the Bolam test is indeed the relevant principle
regarding the delineation of the standard of proper care, but insisted that significant risks
(understood from the point of the view of the reasonable patient) must be disclosed.
Even if it is concluded that the doctor is in breach of his duty of care, the
plaintiff still has to prove that this breach caused the damage that was suffered. This
generates a problem of causation that in this context seems to be particularly acute.
Mainly because the proof of the causal link can only be based on the assessment of the
hypothetical scenario that the patient new the inherent risk, it appears extremely difficult
to prove that on the balance of probabilities the patient would have refused to consent
had she been aware of the risk. The usual norms of causation apply and it is exactly their
application that generates difficulty. That is why a very significant number of claims have
failed on the basis of lack of causation.
Yet, in the recent Chester v. Afsha?v~ the House of Lords appeared to be ready to
"bend" the traditional rules of causation in order to allow for the claim to be successful.
While it was accepted that the standard rules of causation would block any hope for
compensation, the majority of the Court held, on various grounds that included policy
and justice, that in decisions regarding one's health and well-being the stake is so
significant that a departure from the standard rules is desirable. On this basis, the claim
was ultimately successful. By reassessing the mles of causation,133 the decision seems to
obscure the legal position on what was until recently relatively settled legal principle.
Are there any conclusions that one can reach from this exploration of informed
consent? Although the subject has attracted a lot of academic attention, which has
highlighted many different issues, it seems to me that at least one conclusion is
indisputable: informed consent is a clear example of how well-accepted legal principles
oriented to the protection of professional expertise may potentially struggle when
confronted with the concept of patient's autonomy. The fact that the relevant claims
appear as negligence claims within a communicative context, renders informed consent
an exemplary plateau for the co-existence of conflicting concepts. For the time being, it
131 (1999)48 BMLR 118.
132
[2005] 1 AC 134, [2004] 4 All ER 587, [2004] 3 WLR 927.
133
Yet, it has been argued that a more accurate reading of the case reveals that the rules of causation are not
essentially altered and that the outcome is justified because of the very delicate delineation of the exact scope of
the relevant duty of care. For this argument, see M. Hogg, "Duties of care, causation and the implications of
Chester v Afshar" (2005) 9 Edinburgh LR 156.
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appears that professional expertise wins the day. It remains to be seen, if in the future
this will still be the case.
e) Medical confidentiality.
The regulation of medical confidentiality is a particular instantiation of the legal
principles regarding confidentiality in general.134 In the medical setting, confidentiality
integrates two distinct stakes: the first one is the confidential nature of the doctor-patient
relationship as such and the second is the security of the information arising from this
relationship. Obviously, these two are so closely intertwined that they affirm the legal
duty of a doctor not to disclose to third parties the content of the acquired information
related to a patient.135 This duty arises on any occasion when confidential information is
exchanged between parties,136 with the additional condition that the parties know or
ought to have known that the relevant information should remain confidential and, thus,
outside the public domain. There seems to be no doubt that these conditions are met
within the ambit of the doctor-patient relationship and that all health care professionals
owe a duty of confidentiality to their patients. For instance, the General Medical Council
insists that its members owe such a duty and in its relevant guidelines,137 it includes a list
of more particular principles that further elaborate on how one should act in respect of
this duty.
It is usually claimed that the essential justification of the duty is that it is in the
public interest that confidences be respected.138 Accordingly, it is again the public interest
that primarily dictates when a breach of the duty is justified,139 given that this is not an
absolute duty.140 Several cases arising from the medical context show how the public
interest actually functions in this twofold manner. I will briefly refer to some of these
134 For these principles see mainly Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers, (No. 2) 11990] AC 109. It is
interesting to notice here that the exact legal basis of the duty of confidentiality is fraught with ambiguity: for an
introduction to this theoretically puzzling question, see G.T. Laurie, Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-
Legal Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 215-218 and for a much more detailed analysis
R.G. Toulson and C.M. Phillips, Confidentiality (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), chapter 2.
135 This duty is equated with the right of the patient not to have information about her disclosed to the public
without her consent.
136 For an analysis of what information has the "necessary quality of confidence", see the reasoning in Coco v. A.N.
Clark (Engineers) [1969] RPC 41.
137 See GMC, Confidentiality (London: GMC, 2004).
138 See the speech of Lord Goff in Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers, (No. 2) [1990] AC 109 at 281B-C
and also the apposite reasoning in the similar Scottish case Lord Advocate v. Scotsman Pub. Ltd 1989 SLT 705.
Yet, the decision in the more recent R v. Department ofHealth, ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 1 All ER
786, seems to shift the focus of the justification towards the notion of the fairness of use of the relevant
information. For a critique of this case, see G.T. Laurie, 2002, pp. 225-228.
139 It goes without saying that the consent of the patient (the person towards whom the duty is owed) releases the
doctor from the obligation of non-disclosure.
140 As it was explicitly stated mWoolgar v. ChiefConstable ofSussex Police [1999] 3 All ER 604, CA.
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cases, aiming primarily on the conditions that justify a breach of the duty, since this is the
area that seems to be more problematic.
X v. Y141 referred to the disclosure to the public, through the press, of the
information that two general practitioners were suffering from AIDS. This information
was revealed to a newspaper by an employee of the health authority. The health authority
sought an injunction against the identification of the practitioners, while the defendants
argued that disclosure was justified, given that it is in the public interest to know that
health care professionals suffer from such a disease. Rose J took the view that while there
was a public interest in the maintenance of public health as well as a public interest in the
freedom of the press, in this particular case none of them justified the breach of the duty
of confidentiality,142 which is itself established in the public interest. Insisting on the
difference between "what is interesting to the public and what is in the public interest to
make known"143 the judge granted the injunction. The conclusion was different in W v.
Egdell,144 a case referring to the disclosure of confidential information by the psychiatrist
of a mentally ill prisoner. This information, in essence the conclusion of the doctor's
assessment of the dangerousness of W, was acquired during the process of W's
psychiatric evaluation pending his application for transfer to a different secure unit.143
The Court of Appeal held that the breach of the duty was in these circumstances
justified, given that the protection of the public from dangerous individuals merits (as an
obvious demonstration of the public interest) the overcoming of the (equally public in
nature)146 interest to have confidences maintained.
Leaving the factual content of these cases aside, what is interesting to observe is
that the courts do not attempt to develop a set of standard criteria to substantiate the
public interest exception. Rather, they tend to argue in an ad hoc manner that solely aims
at examining whether the breach of the duty was justified in the particular circumstances
of the case they hear.147 Although it has been argued that a common theme, namely the
141 Av. r [1988] 2 All ER 648.
142 More precisely he argued that public health was not under threat given the facts of the case and that the public
interest in the freedom of press was not in the circumstances so strong as to justify the breach of the duty.
143 2 All ER 648, at658d-661g.
144 Wv. Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835, [1990] 2 WLR471, 4 BMLR 96, CA.
145 For a rather similar case that refers to the custodial disposal of a prisoner and manifests a similar outcome, see
R v. Crozier (1990) 8 BMLR 128.
146 What is interesting here is that the court insisted that it is the public interest in maintaining confidences to be
weighed against the public interest that possibly justifies the breach, and not the private interest of the patient
involved.
147 This is not necessarily the case when minors are involved, as it has been demonstrated in Re C (A Minor)
(Evidence: Confidential Information) (1991) 7 BMLR 138 and in Re D and another [1995] 4 All ER 385. In this
context, the concept of the public interest tends to be linked with the best interests principle, in the sense that
serving the best interests of the minor is always in the public interest; this of course, brings us back to the well-
known problem of defining what is in the best interests of the minor!
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avoidance of harm,148 may be traced, it remains the case that the courts prefer a
particularistic approach. In this respect, ambiguity remains a feature of the law of medical
confidentiality and hence future developments must be seen as quite unpredictable.149
With this brief reference to the law of medical confidentiality, I have concluded
the exploration of the most important norms emanating from case law. In the next
section I will take on board the legislative provisions. The structure of this presentation is
twofold: first, I will discuss norms that deal with some particular instances of medical
practice, namely those that have attracted much scholarly interest so far. Then, I will





The regulation of the management of patients suffering from mental health problems
acquires particular significance, mainly because in a rather intuitive manner the stakes in
this field are (or seem to be) unusually high. For a variety of reasons that arguably
include the conceptual unease about the very notion of mental health,150 the untreatable
character of some conditions,151 the possible dangerousness of patients for the public at
large152 and the very real tradition of compulsory detention of mental health patients in
specially designed institutions, it seems that mental health is a special issue that requires
exceptional regulatory responses. Indeed, legislation pertaining to mental health has been
around for quite some time153 and still remains at the centre of a heated public debate. At
the time of writing a new bill aiming at reforming the current system is under scrutiny154
148 For this point, see G.T. Laurie, 2002, p. 230.
149 For further analysis of this problem, with an emphasis on the administrative bureaucracy of the NHS that has an
important effect on this ambiguity, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 277ff.
150 For a classic radical view see T. Szasz, The Manufacture ofMadness (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
151 For a short discussion of the significance of this issue, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 717 with
further references.
152 The popular perception of the mental health patient as a potentially dangerous individual is indeed quite strong,
although it seems that this is probably a misrepresentation of reality. For an introduction to the issue, see P.J.
Taylor and J. Gunn, "Homicides by People with Mental Illness: Myth and Reality" (1999) 174 British Journal of
Psychiatry 174.
153 For instance, for the period after the World War II, the first relevant statute has been the Mental Health Act
1959.
154 This is the draft Mental Health Bill 2004.
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and it seems that the government's intention is to pass this new legislation in the near
future. However, this is not the case yet and as a previous version of this bill has already
been withdrawn after having faced severe criticism,155 I will only discuss here the
legislation as it now stands.
Currently, the relevant regulation is included in the Mental Health Act 1983 for
England, Wales and Northern Ireland and in the Mental Health (Care and Treatment)
(Scotland) Act 2003 for Scotland.156 Both these Acts must be read in the light of the
Human Rights Act 1998, given that many aspects of the management of mental health
may possibly raise issues of human rights infringements.157 Their exact provisions are
quite complicated, since they regulate in a very detailed manner both substantial and
procedural issues. Here, I will refer only to the most significant provisions.
The 1983 Act mainly deals with the regulation of the compulsory detention of
patients suffering from mental health problems. This is just one possibility from within a
range of options regarding the management of such patients. Other alternatives include
care in the community and voluntary hospitalisation, but these are not essentially covered
by the Act. Compulsory detention is addressed according to a twofold distinction:
section 2 of the Act regulates the so-called "compulsory detention for assessment". This
detention that cannot extend a 28-day period aims at detecting whether the patient
suffers from a mental disorder included in section 1 of the Act. If this is the case, then,
according to section 3, the patient is detained in hospital in order to be treated. The
precondition of such a detention is that treatment is deemed to be necessary for the
health and safety of the patient or the protection of others, that treatment cannot be
provided without detention and that two doctors have certified that the patient suffers
from mental illness, severe mental impairment and psychopathic disorder. There is a time
limit of six months for such a detention, but this can be extended if an application is
made to the Mental Health Act Commission, which is also established by the Act, under
section 121.
The most important feature of these provisions is that during the period of the
compulsory detention the patient can be lawfully treated for the mental disorder on the
basis of which she is kept in hospital, without her consent.158 This is explicitly provided in
155 This was the Mental Health Bill 2001.
156 Which repealed the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 1999, interestingly the first Act
passed by the Scottish Parliament.
157 Indeed, cases have been heard on the basis of human rights violation. For a discussion of some of them, see J.K..
Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, p. 725.
158 This exception only applies to treatment of this particular condition; for any other condition, the general law of
consent applies.
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Part IV of the Act, especially by section 63, in terms of which a patient's consent is not
required. The problem here is to clarify what exacdy constitutes "treatment" for a mental
disorder. This issue has been addressed by the courts; the general trend is to perceive
such a treatment in a very wide sense and to include therapeutic measures that not only
directly affect the condition of the patient, but also benefit her indirectly. Just to provide
some examples, it has been held that feeding in cases of anorexia nervosa belongs to
treatment under section 63;159 also, that a caesarean section performed against the wishes
of a pregnant woman suffering from schizophrenia was to be understood as treatment of
her mental condition.160 In both cases the result was that this treatment could be lawfully
administered without consent. Yet, within the Act exceptions are present. Section 57
provides that when surgical procedures that destroy brain tissue or its function are
involved or when hormone implants that reduce male sex drive are to be used, the
patient must consent and the treatment must be further supported by a second medical
opinion apart from the doctor in charge. Additionally, according to section 58 of the Act
the patient's consent is necessary when electro-convulsive therapy is involved, unless a
second medical opinion supports this treatment.
The Scottish Act parallels the 1983 Act in that it also refers to different stages in
the process of detention. A distinction is made between "emergency detention", "short
term detention" and "compulsory treatment" and similar time limits are introduced.
However, two significant differences must be mentioned. First, this Act includes a more
comprehensive definition of what constitutes mental disorder for its purposes: in section
328, this is defined as any mental illness, personality disorder or learning disability.
Secondly, the 2003 Act is very much in favour of a community care philosophy:
therefore, and in combination with Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995
it provides for out-patient treatment with the assistance of the social services.
ii. Reproduction.
Although the field of human reproduction raises a very wide range of issues that call for
medical and legal intervention, I will confine my discussion here only to three apposite
statutes. The first is the Abortion Act 1967, the provisions of which designate the
lawfully performed abortions. The second is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
159 See SWHertfordshire HA v. KB [1994] 2 FCR 1051 (FD).
160 See Tameside & Glossop Acute Services Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FCR 753.
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Act 1990,161 which advances a detailed regulatory framework for the activities that
currendy give content to assisted reproduction. The last one is the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act 1985 that regulates some issues arising from the practice of surrogate
motherhood. It goes without saying that these statutes do not exhaust all the legal
perplexities of the regulation of reproduction; yet, they do constitute a comprehensive
starting point.
The Abortion Act 1967, as amended by the 1990 Act, includes a number of
reasons on the basis of which a termination of pregnancy is lawful.162 The list of reasons
obeys a basic time-related distinction, namely whether the termination of pregnancy
happens before or after the 24th week of gestation. If the 24th week is not exceeded, then
an abortion is lawful if it is performed by a registered medical practitioner and two
register medical practitioners are of the opinion that the continuation of pregnancy
would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, or any existing children of her family
(section l(l)(a)). This reason does not apply after the 24th week of pregnancy. All the
other reasons included in the Act do not depend on this temporal restriction. These
include the risk of a grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman (section 1 (l)(b)); the possibility that the continuation of pregnancy
would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated (section l(l)(c)); finally, the substantial risk that, if the child were born, it
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be severely handicapped
(section l(l)(d)). When any of these reasons holds a termination of pregnancy is lawful
and it can be performed in any NHS hospital or other place approved for such a use. As
a general comment, it can be said that these reasons are so widely drafted that for any
practical purpose abortion is unquestionably lawful in the UK, especially during the first
24 weeks of pregnancy. However, the way that the Act is drafted does not provide
women with a "right" to abortion, but only with a set of reasons that legalise the practice.
This in turn means that in essence, whether an abortion will be performed or not, is a
matter of a complete discretion of the doctor in charge; the Act simply absolves doctors
from criminal responsibilities if one of the defences holds.
The HFE Act 1990 is a very detailed piece of legislation that was drafted as a
result of the realisation that medical advances in the domain of reproduction have
161 From now on, I will refer to this Act as the HFE Act 1990.
162 In purely legal terms, these reasons constitute legal defenses against offences that exist at the background of the
Abortion Act 1967, and are mainly included in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life
Preservation Act 1929 (although the relevant provisions of the latter have been repealed by the HFE Act 1990).
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radically altered a field that was traditionally outside the scope of the law. A detailed
account of the provisions of the Act is beyond the purposes of this chapter,163 so I will
only refer to its underlying principles. The main tenet of the Act is the establishment of a
system of licensing referring to the legality of a range of medical techniques and activities
that are now performed due to scientific developments in medicine. In charge of this
licensing scheme is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, that supervises
any activity regulated by the Act and informs the Secretary of State for Health whenever
it deems this to be appropriate. As far as reproduction is concerned, any clinic or other
institution that provides treatment related to assisted reproduction, which involves
technical activities outside the body, must operate under a license given by the Authority.
Without such a licence, the use or storage of gametes or the creation of an embryo
outside the human body is prohibited. In addition to this basic provision, a set of
activities that include the placing in a woman of any live gametes or embryos other than
those of human origin, the placing of a human embryo in any animal, the replacement of
an embryonic nucleus by a nucleus taken from a cell of any other person or embryo and
the keeping or using of an embryo after the 14th day of its existence cannot be licensed in
any case and therefore are completely prohibited. Furthermore, the Authority is to draft
and maintain a Code of Practice that must provide guidance as to how the clinics that
perform licensed activities are to function.
In addition to these general provisions, the HFE 1990 incorporates a variety of
detailed norms that regulate concrete issues arising within assisted reproduction.164
However, because of the rapid pace of scientific developments in the field, even the 15-
year-period from the passing of the Act has necessitated a reassessment of the regulatory
regime. At the time of writing, a process of re-evaluation of the 1990 Act is in place,
although its desired effect is still unclear. The House of Commons Science and
Technology Committee has already published a relevant report165 and a further
consultation document is apparently imminent.
Let me conclude this section by a brief mention of the Surrogacy Agreements
Act 1985. The main thrust of this Act is to prohibit surrogacy agreements on a
commercial basis. This fundamental provision does not entail that the necessary costs for
the benefit of the surrogate during pregnancy are not to be paid, but only that explicitly
163
Probably the most detailed account of the provisions of the Act can be found in R.G. Lee and D. Morgan,
Human Fertilisation andEmbryology Act 1990 (London: Butterworths, 2001).
164 For a detailed analysis of the most important provisions, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 74ff.
165 The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Fifth Report, Human Reproductive Technologies
and the Law (2005, available at www.parliament.uk/s&tcom).
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commercial transactions are out of the picture. This is further reinforced by section 36 of
the HFE Act 1990, that added a provision in the 1985 Act, according to which no
surrogacy agreement is enforceable by or against any person included in the making of it.
Accordingly, although surrogacy agreements are as such lawful their ultimate result is not
necessarily the one that the parties intended.
Hi. Organ donation and transplantation.
The legal regulation of organ donation and transplantation is based on two fundamental
distinctions. The first refers to the source of the organ or tissue that is donated; in this
respect, one can distinguish between xenotransplantation, where organs are transferred
from one species to another and homotransplantation, where the transfer involves only
human beings. Since at the moment the Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory
Authority166 has imposed a moratorium on relevant clinical trials, based on the need of
further research on the issue, I will deal here only with homotransplantation.167 Here a
second distinction is crucial, one that refers to the status of the (human) donor; one can
distinguish between donations from a living person and "cadaver" donations. This
distinction is essential, both in terms of the technical aspects of the process and in terms
of the exact legal regulation. That is why it will provide the structural backbone of this
section.
"Live" donations are primarily regulated by sections 32-33 of the Human Tissue
Act 2004 that has repealed the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 in England, Wales
and Northern Ireland, but not in Scotland. The 2004 Act stipulates that it is an offence
to perform such transplantation of this type not in accordance with specific regulations;
since such regulations are not yet in place, the relevant regulations under the 1989 Act
are still valid. As these are oriented to the 1989 Act, the main features underlying this Act
also remain quite significant. Generally speaking, the regime is characterised by two main
considerations. To begin with, both Acts168 prohibit the giving or receiving of any
financial rewards for the purpose of organ donations, in an attempt to explicitly integrate
a policy against the commercialisation and commodification of human organs.169 The
166 This Authority has been established with the aim to monitor scientific progress on the matter, until the
emergence of primary legislation.
167
For a concise introduction to the most significant issues regarding xenotransplantation, see J.K. Mason and G.
T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 478-481 with further references.
168 In section 32 of the 2004 Act and in section 1(1) and (2) of the 1989 Act.
169 It has to be stated though that this line of thought is not uncontested. For the opposite arguments, see amongst
others A.S. Daar, "Paid Organ Donation - the Grey Basket Concept" (1998) 24 Journal ofMedical Ethics 365 and
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second consideration is to be found in the 1989 Act. This prohibits transplantation
between persons that are not genetically related (as this is defined in section 2(2) of the
Act), unless this is authorised by the Unrelated Live Transplant Regulatory Authority;170
this provision leaves transplantation between genetically related individuals to be
regulated by the common law and essentially by the doctrine of consent.171 Authorisation
depends on several factors, the most important of which is the lack of any element of
commercialisation, the consent of the donor and the counselling of both parties. 172
"Cadaver" donations are regulated by the Human Tissue Act 2004 in England,
Wales and Northern Ireland.173 The Act has replaced the Human Tissue Act 1961,174
which authorises the removal of organs on the basis of a specific indication of the
deceased or on the decision of the person "lawfully in possession of the body", if this
person has no reason to believe, after having make such "reasonable enquiry as may
practicable", that the deceased or any surviving relative would have objected to the
donation (section 1(1)). The new Act replaces this provision, by stipulating that the use
of the body or of the removed organs of a deceased person is lawful for the purpose of
transplantation if this is done with "appropriate consent", according to section 1(1)(b&c).
The "appropriate" consent is the consent of the deceased person; in case that a relevant
directive is absent, consent may be given by a person nominated by a living adult to act
in his interests after his death (according to section 4). If this is not the case either,
authority to consent is transferred to the person who stood in a "qualifying relationship"
with the deceased (defined in section 27(4)). In any case, cadaver donations and
transplantation fall within the ambit of the Human Tissue Authority, a crucial
responsibility of which is to provide a Code of Practice regarding the procedure. The
new regime emerged as the governmental response to the widespread unauthorised use
of human tissues following post-mortem examination, and tackled the issue by
identifying consent as the cornerstone of its lawfulness.
L.D. de Castro, "Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments in Favour of Compensated Organ Donation"
(2003) 29 Journal ofMedical Ethics 139.
170 This was established by the Human Organ Transplants (Establishment of Relationship) Regulations 1989 (SI
1989, No. 2107) and the Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989, No. 2480).
171 Recall, however, that no one is allowed to consent to being killed or seriously injured and some types of
transplantation involve serious injuries to the donor.
172 See in details the Human Organ Transplants (Unrelated Persons) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989, No. 2480).
173 It must be noticed that the purpose of the Act is not solely to regulate the issue of transplantation, but generally
the use of human tissues.




For the purposes of this chapter, the most interesting feature of the field of medical
research is the significant absence of detailed regulation. Leaving aside the provisions of
the HFE Act 1990, according to which the Authority must license those activities that
fall within the scope of the Act (and certain types of research are indeed covered by the
Act), medical research is essentially unregulated by the legislature directly. At first glance,
this seems rather odd, especially if one considers the history of atrocities that took place
on the sidelines of medical research during the course of the 20th century175 and the very
intense media interest in anything new that is announced as a result of medical research.
The only regulatory instrument that directly deals with medical research, is the
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004. This instrument
implements in the UK the provisions of the relevant European Directive regarding the
conduct of clinical trials on medical products for human use.176 Obviously, the scope of
this instrument is rather narrow, since it applies only to clinical trials of medical products.
Consequently, any other form of medical research is beyond the scope of this particular
regime.
Nonetheless, the scarcity of direct legal regulation does not entail a total lack of
control mechanisms on how research is conducted. On the contrary, a comprehensive
system of "research governance" is in place. The concrete content of this system
originates from two distinct institutional sources. The first is the Department of Health
that provides guidance, in the form of principles, governing all medical research which is
conducted within the ambit of the Department, namely within the NHS. The current
guidelines are included in the Department's publication Research Governance for Health and
Social Care177 and are primarily oriented to the notion of consent as the main premise in
terms of which research can be conducted. The second institutional source of research
governance is a "network" of Research Ethics Committees that also provides guidance
for medical research. I use the term network to stress that there exists a variety of such
Committees or similar bodies that all operate in the "soft" regulation ofmedical research.
For instance, several NHS Trusts have formed ethics committees that participate in the
relevant decision-making processes. In a more central level, Health Authorities have set
175 In the international domain, codes of practice have been drafted in order to counter the possibility of such
atrocities happening again. The most significant one is currently the Declaration of Helsinki drawn by the World
Medical Association, as amended in 2000.
176 Directive 2001/20/EC of 4 April 2001.
177
Department of Health, Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (2005), available at
www.dh.gov.uk.
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official (in the sense that they have done that under the auspices of the Department of
Health) Local Research Ethics Committees in order to control research that involves
patients within their responsibility. These committees operate under the general control
of the Central Office of Research Ethics Committees178 and the UK Ethics Committee
Authority, which further ensures that medical research is under a centralised system of
control. In addition to these public committees, other bodies also provide guidance for
research, such as private research establishments (like the Nuffield Council of Bioethics)
and the Medical Research Council.179
Although this system of governance ostensibly appears as heavily bureaucratised,
it constitutes an alternative structural possibility for the control of a particular aspect of
medical practice. It can be said that it is more flexible, since it allows for different
decisions to be made as science progresses; also, such a system is more open to a wide
range of influence from several parties and this again has the advantage of a more
comprehensive review of a proposed research project. Of course, these positive features
constitute just one side of the story. Against such a system it can be said that it is over¬
complicated and that it is very difficult to achieve uniformity of standards.180 In any case,
it seems that as time goes on, the regime is further expanded by a proliferation of the
number of committees that are being established. Therefore, it is safe to state that "soft
regulation" will remain the choice regarding the control of medical research in the
foreseeable future.
v. Miscellaneous.
I will conclude this part of this chapter by referring briefly to a number of statutes that
have a significant impact on the regulation of medical practice. These statutes do not
directly cover a particular condition or a particular aspect of medicine. Their scope is
more general than medicine, but their particular provisions combine with norms
emanating from case law and in this sense complete the relevant normative edifice. I will
refer to three statutes: the Data Protection Act 1998, the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
178 It has now been subsumed under the National Patent Safety Agency.
179 For a very detailed analysis of the exact regime under which all these bodies operate, see J. Montgomery, 2003,
pp. 348ff.
180 For a careful discussion of the pros and cons of research committees, see J. Neuberger, Ethics and Health Care:
The Role ofResearch Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom (London: King's Fund Institute, 1992).
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The Data Protection Act 1998 implements in the UK the relevant EU
Directive181 and aims at providing a regulatory regime that covers the processing of
personal data. The Act refers to all personal data (that are stored either electronically or
manually) that enable information about a person to be readily accessible and prohibits
the "procession" of them unless certain particular conditions are met. According to
section 2 (e) of the Act, health information is to be understood as "sensitive personal
data"; thus, in the field of medicine, the Act complements the case-law protection of
confidentially, by further elaborating the conditions on the basis of which confidentiality
can be breached in the processing of health information. These conditions correspond to
a twofold level of protection. The first level is applicable to all personal data: the relevant
conditions include the consent of the patient, the necessary use of the data for the
patient's "vital interests" and the necessary use of them in carrying out a governmental or
statutory function.182 If any of these conditions is met, then the processing of data is
justified. Yet, since health information belong to the category of sensitive data the second
level of protection is activated and use is authorised only if one of an additional set of
conditions is also met.183 These include the explicit consent of the patient, again the
protection of her vital interests, the placing of the relevant data in the public domain by
the patient, the need to use the data in seeking legal advice or participating in legal
proceedings, again the use of the data for fulfilling governmental or statutory functions
and ultimately the use of data by a health professional who is under an obligation of
confidentiality for particular medical purposes (namely, preventive medicine, diagnosis,
research, the provision of care and treatment and the management of health care
services). In addition to these provisions the Act regulates the right of patients to have
access to their records. According to sections 7&8, on the basis of a written application
any patient has the right to know whether personal data are being stored and processed
and also to be informed about their content in an intelligible way. This right is subject to
a set of limitations, the most important of which is the likelihood of the possibility that
the granting of access will cause serious harm to the physical or mental health of the data
subject or any other person.
The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 is a statute that deals with the
general management of the affairs of incapacitated individuals. Part V of the Act refers
explicitly to medical treatment and research and in this respect it complements the
181 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data.
182 Schedules 1&2 of the Act.
183 Schedules 1&3 of the Act.
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common law position regarding the legality of the treatment of an incapable adult. The
main tenet of the Act is that the practitioner primarily responsible for the patient has a
"general authority to treat", which must be understood as the authority to do all that is
under the circumstances reasonable "to safeguard or promote the physical or mental
health of the adult".184 What is interesting here is that the Act does not explicitly
incorporate the best interests principle; instead, in deciding what to do the practitioner is
to take into account a wide range of factors that include the previously expressed wishes
of the patient, the views of relatives and other carers and the benefit of the patient. In
any case, the final decision is within the discretion of the practitioner, even though the
Act allows the appointment of proxy-decision makers. This is because proxies have the
right only to consent to what the practitioner proposes and not to refuse. Of course, this
leaves open the possibility of a dispute: in such a case, the opinion of a second medical
officer appointed from a list provided from the Mental Welfare Commission provides
the necessary authority for treatment or care to proceed. If the proxy still disagrees, the
only option that remains open is to appeal to the Court of Session.185
Similar provisions are included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which refers to
England and Wales. Again the main aim is to regulate the management of the affairs of
the incapacitated adult, who is defined as someone who is unable to make decisions. The
main difference is that the 2005 Act is explicitly oriented to the best interests principle.
In effect, Part I of the Act includes a list of issues that must be considered in deciding
what course of action is in the best interests of the incapable adult. Apart from that issue,
the Act is very similar to its Scottish counterpart: again a proxy can be appointed to act
on behalf of the incapax and be responsible for her affair (the "donee"), although the
exact relationship between the donee and the doctor in charge is drafted in a more
informal way.
b) The regulation of health care provision.
My intention in this part of the chapter is to provide a brief sketch of the organisation of
health care provision in the UK. This sketch must necessarily be brief, mainly because
both the exact structuring and the regulatory framework of health care provision are
highly complex. Accordingly, a complete discussion would necessitate a completely
184 Sections 41(1) and (2) of the Act.
185 For a detailed discussion of these provisions see G.T. Laurie and J.K. Mason, "Negative Treatment of
Vulnerable Patients: Euthanasia By Any Other Name?" (2000) Juridical Review 159.
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different academic project than mine.186 Nevertheless, since the practice of medicine
cannot be adequately understood without even a short reference to its institutional
background, I will try to sum up this background in the next three sections. The first two
sections are very closely connected, but I prefer to distinguish between them for reasons
of analytical clarity: the first will deal with the regulatory framework that refers to the
organisation of health care professions into professional bodies and the second will
present the structure of the NHS, within which the health care professionals usually
work. Finally, in the- third section I will discuss the regulation regarding public health,
since this is an issue that is always present at the background of the provision of health
care within any jurisdiction but often escapes attention.
i. The regulation ofhealth careprofessionals.
The starting point for the organisation of medicine as a profession can be traced back to
1832 through the formation of the British Medical Association (BMA). Later, in 1858 the
General Medical Council (GMC) was established, which until today remains the main
governing body of the medical profession. It is now regulated by the Medical Act 1983.187
The main functions of GMC are to ensure that members of the medical profession are fit
to practice188 and to maintain an official register of medical practitioners. The upkeep of
such a register is important, because although there exists no legal monopoly for
medicine to be exercised solely by medical practitioners, it is an offence to pretend to be
a registered practitioner. In addition to these functions, the GMC has disciplinary powers
in assessing whether its members are fit to practice and in taking action whenever this is
not the case. The disciplinary measures that can be taken are wide and they may include
suspension or erasure from the register.
Similar bodies are in place for the oversight of other health care professionals.
These are the Nursing and Midwifery Council,189 the General Dental Council,190 the
General Optical Council,191 the Council of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain,192
the General Osteopathic Council,193 the General Chiropractic Council194 and the Hearing
186 For a very accurate discussion of the issue, see R. Baggott, 2004.
187 Recently amended by the Medical Act 1983 (Amendment) Order 2002 (SI 2002, No. 3135)
188 This function is laid down in details by the Medical (Professional Performance) Act 1995.
189 Established by the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 (SI 2002, No. 254).
190 Established by the Dentists Act 1984.
191 Established by the Opticians Act 1989.
192 Established by the Pharmacy Act 1954.
193 Established by the Osteopaths Act 1993.
194 Established by the Chiropractors Act 1994.
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Aid Council.1'15 All these bodies have similar authority to the GMC: they maintain a
record of practitioners and they are to contribute to their educational preparation.
Against this background of professional bodies, a new watchdog has been
established under the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act
2002. This is the Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals,196 which has
the authority to control the other regulatory bodies and to influence the way that they
perform their functions.197 In effect, the establishment of this Council constitutes a
second level of control, with the aim of achieving unifying impact on the particular
policies of each one of the individual bodies within its remit. This is most clearly
demonstrated by the authority of this Council to scrutinise the disciplinary decisions of
the first order bodies and to appeal against them to the High Court. It may do so because
its underlying justification is the protection of the patients and other members of the
public against unfit health care professionals. In this respect, it seems that the creation of
this Council has added a further dimension of control that goes beyond medical self-
regulation. As such it has not been very well received from the medical establishment,
although the new Council is an independent body.198
ii. The structure ofthe NHS.
In order to understand the exact structure of the NHS, it is indispensable to keep in
mind that its current state represents the outcome of a long political process that started
with the inauguration of the system in 1948 by the then labour government. In the
course of the 60 years since then, different governments and more importantly different
political parties have all contributed to what the NHS is today.199 It is probably this
constant political input that has determined the complex nature of the system and the
simultaneous presence of different (and sometimes contradictory) ideas and policies.
From a legal point of view, the UK government is under an international
obligation to provide a health service to those that are sick and without adequate
resources to secure health assistance for themselves. This is firmly provided by the
European Social Chapter (article 13). This governmental obligation is fulfilled through
the establishment and the regulation of the NHS, which in effect constitutes a
195 Established by the Hearing Aid Council Act 1968 and the Hearing Aid Council (Amendment) Act 1989.
196
Recently it has been renamed as the "Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence".
197 For further discussion, see its assessment in S. Dewar and B. Finlayson, "Regulating the Regulators" (2002)
324 5M/378.
198 For a relevant discussion, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 19ff.
199 For a historical account, see R. Baggott, 2004, pp. 88ff.
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comprehensive system of health care delivery, which is available to all and which is not
based on the ability to pay at the point of delivery. A wide number of statutes and
statutory instruments regulate in detail how the service is organised and operates; also, a
number of essentially political publications exhibit the aspirations of the government of
the day regarding what the NHS is supposed to achieve.200 Currently, these aspirations
can be found in the governmental NHS Plan,201 which insists on a number of targets
referring to the quality of service and to the minimisation of waiting times and which
crucially advances the idea of the gradual intensification of the role played by the private
sector in several aspects of the NHS.202 This idea has been already been substantiated in a
number of statutory provisions.203
Currently, the NHS is organised in a tripartite structure.204 At the top of this
edifice is the Department of Health, the authority of which is defined by the National
Health Service Act 1977. According to this Act, the Secretary of State for Health is
obliged to promote a comprehensive health service to secure improvements in the
physical and mental health of the people of England and Wales and in the prevention,
diagnosis and treatment of illness. The Act does not define what illness means and allows
for a very considerable range of discretion. Part of this discretionary framework is the
option to combine health services with social care services and as a matter of fact a
number of statutes materialise this possibility in a very detailed manner.205 In effect, the
Department of Health is responsible for policy making and for the centralised planning
of the whole edifice of the NHS.
The second level of the structure is occupied by the Strategic Health Authorities.
These have been introduced by the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002
and in essence have taken the intermediate place that Health Authorities used to occupy
according to the Health Authorities Act 1995. The main responsibility of these
authorities is to provide local leadership to all the authorities of lower level that exist
200 This is important because it is rather difficult to discern a clear function or purpose for the NHS. For a
discussion of this issue, see D. Seedhouse, "Does the National Health Service have a Purpose?" in A. Grubb (ed.),
Challenges in Medical Care (Chichester: Wiley, 1992).
201 For a presentation of its more important features, see R. Baggott, 2004, pp. 122-125.
202 For a critique of this commitment see A.M. Pollock, NHSpic: The Privatisation ofOur Health Care (London:
Verso, 2004).
203 See, amongst others, the Health and Social Care Act 2001 that allows for public-private partnerships between
NHS trusts and private sector bodies to secure facilities or services under the NHS Act 1977.
204 Recall that because of devolution arrangements the organisation of the NHS in England is different from that in
Scotland and Wales. My discussion here refers to the English structure; for the other two jurisdictions, see R.
Baggott, 2004, pp. 109-110 with further references.
205 See, amongst others, the NHS and Community Care Act 1990, as amended by the Health Act 1999 and by the
Health and Social Care Act 2001; also, the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 and the Disabled
Persons (Services Consultation and Representation) Act 1986. For further analysis of their provisions see J.K.
Mason and G.T. Laurie, 2005, pp. 444-448.
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within the geographical area that they control. This responsibility refers to the delivery of
the targets incorporated in the NHS Plan and crucially to the quality of health care
services within their particular area.
The third level of the NHS is occupied by a number of institutions that perform
different functions. Primary Care Trusts, regulated by the 2002 Act and by the Primary
Care Trusts (Membership, Procedure and Administration Arrangements) Regulations
2000 (SI 2000, No, 89) have a managerial function. They are responsible for
commissioning actual health services locally. The local providers are the NHS Trusts,206
which are responsible for providing goods and services (usually of secondary and tertiary
nature), and individual general practitioners that are responsible for the delivery of
primary services. These practitioners are in a contractual relationship with the NHS for
the delivery of their services.207 In addition, Care Trusts also belong to the same level and
they are responsible for the provision of a combination of health and social services.208
Within such a complicated structure, the most significant issue is to ensure the
quality of the services provided. This is usually referred to as the problem of
"accountability". In effect, two main mechanisms are in place to guarantee quality of
service.209 The first is the clear drafting of guidelines regarding what standards of care are
to be achieved. The body responsible for this is the National Institute of Clinical
Excellence (NICE). This is an independent body the aim of which is to create unified
standards for the NHS across the country.21" It does that by developing particular models
of care related to specific domains of care, widely known as "national service
frameworks". These models of care incorporate rationing of particular treatments and
proposals for financing particular chugs. It must also be noticed that NICE collaborates
with the National Care Standards Commission, which is responsible for overseeing the
provision of health care in the private sector.211
The second mechanism is the incorporation into the structure of several detailed
procedures that allow patients to launch complaints against the service they have
206 These are regulated by the NHS and Community Care Act 1990 and a number of statutory instruments that
include the NHS Trusts (Membership and Procedure) Regulations 1990 (SI 1990, No. 2024)
207 The general terms of these contracts are included in NHS (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992 (SI
1992, No. 635), NHS (General Ophthalmic Services) Regulations 1986 (SI 1986, No. 975), NHS (General Dental
Services) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992, No. 661) and in the NHS (Primary Care) Act 1997.
208 Care Trusts are regulated by the Health Act 1999 and the Social Care Act 2001.
209 It has to be stressed that this is a very simplified account of the situation. For a much more detailed analysis, see
R. Baggott, 2004, pp. 213-244.
210 NICE came into existence due to the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution)
Order 1999 (SI 1999; No. 220) and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence Regulations 1999 (SI 1999, No.
260).
211 In accordance with the Care Standards Act 2002.
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received.212 These procedures are mainly regulated by the Hospital Complaints and
Procedure Act 1985; they run in parallel with the disciplinary procedures that are
available from the particular procedural bodies that a health care professional belongs to.
Finally, two independent bodies are also responsible for ensuring the quality of
services provided. The first is the Healthcare Commission that has very extensive powers
in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the health care services and is authorised
to provide information and advice to health authorities and trusts.213 The second is the
Health Commissioner who has the authority to investigate any complaint that patients
214
may raise.
Hi. The regulation ofpublic health.
The most interesting feature of the legislation regarding public health is its rather quaint
character. Indeed, the statutes that deal with the control of infectious diseases and more
generally with the response to health threats to the community are quite old and rarely
thought of, although they may raise significant concerns, especially from a human rights
perspective.215 In a sense this appears paradoxical, given the parallel trend in emphasising
the communal importance of health and healthy lifestyles - a political strategy that is of
obvious significance for the health of the community.216 Nevertheless, the direct
regulation of public health remains sparse.
One has to start with the National Assistance Acts of 1948 and 1951. These
especially refer to the removal of infected individuals to hospitals, more importantly of
those individuals that cannot care for themselves. The regulation essentially amounts to
compulsory care, an option that is usually allowed only for patients with particular mental
health problems. More recently, the Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984 creates
a number of criminal offences regarding the so-called notifiable diseases, namely these
diseases that a registered medical practitioner is under a legal duty to report to the
relevant Authority. Initially the Act included a list of five notifiable diseases,217 but later
this list was expanded by the Public Health (Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 (SI
212 The exact framework is very complicated; for a detailed analysis, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 112ff.
213 The Commission is regulated by the Health Act 1999 and the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act
2002, in combination with the Commission for Health Improvement (Functions) Regulation 2002.
214
Regulated by the Health Service Commissioners Act 1993, as amended in 1996 and 2000.
215 It is implied here that the relevant legislation must now be read in conjunction with the Human Rights Act
1998.
216 See, for instance, Department of Health, "Choosing Health: Making Healthier Choices Easier" (2004), available
at www.dh.gov.uk and recall the gradual intensification of the campaign against smoking.
217 Namely cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox and typhus.
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1988, No. 1546). The 1984 Act incorporates a set of measures that may be taken against
individuals suffering from a notifiable disease: these measures include the removal of the
patient from her usual place of residence, the isolation of the patient, the compulsory
detention of the patient in a medical establishment and the compulsory vaccination of
the patient. Interestingly, HIV infection is not considered to be a notifiable disease and
therefore the 1984 Act is not of direct relevance.218 However, according to the AIDS
(Control) Act 1987, Health Authorities and NHS Trusts are obliged to provide reports
and information to the Secretary of State for Health regarding statistics on positive HIV
tests, on the number of persons actually suffering and having died from AIDS and on
the relevant facilities and services they provide.
Obviously, there exists concern whether this legislative apparatus can be
successful in dealing with health threats in modern times. Yet, it does not seem that any
new measures are at the moment ante portas. The only exception has been the
establishment of the Health Protection Agency by the Health Protection Agency Act
2004. This body is in charge of centrally identifying and taking action against any
infectious disease or more generally health hazard that may be detrimental for the
community, although what it can do is still under the auspices of the legislation presented
in the previous paragraph.
D. The modus operandi of the courts: models of judicial reasoning.
In this penultimate part, I will direct my attention again to the judicial terrain. My
intention is not to explore once more the legal norms generated by the judiciary, since I
have already done that in section (C). What I will do here is to investigate the reasoning
that the courts employ when adjudicating in medical cases. To put it more accurately, I
intend to focus on types of arguments that are used in reasoning and through them to
observe how decision-making unfolds: accordingly, it will be the mode of the reasoning
that will interest me, not its substance. The reason for doing this refers again to the initial
question of my thesis. My claim here is that not only the content of the relevant legal
norms, but also the way that these are used is important in determining what the law can
achieve in the context of medicine. From this perspective, I ;will intend to argue that
different models of reasoning can be detected and that this in itself is significant insight
for understanding the orientation of law to medicine.
218 Nevertheless, specific powers of detention of HIV/AIDS patients are included in the 1988 Regulations.
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In order to do that, I will discuss the reasoning in five cases, which I will use as
short case studies. My analysis will be conducted with the help of a range of theories of
legal reasoning, chosen because of their compatibility with the particularities of the
decision in each case. I am aware of course that this methodology is liable to the criticism
that the selection of both the cases and the theories is arbitrary and therefore any
conclusions that may be reached essentially unfounded. However, the cases I am
presenting incorporate a variety of medical disputes and have been decided by courts
belonging to different levels of the judicial hierarchy and at different moments in time;
accordingly, it seems to me that they are quite representative of the field. Also, I must
insist that my reading of these cases in terms of particular theories that advocate (either
descriptively or normatively) one model of reasoning at the expense of any another does
not imply that this is the only possible way that these cases may be analysed. I totally
accept that alternative readings are also possible. Still, I believe that this further justifies
the point that traces of different models of reasoning are present in the case law. The
choice of a particular theory as a point of observation simply helps to identify some of
these traces; it does not follow that everything is in that way revealed.
1) Re C (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment).2V>
The facts of this case, decided by Thorpe J, are rather straightforward. The patient
involved, a 68-year-old man, was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia. In
September 1993, he was diagnosed with gangrene in the foot and for this reason he was
transferred to Heatherwood Hospital. After a period of testing and consultation, it was
concluded that the patient would die imminendy if the leg were not amputated below the
knee, and that the chances of survival if more conservative treatment were administered
were very low. However, the patient refused to accept amputation and insisted on his
refusal even though pressure was applied on him to consent. Accordingly, an injunction
under the court's inherent jurisdiction was sought, restraining Heatherwood Hospital
from amputating his right leg without his express consent.
Thorpe J granted the injunction sought. He approached the issue in terms of the
law of consent, according to which the legality of any medical intervention on an adult
patient capable of consenting depends on his or her actual consenting to the
intervention. Given that the patient refused to give his consent, it was his capacity to do
219
Re C (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.
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so that was primarily questionable. The judge held that the patient was indeed capable to
give or refuse consent, that his refusal was for this reason valid and that, accordingly, he
was obliged to grant the injunction, although there was a possibility that this could lead
to the death of the patient.220 Focusing on capacity to consent, he argued that this is a
relative concept that depends on the nature, purpose and effect of the medical procedure
involved and not on the general state of the patient.221 He further expanded this
argument by proposing a three-stage test regarding the assessment of this relative
capacity to consent which includes the ability of the patient to comprehend and retain
the necessary information; to believe this information; finally, to weigh the information
by balancing risks and benefits so as to arrive at a choice.222 Thorpe J was persuaded that
given the proven facts of the case the test was satisfied and thus the patient was capable
to consent or refuse the proposed amputation.
As far as the reasoning underlying this decision is concerned, it seems to me that
this is a clear example of what is generally described as formal reasoning based on deductive
justification.223 Thorpe J justifies his decision through the direct application of a legal norm
(that the consent of a capable adult is always required for the legality of a medical
intervention) that both classifies what aspects of the facts are relevant (namely the refusal
to consent and the question of capability) and serves as the major premise for a
conclusion (that the injunction should be granted) based on deduction. Of course, in the
course of the justification of the conclusion, the capacity issue must be resolved; indeed,
it is the dispute regarding the capacity of the patient that constitutes the main legal
dispute of the case. However, this problem is again framed in terms of the initial legal
rule regarding consent. Thorpe J is ready to accept as a general presumption that any
adult patient is autonomous and thus capable to decide, on the basis of a general right of
self-determination; then, he formulates the test of capacity as a means that substantiates
this presumption and that designates the conditions for the possibility of a particular
patient to be excluded from the presumption (when in a particular scenario the test is not
satisfied). The very formulation of the test is not in itself arbitrary: it is a based on a
similar proposal of the Law Commission at the time,224 which again presumes that
220 As it turned out the patient survived even without having the leg amputated.
221 This implies that for the particular stake of the case, the fact that the patient suffered from schizophrenia was
irrelevant as such.
222 See [1994] 1 All ER 819, at p. 824.
223 Although the relevant literature is vast, an excellent analysis can be found on N. MacCormick, 2005, pp. 33ff.
224 Thorpe J quotes the consultation paper 129 of the Law Commission, entitled Mentally Incapacitated Adults and
Decision-Making, especially paragraph 2.20.
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capacity to decide exists and that it can be displaced only on the basis of a negative
assessment in terms of the test.
Within this framework, one could classify this case as a clear case, namely a case
that generates no essential dispute about the relevant facts or the applicable law.225 The
relevant theorising insists that decisions in clear cases are justified (and also should be
justified) in terms of a deductive syllogism that treats the relevant legal rule as its major
premise and provides justification exactly because of its logical strength. Indeed, it seems
that this is exactly the path that Thorpe J is following here: he reaches his conclusion
through a deduction based on the application of the relevant legal rule to the pertinent
facts.226 That is why external factors that could have an impact on the decision (for
instance the dangerousness of the refusal for the health of the patient) were excluded
from consideration. Deductive justification is essentially characterised by a certain
closure: since this is a form of justification based on logic, only what falls within its
syllogistic schema is and should be considered.
2) Sidawayv. Bethlem RHG (HL).227
This is probably one of the most widely analysed cases regarding the law of consent. The
dispute arose because Mrs Sidaway was left partially paralysed after an operation to free a
trapped nerve. This outcome was due to the fact that the patient suffered injury to her
spinal cord during the operation. However, its occurrence was not attributable to any
negligent mistake in the way that the operation was performed; rather, it was the result of
the unfortunate materialisation of a risk inherent in similar operations. The possibility of
a claim of usual negligence having been excluded, Mrs Sidaway brought an action
claiming that she had not been informed about the risk and that had she known about it
she would have refused to agree to the operation. This was again a claim of negligence,
but the alleged negligence referred to the process of communication between Mrs
Sidaway and her doctors.
225 For the term "clear case", 1 will refer again to N. MacCormick, 2005, chapter 3; see also, J. Raz, The Authority
of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 181ff., although he prefers the term "regulated" cases and reaches
slightly different conclusions. For the opposite view, namely that this particular type of case simply does not exist,
see amongst others M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1987), pp. 4ff.
226 In this respect, the value of discussing this case is exactly in showing that at least in clear cases a deductive
syllogism is part of legal reasoning.
227 Sidaway v. Board ofGovernors ofthe Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Mauldsay Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643,
[1985] AC 871, [1985] 2 WLR 480, 1 BMLR 132, HL.
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Her claim failed at all judicial levels. Yet, although the outcome was the same at
each level, none of the justifications proposed was similar. Especially in the House of
Lords, where four judges delivered speeches, each one of them provided a different
justification for his conclusion. It follows that it is necessary to take into account all the
four opinions. Before continuing, let me just repeat that what we are dealing with here is
the issue of substantiating the standard of care in the case of information disclosure.
Approaching this problem from a jurisprudential point of view, the claim ofMrs
Sidaway's generates what it can be called a "problematised" case.228 This is to be
contrasted from the previously employed term "clear" case and implies that in the case at
hand, it is not enough to simply apply a deductive syllogism to yield a solution: this is
because one or some of the premises of the syllogism has been contested, in other words
has been "problematised", by one of the parties involved. Neil MacCormick has
identified four possible types of such a problematisation.229 The first type can be depicted
as a problem of proof and refers to the situation where the factual aspects of the case
remain contested. The second type, depicted as a problem of classification, refers to the
situation where it is contested whether the undisputed facts of the case should be
understood as an instance of the legal norm that is to serve as the major premise of the
syllogism. The third type, depicted as a problem of interpretation, refers to the situation
where the proper interpretation of the applicable legal norms is contested. Finally, the
fourth type of problem, depicted as a problem of relevancy, refers to the situation where it
is disputed whether the ostensibly applicable norm is properly constructed as such from
the existing matrix of legal norms, in the light of the particular facts of the case.230
Along these lines, it can be argued that the case I am discussing is problematised
in terms of either classification or relevancy. In essence, what Mrs Sidaway argues is that
the facts of her claim do not fall within the ambit of the norm that defines the standard
of care (namely the Bolam test), because this norm refers to negligence in treatment and
not in communication (a problem of classification). Alternatively, the argument could be
that a norm must be constructed that would be relevant for the standard of care for
negligence in communication: such a norm is not to be drafted in accordance with the
228 The term "problematised" case is advanced by N. MacCormick, 2005, pp. 50ff, following the analysis in J.
Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court ofJustice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 183ff.
Traditionally the term that is used to describe such cases is the term "hard".
229 See, in details, N. MacCormick, 2005, pp. 39ff.
230 It is interesting to notice that "problematisation" thus defined is a pragmatic and not an ontological feature of
cases, in other words it is totally contingent on the way that a particular judicial dispute will evolve. Once again,
see N. MacCormick, 2005, p. 51 and J. Bengoetxea, 1993.
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Bolam test, because such a formulation ignores the differences of the factual situation (a
problem of relevancy).
Having conceptualised the case as problematised, what has to be tackled is the
method that is to be used in resolving the problem, namely the exact formulation of the
applicable norm. Again, this involves an argumentative process, since the outcome of
this resolution has to be justified. Now, this is a different level of justification in the
sense that it does not directly control the final outcome of the case but only the
preliminary stage of settling the major premise. Still, this second-order justification231 is
equally important for the obvious reason that its outcome will be part of the final
determination of the solution.
So, how is the need for a second-order justification to be addressed?
MacCormick argues that this kind of justification must follow a methodology at the
centre of which rests the concept of the universalisibility of the consequences of the
decision that is to be made.232 This claim integrates three distinct tenets. First, that for a
decision to be justified, its underlying logic must be universalisable, namely able to be
applied in all the similar situations that may arise in the future. Second, that the general
criterion that must be used in determining whether this is the case is the consequences
that the application of the same solution will have in future cases; by the term
consequences what is meant is "juridical consequences",233 namely the consequences that
will relate to the behaviour of the judiciary in future cases. Third, that the evaluation of
these consequences must not be exercised in a vacuum, but rather in a manner controlled
by more elaborate criteria. The most important of these criteria is the requirement of
consistency and coherence: in this context, consistency means non-contradiction with the
existing body of law and coherence signifies consistency in principle with previous
decisions.
Bringing this abstract theoretical edifice back to Mrs Sidaway's case,
MacCormick's argument is that the dispute regarding the settling of the standard of care
in informed consent must be resolved as follows: the court must provide a justified
solution to the problem of classification/relevancy (second-order justification), the logic
of which will be universally applied to all the cases of informed consent that will arise in
the future. The criterion of this justification is the juridical consequences that the ruling
231 For the reasons why this should be understood as second-order justification, see N. MacCormick, Legal
Reasoning and Legal System (2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. lOlff.
232 In effect, this assertion is the cornerstone ofN. MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning, which is discussed in
details in both his 1993 and 2005 publications. What I say here is just a simplified version of very thorough and
complex theory.
233 For this notion, see in details N. MacCormick, 2005, pp. 104ff.
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will have for future cases, in other words the particular impact that the ruling in the case
at hand will have on the way that courts will later decide similar cases. In turn, this
impact has to be evaluated in terms of the requirements of consistency and coherence:
accordingly, a universalisable decision must yield a result that will allow future judges not
to be inconsistent (namely not to contradict established legal norms) and incoherent
(namely, not to contradict well-established legal principles). Having summarised the
theory in such a way let me now examine if its findings hold true in the speeches of the
judges that actually decided the case.
Let me start by considering the judgement of Lord Diplock. The core of his
argument is that in cases of medical negligence there is only one professional duty: this is
to exercise skill and judgement with the aim of improving the patient's health. This being
the case, it makes no sense to fragment this duty in accordance with particular types of
medical activity. Accordingly, the usual norm regarding the standard of care should
apply. By following this line of argument, Lord Diplock discards the problematisation of
the case that Mrs Sidaway advocates at the outset: what he does is to counter her claim
regarding classification/relevance by arguing exactly that there is no significant
distinction to be made between negligence in treatment and negligence in
communication. For him, this remains a clear case. The Bolam test is undoubtedly to be
applied and this being so, the outcome is yielded through the implicit invocation of a
deductive syllogism very similar to the one in Re C.
In contrast with Lord Diplock the three other judges seem to accept the
problematised nature of the case at hand. This can be inferred from their attempt to
reformulate the normative content of the Bolam test, in order to render it more
compatible with the context of informed consent. In this respect, they are all involved in
a process of second-order justification. What has to be seen is whether they do that by
respecting the requirements that MacCormick advances in his theory.
Lord Scarman argues that the starting point for the delineation of the standard of
care must be the right of the patient to decide about what will happen to her. In
accordance with this main tenet, she has the right to be informed about any material risks
that may be part of the procedure proposed. Therefore, it is the duty of the doctor in
charge to inform the patient about such material risks; to this assertion, he adds that the
criterion of what risk should be understood as material is the assessment that would be
expected by a prudent patient facing the same procedure as the claimant. In formulating
the standard of care in such a way, Lord Scarman is actually in tune with both the
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requirements of coherence and consistency. He respects coherence, since his formulation
cherishes the basic principle of autonomy that underlies the whole field of consent to
treatment. Also, he is careful in avoiding the possibility of inconsistency: he adds the
caveat of the "therapeutic privilege", namely he allows doctors not to reveal information
that they reasonably believe that could have detrimental effect for the health of the
patient. This caveat is in tune with the best interests principle, which is primarily
determined in accordance with the medical assessment of the situation and with the
general significance of professional expertise in the law of medical negligence.
Although Lord Bridge is much closer to Lord Diplock than Lord Scarman, again
he is ready to modify the standard of care although in a much more modest way. His
argument is that derogation from the Bolam test is justified only when a serious risk is
involved: such a risk must be disclosed no matter what. In this respect, his speech in
essence reverses the view taken by Lord Scarman: he seems to provide a standard of care
coherent with the idea of the domination of professional expertise, but allows some
room for the notion of patient's autonomy through the caveat of the communication of
serious risks.
Finally, Lord Templeman also takes the view that the standard of care must be
modified. His proposal incorporates into the standard the obligation of the doctor in
charge to explain in details the situation to the patient and, crucially, to answer any
particular question that the patient may ask. For him this is very significant, because it is
not always the case that a patient is willing to know all the details of a proposed
operation. Once again, the requirement of coherence is justified: the principle of
autonomy is enhanced, by ensuring that the doctor is to communicate with the patient,
according to the particular way that the patient sees fit.
It seems to me that the conclusion that can be reached from the speeches of at
least three of the law Lords is that the theoretical proposition advanced by MacCormick
accurately captures the method that they use in their reasoning. Lord Scarman, Lord
Bridge and Lord Templeman all justify their modification of the Bolam test by
incorporating arguments of coherence and consistency. These arguments constitute the
justificatory basis for formulating the standard of care in such a way as to bind the
members of the judiciary that will decide similar cases —and essentially all the similar
cases- in the future. It is only in this justified way that they are ready to universalise their
rulings.
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3) Gillick WestNorfolk& Wisbech AHA (HL).234
The factual background of this case is well known. Mrs Gillick set in motion a judicial
challenge against the legality of the advice given by the Department of Health that
doctors are allowed to provide contraceptive advice and treatment to girls under the age
of 16 without parental consent. Although she won her case at first instance and at the
Court of Appeal, she lost by a majority decision at the House of Lords. There, it was
held that doctors are legally entided to provide advice and treatment, if they are satisfied
that the minor is mature enough to have "sufficient understanding and intelligence to
enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed".235 This decision opened up the
possibility of minors being able to consent to treatment without previous parental
consent and significantly changed the position held until then.
What I intend to do here is to discuss the reasoning of the majority of the House
of Lords, in accordance with the theory of legal reasoning advanced by Ronald
Dworkin.236 I believe that this is a justified choice because it seems to me that his
assertions regarding the nature of legal reasoning capture in a very accurate way the basis
on which the case was ultimately decided. I will first present a short summary of the
theory of Dworkin and then I will examine how it can be applied in the reasoning of the
case.
Dworkin's theory of legal reasoning is an integral part of his general political
theory, which is to a very significant extent inspired by liberal aspirations and by the
primary importance of rights.237 For Dworkin the understanding of what legal reasoning
must be is inherently connected with the understanding of the function of the judiciary
and this in turn becomes meaningful only within a political theory that advocates a
particular central point for the law. This point is to ensure that "force is not to be used or
withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial
or noble these ends, except as licensed or required by individuals rights and
responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is
justified".238 In accordance with this concise formulation, Dworkin has developed a
234 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, [1985] 3 All ER 402, [1985] 3
WLR 830, [1986] 1 FLR 224, [1986] Crim LR 113, 129 Sol Jo 738, 2 BMLR 11, [1985] LS Gaz R 3551, [1985]
NLJ Rep 1055, HL.
235
[1985] 3 All ER 402, at p. 423 by Lord Scarman.
236 The most complete presentation of the theory can be found in R. Dworkin, 1986 and in his earlier Taking Rights
Seriously (2nd edition, London: Duckworth, 1978).
237 For a presentation of his political theory, see R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1985).
238 See R. Dworkin, 1986, p. 93.
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complete theory about the law, the judicial branch and the process of legal reasoning that
is primarily determined by the idea that law is a social practice, every instance of which
has to be oriented to the fulfilment of its particular point.
As far as legal reasoning is concerned, the idea that law is a practice with a
particular political function has far reaching consequences. For Dworkin, any participant
in the practice of law, for instance any legal official whenever he acts under this capacity,
is to contribute in the successful maintenance of law's main point. This is always the case
when a judge adjudicates a dispute: the very process of adjudication is part of law as
practice and therefore the procedure in terms ofwhich the judge adjudicates is essentially
linked with the essence of the law. From this starting point, it follows that a number of
constraints are always present in adjudication and naturally in the method of legal
reasoning that a judge employs when deciding cases. The most important of these
constraints is that the judge must always take an interpretative stance towards the law:
she must take into account the past record of the law as included in previous decisions
and, most importantly, she must constructively interpret this record239 so that she can
unearth the most appropriate norm to be applied in the case at hand. It is for this reason
that Dworkin claims that the category of a clear case is non-existing and that in all cases,
interpretation of the law is necessary. Dworkin further elaborates on this idea by
providing two particular requirements that must be met when a judge constructs a legal
solution. The first is the requirement of fit: the proposed solution must be compatible
with solutions already present in the past record of the law in similar cases. The second
requirement is depicted under the term "justification". This notion complements the
requirement of fit in the following sense: it is quite possible that a variety of solutions
may fit with the past record of the law. From the matrix of these solutions, the judge has
to choose the one that appears as the most justifiable, namely the one that if accepted
and ultimately added to the body of the practice of law would contribute in the fulfilment
of the point of the law. Within these lines, the solution that best serves the point of the
law is the absolutely right one for the case at hand; accordingly, there is always scope for
hoping that such a right solution is achievable. Dworkin accepts that this is just an ideal,
yet he insists that this ideal correctly captures the nature of law, what he calls "law as
integrity".240 In order to provide a working device for the achievement of this ideal,
Dworkin proposes a distinction between arguments from policy and arguments from
principle. The former justify decisions by advancing some collective goal of the
239 For the notion of "constructive interpretation" see in details R. Dworkin, 1986, pp. 52ff.
24° por further analysis of this notion, see R. Dworkin, 1986, chapters 6&7.
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community as a whole, while the latter justify decisions by securing some individual or
group rights.241 For Dworkin only arguments from principle can yield justifiable decisions
within the context of judicial reasoning and, therefore, only that type of arguments
should be used.
Going back to the decision in Gillick, a Dworkinean reading of the case would
insist that the majority opinion at the House of Lords has generated a justified solution
on the basis of an argument from principle. To begin with, the court refused to perceive
the issue as a settled one and instead it took an interpretative stance towards the relevant
record of the law. This stance materialised in the particular decision that took on board a
principle widely accepted in the relevant field of the law. Unsurprisingly, this is the
principle of autonomy that is inherently linked with the right of individuals to self-
determination. In the particular context of the case, autonomy takes the particular form
of reproductive autonomy: here it is expressed as the right of the individual to organise
according to her own wishes her sexual activities. The fact that the individual at stake is
under the age of 16 is as such irrelevant: what is crucial is the formulation of a norm
according to which the right of self-determination of a mature individual is as such
protected by the judiciary. The only thing that has to be addressed are the conditions in
terms of which an individual is deemed to considered mature enough, and the court
actually provides a list of these conditions.
Within these lines, the decision of the court both fits with the past record of the
law, in the sense that autonomy is part of the existing normative edifice and is in tune
with the requirement of justification, in the sense that it originates from an argument of
principle that expressly protects the rights of individuals. Furthermore, the court in
deciding in such a way implicitly rejects a number of arguments from policy that could
have been used, namely the need to control the sexual activities of minors and the
importance of insisting on parental consent.242 These being the case, the decision is
compatible with a vision of law as integrity.
241 See, in details, R. Dworkin, 1978, pp. 82ff.
242 For possibility of such arguments, see J. Montgomery, 2003, pp. 397.
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4) McFarlane andAnother v. Tayside Health Boards
I have akeady referred to this Scottish case in a previous section of this chapter. Let me
start by a brief presentation of its factual background: the pursuers decided that they did
not want any more children (given that they already had four), and that, accordingly, the
husband should undergo a vasectomy.244 A surgeon employed by the Health Board
performed the operation. After having analysed a sperm sample, he informed Mr.
McFarlane that the operation was successful and that other contraceptive measures were
no longer necessary. However, 2 years later Mrs. McFarlane became pregnant, and after a
normal pregnancy and labour gave birth to a healthy child. The couple argued that they
have suffered loss as a result of negligence on behalf of the Board and claimed damages
for the physical discomfort suffered by Mrs. McFarlane from her pregnancy,
confinement and delivery and for the financial costs of caring for and bringing up the
child.
What I am interested in here is to discuss the second claim of the parents, namely
the one that refers to the recovery of the financial cost of bringing up the child that was
born. Once again, I will do that taking on board a particular understanding of legal
reasoning, namely John Finnis' analysis of legal reasoning245 in the light of his natural law
theory. Before doing that, I must admit that the theorising of natural law is not usually
considered when the domain of legal reasoning is discussed. The analysis of why this is
so escapes my present purposes.246 However, it seems to me that especially in the field of
medical law, an analysis of legal reasoning that considers some insights from natural law
theory may yield interesting and often neglected results. This is why this section is
included. In order to clarify my point, I will first revisit the decisions reached at each
judicial stage and then I will advance the theoretical analysis.
In the Outer House, Lord Gill dismissed the claim on the basis that the process
of normal pregnancy and labour cannot constitute personal injury even when undesired.
In addition, he argued that the benefits of parenthood transcend any financial loss that is
incurred as a result of the child's existence. It follows that the parents are not in an
overall position of loss and therefore they cannot recover damages.
243 McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board 1997 SLT 211, OH; revsd 1998 SC 389, 1998 SLT 307, 1998 SCLR 126,
44 BMLR 140, CS; [2000] 2 AC 59, [1999] 4 All ER 961, [1999] 3 WLR 1301, [2000] 1 FCR 102, 52 BMLR 1,
2000 SCT 154, 2000 SC 1, HL.
244 This is a surgical operation that consists of the removal of the ducts through which semen passes from the
testicles. It is usually performed as a method of birth control.
245 As this is mainly included in J. Finnis, "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning" in R.P. George (ed.), Natural Law
Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 134-157.
246 For an introduction to this issue, see M.C. Murphy, "Natural Law Jurisprudence" (2003) 9 Legal Theory 241.
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The Inner House reversed this decision by insisting that the main question in the
case refers to the possible manifestation of damnum (ie a loss in the sense of material
prejudice) to an interest recognised by law. Such an interest is present here, since Scots
law recognises the pursuers' interest in avoiding pregnancy. This interest had been
injured and therefore the relevant damage was recoverable. Within such an argument the
idea that the birth of child is always a blessing was thought to be unwarranted: in any
case, it was deemed that this was a matter of public policy and as such it should not
influence the decision of the court that had to apply only legal norms.
However, the House of Lords unanimously discarded the decision of the Court
of Session and held that the cost of bringing up the child is not recoverable. Five Law
Lords delivered speeches and all of them reached the same conclusion, although on the
basis of different premises. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of
Craighead all argued that the claim of the parents was essentially a claim for pure
economic loss and for this to be compensated it had to be shown that it would be fair,
just and reasonable to impose liability, a requirement that was not satisfied in the
particular case. Lord Steyn further argued that considerations of distributive justice do
not permit the parents of a healthy but unwanted child to claim as compensation the cost
of its upbringing. Lord Clyde insisted that a compensatory relief of the financial
obligations of the parents related to the care of the child would go beyond the scope of a
reasonable restitution of the harm done to them. Finally, Lord Millett regarded the birth
of a child as a blessing and argued that the advantages and disadvantages of parenthood
are intrinsically linked together in such a way that the benefits outweigh any loss, with the
collateral result that no compensation should be awarded.
It seems to me that what brings all these different opinions together, is a certain
unease to award compensation for the birth of a healthy child. The source of the unease
is the importance attached to life in all its manifestations, which obviously includes birth.
This importance is probably more accurately captured by the idea of the sanctity of life,
the most significant aspect of which is the essentially incommensurable nature of life, in
terms of which the value of human life cannot be measured in accordance to any metric
system.247 Accordingly, the complicated nature of the case is triggered exactly by the
parental claim to be compensated for a birth, since this claim essentially transforms the
incommensurability of life into something commensurable. This is the source of the
judicial unease; this also applies to the decision of the Court of Session that discards this
247 For an introduction to the notion of incommensurability, see C.R. Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation
in Law" (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 779.
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irritation by insisting on a formal solution while simultaneously acknowledging that an
issue of public policy is present here, but as such it is beyond its authority. In all the
other opinions this unease is quite explicit and this is probably the main reason for the
generation of differently argued solutions: the judges attempt to couch the problem of
life's incommensurability in different legal principles, with the common aim of rejecting
the claim.
Finnis' theory captures this problem in very explicit terms. For Finnis, human life
is a basic good248 and as such a basic reason for action, in the sense that all action has to
be oriented to its better fulfilment.249 As with all the other basic goods, human life is an
incommensurable good and is very much linked with the domain of moral choice. In
essence, it is in this domain that it primarily constitutes a reason for action, by providing
guidance for moral choices. Being a basic good it can only offer open-ended guidance
and therefore it allows for many different options regarding its exact fulfilment. On the
contrary, legal reasoning belongs to a different realm of reality: it belongs to the domain
of technique and has a very particular function, namely to achieve a settled resolution of
disputes.250 For Finnis, legal reasoning is not immune from participating in the resolution
of moral choices; on the contrary, there exist inherent moral values in law and these are
present in adjudication. However, as the law belongs to a different order of reality there
is no guarantee that it will be able to contribute to the moral choice in a satisfactory way.
When this is the case and, more importandy, when an open-ended moral problem is
expressed in legal terms, the law may be unable to provide a solution on its own terms
and the moral problem reappears as such.
In the case I am discussing, it can be argued that this is exacdy what is happening.
The courts involved are called to opine on an essentially moral issue, namely on how the
basic good of human life would be better fulfilled under the particular circumstances. By
definition, human life is incommensurable, yet the dilemma that is present here allows
for the opposite possibility, namely to consider life as commensurable for the purposes
of this claim. Since the law is unable to solve this dilemma, it reappears as a moral
question and it is solved by each individual judge according to his own moral feeling.
Quite unsurprisingly, as soon as the moral dilemma is solved, the solution is redrafted in
legal terms and ultimately appears as the legal solution.
248 See J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 84-85.
249 See J. Finnis, 2002, p. 135.
250 See J. Finnis, 2002, pp. 141-142.
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5) R v. Cambridge District Health Authority, exp B (CA).251
B, a 10-year-old child, had been suffering from lymphoma from the age of five. After a
lengthy course of different treatments, the doctors in charge of his care reached the
conclusion that there was no point in administering further treatment and predicted a
very limited life expectancy. B's father obtained a different medical opinion from the
USA, according to which further treatment would carry an 18% chance of full recovery.
Doctors in the UK insisted that the chance of recovery was much lower; also, it
subsequently emerged that due to scarcity of hospital resources, the proposed treatment
would have to be carried out privately, with an estimated cost of 75,000 pounds. The
health authority in charge of the care of B refused to provide the funding, arguing that
not only would the proposed treatment not be in B's best interests, but also that the use
of a significant amount of money for a treatment with such a low chance of success was
essentially an ineffective use of the limited resources at its disposal. The father of B
sought judicial review of this decision. In the High Court, Laws J decided in favour of
the father and ordered the authority to reconsider its decision. The authority appealed.252
The Court of Appeal overruled the decision of the High Court. It insisted that it
was only the lawfulness of the refusal of the health authority to provide funding that was
to be adjudicated and that it was not within the judicial function to provide judgement
regarding the (contested) medical merits of the proposed treatment. Additionally, and
even though the health authority also argued that what was proposed was not in B's best
interests, it was the argument regarding the allocation of resources (in this case the
75,000 pounds needed) that was of crucial significance. In essence, the court held that it
was indeed within the power of the health authority to decide how its limited resources would be more
efficiently used, on the condition only that the parents of B had been properly consulted. As
this condition was met, the authority was entitled to reach the decision that it actually
reached especially given the fact that limited resources is part of the reality of health care
provision. Interestingly, Sk Thomas Bingham MR explicitly accepted the importance of
limited resources:
"I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a patient... sought would
be provided if the doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it costs... It
251 R v. Cambridge District Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 FLR 1055, [1995] Fam Law 480, 23 BMLR 1,
[1995] 2 All ER 129, [1995] 1 WLR 898, CA.
252 For a very detailed account of all the issues regarding this case, see C. Flam and S. Pickard, Tragic Choices in
Health Care: The Case ofChild B (London: Kings Fund, 1998). It is also interesting to refer to V. Entwistel et al.,
"Media Coverage of the Child B Case" (1996) 312 British Medical Journal 1587, regarding the involvement of the
general public with the case.
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would, however, be shutting one's eyes to the real world if the court were to proceed on
the basis that we do live in such a world."253
Based on this reasoning and with further help from the argument that the proposed
treatment was at best a marginal treatment, it comes as no surprise that the Court of
Appeal opined in favour of the health authority.254
This case was decided on the basis of the particular constraints of the process of
judicial review, which insist on the procedural legality of the challenged decision.255
Nonetheless, it is not necessarily helpful to admit that this was the main reason for
focusing so much on the problem of limited resources, at the expense of the clinical
aspect of the situation. In my view, it is more meaningful to treat this case as a telling
example of what happens when the judiciary is called to opine with reference to an
essentially economic decision. Although the father, in contesting the withholding of
funding, is naturally motivated by the well being of his child, what he does is to complain
against a decision regarding clinical priorities that takes place in a real environment of
limited resources. In this respect, the explicit counter-argument of the health authority
that this particular funding would be an inefficient use of resources256 is not only sound,
but very informative as to the exact nature of the dispute: this is essentially an economic
dispute, regarding the proper management of funds. Accordingly, the court gets involved
in order to scrutinise an economic decision and its ruling has a clear economic impact.
This being the case, it seems to me that an "economic" reading of the case is very helpful
in revealing its most significant features.
The economic rationale and the economic impact of judicial decisions has been
thoroughly analysed by a school of thought usually depicted under the rubric "economic
analysis of law".257 Building on several insights from economic theory,258 which are
combined with the premises of utilitarianism, scholars like Richard Posner259 argue that
an understanding of law as a means for achieving the maximisation ofwealth is very helpful,
253 [1995] 2 All ER 129, at paragraph 16.80.
254 Ultimately, the treatment was funded from both the public and the private sector, but it was unsuccessful; the
child died 14 months after.
255 For the possible grounds on which an application for judicial review may be granted in the context ofmedicine,
see J. Montgomery, 2003, p. 68, with further references.
256 I am not implying here that the notion of efficiency within the provision of health is free from ambiguity. On
the contrary, its content is quite contested and several different ideas of what should be understood as efficient can
be sustained. For further analysis of this issue, see R. Baggott, 2004, pp. 57-64.
257 For a detailed presentation of the most significant insights of this approach, which remains quite popular, see A.
Leff "Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism" (1974) 60 Virginia Law Review 451.
258 Especially from the work of Ronald Coase; see his The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988).
259 See especially his Economic Analysis of Law (5th edition, New York: Aspen, 1998) and The Economics of
Justice (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1983).
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both in explaining what the courts do when adjudicating, and in providing a theory of
justice, in terms ofwhich one can reach normative conclusions regarding what the judges
and other officials should do. Within this theoretical framework, judicial rulings are to be
understood as judicial attempts to maximise economic welfare.260 This applies
notwithstanding the language that is engaged in the rulings; indeed, it is rarely the case
that the courts refer explicidy to economic criteria. However, the inherent rationality of
the applicable legal norms and the mode of their judicial interpretation, both ensure that
in essence, all common law can be explained in the light of economics.
Going back to the case at hand, it seems that implicitly but decisively, the Court
of Appeal adopts a stance that makes sense primarily in economic terms. Even though at
first glance the court abstains from substantively evaluating the decision of the health
authority, this very abstinence can be explained in economic terms. In essence, what the
court maintains is that from an economic point of view, the body more able to reach a
correct decision regarding the efficient allocation of limited resources is the body that is
actually in charge of these resources, namely the health authority. In economic terms, a
substantial intervention of the court would probably generate an inefficient solution;
hence the decision of the authority was sanctioned. This stance is compatible with a
liberal, non-interventionist ideal that insists that the best way for achieving efficiency is to
allow the relevant sector of society to reach the proper solution on its own. Given that
the judiciary belongs to the wider apparatus of the state, it comes as no surprise that non¬
intervention is deemed as the correct legal and economic solution.
Is this reading of the case plausible? This of course can be contested, but in my
view the economic analysis of law provides a useful platform for explaining the insistence
on the allocation of resources and the non-interventionist outcome. Also, it helps to
explain why the question of the best interests of B was, here, intrinsically linked with the
pragmatism of limited resources. The management of scarce resources falls properly
within the domain of economics; thus, an economic reading of the case shows that the
substantiation of the best interests principle is not determined by clinical and quality of
life considerations alone, but that it ultimately relates to the broader issue of economic
efficiency in health care provision.
260
SeeR. Posner, 1983, p. 4
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E. Conclusion.
The aim of this admittedly long chapter was to present the normative content of the
law's involvement with medicine, as this has actually taken place so far. Having reached
the end, and with the reminder that this was only a partial presentation that left many
issues in the dark, it seems to me that at least one very significant conclusion can be
reached, namely that the field is characterised by a degree of internal complexity that should
not remain unnoticed.
I use the term complexity here as a shorthand that indicates several significant
issues. Let me present them in the form of five statements that capture quite accurately
what I mean by claiming that there exists complexity in the field:
a) The law interferes with medicine either through adjudication or through legislation;
however, it is not clear whether a pattern can be identified, able to explain why the one
form of regulation is actualised at the expense of the other. It appears that an element of
randomness is present, especially in terms of the technical aspect of medicine. This
randomness is further intensified by the sheer quantity of the relevant material. In any
case though, there is no doubt that adjudication is of crucial importance for the actuality
of the discipline and that more often than not the courts are called upon to opine about
new developments in medicine.
b) In the justification and interpretation of the relevant norms, there seems to be a
constant (although implicit) presence of all the "shareholders" in the domain of
medicine. The interests of health professionals, scientists, patients, the state etc. are all
mirrored through the use of concepts that arguably emanate from those interests, but are
couched in legal terms. The notion of autonomy or the delineation of the best interests
test according to the medical view, are just the most obvious examples. In any case, the
exploration of the field simply highlights that these different interests are present; the
balance between them is constantly unstable and the tension between conflicting or
simply different stakes is rarely resolved in a definite manner.
c) This last point is very much exemplified if one considers the organisation of the
provision of health care. Here, a variety of different interests conflict with each other: for
instance, the gradual openness of the NHS to market forces (through the welcoming of
the involvement of the private sector) contradicts a trend against commercialisation that
is present in other areas, like transplantation of organs and reproduction. Similarly, the
regulatory framework of the health care professions and of the NHS is fraught with
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mechanisms of control of the conduct of health care professionals. Against this trend,
one cannot but notice that the judicial handling of the same individuals is characterised
by a very significant degree of respect to professional authority and autonomy.
d) In combining the above statements, it becomes obvious that medical law is sensitive
to a wide variety of influences. In this respect, it develops in a very particularistic manner:
both judicial decision-making and parliamentary intervention are oriented to the
particular nature of the case or the area that they refer to and they integrate different
factors according to this particularity. As a result medical law is generally characterised by
a dense substantive rationality.
e) Finally, even in the field of legal reasoning, the plateau where coherence is often
depicted as a desirable ideal, randomness is also present. Different considerations and,
quite often, different modes of reasoning are employed — my enquiry shows that formal,
ethical, economical and probably political considerations all shape the way according to
which the courts decide medical cases. This further means that even if some of the
modes of reasoning are consistent with theories that underlie the importance of
coherence, it is the notion of incoherence that best captures what is happening in the field.
These findings must be combined with the conclusion of the previous chapter,
namely that the doctrinal analysis has not been so far able to provide a plausible
argument regarding the subject matter of a supposedly coherent discipline of "medical
law". Is this not another indication of a significant degree of complexity? For me the
answer is affirmative and additionally, it indicates exactly how I use the term complexity
in this chapter. In effect, I take complexity to signify a lack of internal coherence, in the
sense that the field cannot be described according to a unified set of principles in terms
of which setded conclusions can be reached. On the contrary, my point is that the
orientation of law towards medicine has produced an internal normative horizon where
conflicting principles are present in abundance and where inconsistency is the norm
rather than the exception: within the field of medical law a point of equilibrium is not
easy to find. This is exacdy what the term internal complexity depicts at this stage of my
thesis.
This being said, the need to explain why such a complexity is present seems to
me a task worth pursuing. Clearly, one could tackle the issue from many different
perspectives and with different foci of inquiry. For instance, it is arguable that the
balance between legislation and adjudication can be explained from the point of view of
a political analysis that may identify the reasons why the state decides to intervene in
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certain areas directly and not in others; equally, the size of the relevant case law can be
analysed from a perspective emphasising the reasons that underlie the phenomenon of
litigation. Similarly, a sociological analysis could explain the simultaneous presence of
different interests as a marker of how the struggle between these interests is evolving in
society; even my own discussion regarding medicine as a professional jurisdiction implies
as much. Finally, the complexity of the legal reasoning could be explained by any theory
that would be ready to argue that the process of reasoning is essentially open to general
societal pressures that may take different forms.
I have no doubt that all these approaches can provide crucial insights regarding
the problem of complexity that I have identified. However, all of them are helpful in
explaining complexity only if one is willing to externalise it, namely to treat it as an
indication of phenomena that take place outside the law. This shifts the emphasis away
from an internal perspective that would treat complexity as a phenomenon that resides
within the law. Such a perspective is crucial in a very significant respect, namely in that it
shows that complexity indicates something about the nature of medical law itself. By
advocating an internal point of view, the focus returns to the law and the question that
has to be answered is the following: what does the existence of internal complexity reveal
regarding the very nature of law's orientation to medicine?
It is my firm belief that this kind of questioning is the most fruitful for furthering
our understanding of how medical law is constituted. This is why I consider that a
discussion of complexity from an internal perspective is apposite to the initial question of
my project. This is exactly what I will do in the next chapter, where I will turn to a more
theoretical analysis. In essence, what I will do there is to provide a theory that takes on
board internal complexity and to explore what such a theory unearths regarding the
emergence of new disciplines in the process of legal regulation. In the light of this
proposed theoretical framework, I will provide a concrete platform for tackling the initial
question ofmy thesis. This platform will be then applied to medical law in the fourth and
final chapter of the thesis.
Chapter 3
Legal Regulation
From a Systems-Theoretical Perspective
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A. Introduction.
In the previous chapters of the thesis, I undertook an unpacking of the discipline of
medical law as it stands, on the basis of which two conclusions were reached. The first
conclusion is that the doctrinal propositions on the subject matter of medical law are
implausible and thus that they cannot sustain the constitution of medical law as a distinct
discipline. The second conclusion is that the empirical material of medical law is
characterised by a significant degree of complexity, that can be understood —at least
ostensibly- as a high "concentration" of substantive instead of formal rationality within
this branch of the law.
Let me now introduce this chapter, by highlighting the importance of an
additional remark that in a sense brings these two conclusions together, although in an
oppositional manner. On the one hand, the doctrine insists that it is possible to define
coherently what medical law is. The fact that the relevant propositions that have so far
been advanced are implausible, does not mean that the goal itself is unachievable: maybe
we simply miss an adequate conceptualisation, which will eventually describe accurately
the subject matter of medical law and organise the discipline accordingly. On the other
hand, though, the complexity identified in chapter 2 is so significant and so multi-layered
that maybe a doctrinal constitution of medical law is beyond the doctrine's range. Indeed,
it may signify that any doctrinal attempt to gather this empirical "variety" as a coherent
body under adequate concepts has no chance of success.
In effect, a discrepancy exists here, which has not been seriously considered so
far and which, although under-theorised, is very important for any attempt to assess how
the discipline of medical law can be constructed. Therefore, in the chapter at hand, which
aims at presenting a theoretical argument on the basis of which the constitution ofmedical law will be
reassessed., I will take on board this discrepancy as the starting point for the choice of the
theoretical perspective adopted here. This means that I will be based on a theory that
integrates the significance both of complexity and of the founding presuppositions of the
doctrinal definitions, namely that medical law becomes constituted in the process of the
regulatory orientation of law towards medicine.
This latter remark determines the exact structure of the chapter. In the next two
parts, I will explain in detail the main tenets of the theoretical view that best fits my
purpose. Then, I will analyse the problem of regulation and in the light of the same
theory, I will explain exactly how the intensification of legal regulation determines the
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constitution of new, autonomous disciplines within the law. In the final part, I will
summarise my findings in such a way as to apply them directly to the constitution of
medical law. This task will be the subject matter of the next chapter of the thesis.
B. Complexity as an object of theoretical enquiry.
I will begin my discussion by following closely some insights from the doctrinal
propositions. At this level, the argument in effect is that the subject matter of medical
law (the identification of which determines how the discipline is constituted) must be
defined in terms of the crystallisation of law's response to an external theme originating
from medicine — whatever this theme may be. This assertion presumes that the law is
called upon to deal with a specific problem or a cluster of problems, which for some
reasons require regulatory intervention. In turn, this is based on the idea that the law is
an instrument that can be used for political reform, or more generally a mechanism that
can steer social action; that is why it is assumed that specific changes in various social
spheres (in our case medicine) can be achieved through law. At a further level of
generalisation, the acknowledgement of the possibility of social guidance through law is
based on the fundamental belief that the law can both integrate issues originating from
the non-legal world and also penetrate this world through regulation. To put it in a more
sophisticated language, the doctrinal propositions are ultimately connected with the idea
that the law is an open system, which receives questions from other societal spheres as
input and generates relevant regulatory solutions as output.1
From a sociological point of view, any perspective based on the notion of open
systems treats social institutions and organisations as autonomous units that constantly
interrelate directly with their environment.2 It highlights issues like adaptation,
maintenance, variety and equilibrium. Especially as far as regulation is concerned, an
open systems perspective would stress the possibility of rational organisation of means
towards particular ends and would theoretically support the possibility of direct social
1
For a detailed analysis of the argument that the law is an open system, see L. Friedman, The Legal System: a
Social Science Perspective (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975), pp. 5ff.
2
This theory has its origins in biology. For the original idea, see L. von Bertalanffy, "The Theory of Open
Systems in Physics and Biology" (1950) 111 Science 23, whereas for its application to sociology see, amongst
many others, W. Buckley, Sociology and Modem Systems Theory (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967) and D. Katz
and R.L. Kahn, The Social Psychology ofOrganizations (New York: Wiley, 1966).
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intervention, through a wide range of mechanisms.3 In brief, this perspective establishes
the regulatory potential of the law as a relational issue, which is determined by the actual
interaction between the legal system and its environment in accordance to an input-
output model. The presupposition that medical law is constituted as a discipline because
the law reacts to problems emanating from medicine and that these problems can be
regulated through law is the self-evident consequence of the implicit affirmation of an
open-systems perspective; it is also the cornerstone that sustains the whole doctrinal
edifice of medical law as it now stands and is embedded in the practical view point that
the doctrine adopts.
Nevertheless, the effect of actual attempts for social change through law cast a
shadow on the uncontested plausibility of the open systems approach. Although
regulatory efforts certainly have a significant impact, it has gradually been noticed that
this is not always the expected one. Often, the regulated areas show a contingent degree
of sensitivity to regulatory projects: sometimes, regulatory projects fail for no obvious
reasons, whereas on other occasions they achieve results beyond the pre-existing
expectations in a rather paradoxical manner.4 In addition, even the idea of a rational
organisation of legal structures towards particular ends seems itself to collapse: legal
regulation is often shaped in a contingent way, through isolated legislative initiatives and
complicated judicial decisions, as the example of the internal complexity of medical law
perfectly highlights. The conclusion that can be reached is that the mobilisation of the
law as a means for achieving particular aims may result in unpredictable outcomes, which
are expressed as an increase of the complexity both of the legal system and of the
regulated field. This unpredictability is not very welcome from a theoretical point of
view: according to the paradigm of open systems a direct, rational and efficient
intervention through law is achievable and, therefore, because of this detected
unpredictability something must be missing. Naturally, efforts have been made, from
within the open systems model, to understand the contingency of legal regulation up to
this point and to provide solutions.5 However, the problem seems to persist. Ultimately,
this realisation has necessitated a different theoretical paradigm,6 able to integrate
3 For further analysis, see G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 13-14.
4 For this point, see in details G. Teubner, "After Legal Instrumentalism: Strategic Models of Post Regulatory
Law" in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas ofLaw in the Welfare State (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985) and 1993, pp. 13-15.
5 For an introduction, see R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an Introduction (2nd edition, Edinburgh:
Butterworths, 1992), pp. 50-53 and 59-63.
6 For the history of the realisation of the need to change paradigm, see G. Teubner, "Evolution of Autopoietic
Law" in G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp.
217-241, at pp. 218-220.
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empirical unpredictability and complexity. This paradigm has been found in a new
version of systems theory^ primarily developed in the work of Niklas Luhmann.8
Luhmann starts from the premise that the social universe is strikingly complex,
characterised by an infinite number of possibilities, discontinuities and alternative
options. Against this background of complexity, the most fundamental sociological task
is to explain how social interaction and ultimately society is possible. Indeed, this appears
as an improbability given that intense complexity generates contingenty that runs through the
whole social world and hinders the possibility of building up constancy of patterns of
social interdependence.9 This formulation of the issue invites the theory to come up with
a way of solving the familiar problem of "double contingency",10 according to which the
very possibility of social interaction is dependent upon the stabilisation of a particular
interactional context. This means that the meaningful unfolding of any social interaction,
the exact content of which is by definition contingent (first-order contingency), can only
happen within a context, the particular settling of which is also contingent (second-order
contingency). To provide an example: one can choose to agree or disagree with someone
else (first-order contingency); however, it is indispensable to know about what (second-
order contingency) one agrees or disagrees, otherwise nothing would make sense.
Consequently, the necessary presupposition of any interaction and more generally of
society itself as a meaningful, ordered "entity" is the possibility of stabilising contexts of
interaction.
Luhmann solves the problem of double contingency, by proposing a radical
departure from traditional sociology: he claims that instead of taking action as the
elementary unit of the social, the focus should be on communication.n Society represents
7 This theory takes shape accommodating a variety of influences and most notably: (obviously) general systems
theory (see L. von Bertalanffy, 1950)); biological ideas regarding the autopoietic character of living organisms (see
H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition (Boston: Reidel, 1980) and F.J. Varela, Principles of
Biological Autonomy (New York: Elsevier, 1979)); cybernetic models regarding the possibility of systemic
interaction (see H. von Forster, Observing Systems (Seaside, California: Intersystems Publications, 1981));
mathematical models of logic (see G. Spencer-Brown, Laws of Form (New York: Julian, 1972)); sociological
understandings of the notion of self-reference (for the debate regarding this notion, see G. Teubner, 1993, p. 15,
with further references)); finally, the theoretical premises of functional differentiation (see, in details, T. Parsons,
The Social System (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul Ltd, 1951) and T. Parsons and E.A. Shils (eds.), Toward a
General Theory ofAction: Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences (Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1951)).
8 The most detailed presentation of the theory can be found in N. Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1995a).
9 SeeN. Luhmann, 1995a, pp. 114-117.
10 Originally formulated by Talcott Parsons and classically summarised in 1951, p. 105.
11
Although this is a founding argument of all Luhmann's work, its most explicit exposition can be found in N.
Luhmann, "The Concept of Society" (1992) 31 Thesis Eleven 67 and in 1995a, pp. 137ff. Not surprisingly, this
thesis has been the focus of intense criticism, especially for the collateral "subordination" of action to
communication; for an introduction to the relevant debate, see E. Christodoulidis, Law and Reflexive Politics
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 75-76 and also G. Teubner, 1993, p. 43.
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the totality of communications12 and therefore complexity, at the social level, equals
communicative complexity. It follows that the problem of double contingency in society
must be reformulated as a problem of setting up communicative contexts. In Luhmann's
terms this task should be understood as a reduction achievement, because the establishment
of a context reduces the infinite social complexity into a "particularised" complexity,
which is tolerated and processed as such by the context itself. It is important to stress
that any contextual reduction provides a solution to double contingency: it eliminates
second-order contingency and, thus, it allows for the meaningful unfolding of the first-
order contingency. It is only within a stable, communicative context that human
interaction becomes meaningful.
Within this theoretical framework, systems are perceived as "agents" that make the
reduction achievement possible, that stabilise contexts and handle complexity.13 As far as
society is concerned, social systems fix communicative contexts and are themselves
systems of communication.14 They attain this by providing internally defined recurrent
schemes for processing communication and therefore they manage complexity only by
existing, as distinct systems, in time. The medium that social systems use in doing this is
meaning, they stabilise communicative contexts by providing system-specific meaning-
related networks of structures that endure in time.15 These structures impose particular
reductions to the social (communicative) universe and they orchestrate the very
possibility of meaningful interaction, by particularising the abstract and undefined
possibilities that exist in the social domain.16 To put it in a simpler manner, what systems
achieve is the stabilisation of specific types of meaning: the contexts that they fix are
meaning-related contexts, only within which meaningful interaction can be attained.
Let me insist for a while on the consequences of the system-specific achievement
of reduction. To begin with, it must be understood as a paradoxical achievement in the
following sense: although systems reduce complexity in order to ensure meaningful
communication, when doing so they simultaneously contribute to the intensification of
12 SeeN. Luhmann, 1992, passim.
13 For a definition of what should be understood as "system", see N. Luhmann, Law As A Social System (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 78.
14 Within the infinite complexity of the world, which includes the realm of non-communications, other types of
systems are also present. For example, in his typology of systems (in 1995a, pp. 2ff), Luhmann distinguishes
between living, psychic and social systems.
15 It goes without saying that the possibility of communication is inherently linked with the problem of how
meaning emerges. For this, see in details N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 144-145.
16 One could generalise further and argue that only through systemic reduction is meaning possible in general, as
its very possibility is conditioned upon the setting up of a context against the loose and undefined complexity of
the communicative universe.
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the general communicative complexity.17 This is because any emerging system-specific
stabilisation of meaning generates a new communicative possibility, which registers
within the societal domain and therefore increases the already existing matrix of
alternative options.18 This should not be seen as a contradiction, but rather as an
unavoidable side effect of interacting in a complex world. As such, this double effect of
systemic reductions is itself managed within systems: as general societal complexity tends
to intensify, systems elaborate on their internal structures and become themselves more
complex in response.19
In order to further elaborate on the reduction achievement it must be stressed
that it rests completely on the possibility of an internal organisation of a system-specific
context. Only internal operations that utterly depend on systemic elements, structures
and events are mobilised as soon as a particular context is stabilised. Therefore the
reduction of complexity is always system-specific and it is contingent on this
"internalisation" of the complexity of the world. It follows that it is presupposed and
also actualised in all the possible operations of any social system. It rests on the core of
the very nature of systems and in a sense —as a particular reduction- it determines them.
This latter point justifies the explanatory strength of ostensibly paradoxical notions like
self-reference and autopoiesis, which further elaborate on how a system thus conceived
is constantly referring back to itself in order to generate new operations.20 Social systems
must be circular, self-referential systems because otherwise they would not be able to
stabilise meaningful interactions and would fail to accomplish the reduction of
complexity. As a consequence, systems make sense of the world only on their own terms
and perceive everything only within their own internally defined horizon of
understanding. It is crucially in this respect that systems theory provides a more
sophisticated account than the open systems approach, according to which systems
operate using external points of reference that exist independently of systems.
This latter remark does not imply that systems do not interrelate with their
environment, nor does it advocate a constructivist understanding of social reality.21
17 It must be stressed here that society as the totality of communication is itself a system contrasted with the non-
communicative world.
18 See, in details, E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 83-84.
19
I will come back to this point in the course ofmy discussion.
20
At this point of the argument, I am referring to the rich conceptual apparatus of systems theory only with the
aim to clarify my point about the reduction achievement. Concepts like operation, self-reference, autopoiesis etc.
require a much more sophisticated discussion to which I will return in the next section.
21 For the epistemological premises that underlie systems theory, with a particular focus on law, see G. Teubner,
"How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law" (1989) 23(5) Law and Society Review 727,
especially at pp. 736ff.
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However, it shifts the focus away from an input-output model and stresses that this
interrelation must take into account that social systems are essentially self-referential
systems.22 By applying this approach to law and by arguing that the law is itself a self-
referential system of communication,23 the problem of regulation, and with it the
problem of the constitution of medical law, appears in a different light: against the open
systems approach, one needs to investigate how the law can interrelate with other
systems, which are themselves self-referential and which also perceive the world
internally."4 Although this sounds paradoxical, it is the necessary conclusion of a theory
which, building upon the notion of complexity and the need for its reduction, advocates
the self-referential character of social systems. Accordingly, in the next section I will
investigate in details how the law, understood as a self-referential social system,
interrelates with its environment.
C. Law as a social system.
1) Basic concepts.
In what follows I will introduce some fundamental concepts of systems theory, in order
to facilitate the reader's understanding of what law and legal regulation entail according
to the theory. This is not supposed to be a complete exposition of the theory, nor a full
account of the law as a social system. Rather, it is simply a selective summary of some
crucial insights. Also, I must stress that all the concepts employed here should be
understood as analytical tools that are necessary for any attempt to make sense of the
world of social systems; as far as social reality is concerned, one can empirically identify
only its "matter", namely communications.25
22 For a detailed analysis of phenomena that are linked with self-referentiality, see G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 19ff.
23 This argument may indeed have radical repercussions, not least because traditionally law is understood to
contribute to the normative foundations of action. For this tradition, see, amongst many others T. Parsons, "The
Law and Social Control" and H.C. Bredemeier, "Law as an Integrative Mechanism" both in W.M. Evan (ed.), Law
and Sociology: Exploratory Essays (Glencoe: Free Press, 1962), pp. 56-72 (Parsons), 73-90 (Bredemeier).
24 A switch from an open systems approach to a systems-theoretical approach has further consequences: it
necessitates a change of emphasis from design/control to autonomy and environmental sensitivity and from
regulation to systemic co-evolution. See, in details, G. Teubner, 1988, p. 217.
25 For this point see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 84 and 209.
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a) System and environment.
In the previous section, I claimed that social systems constitute planes that reduce the
communicative complexity of society. In a close inspection, these systems emerge by
establishing a sharp distinction between themselves and whatever remains beyond them,
namely their environment. To put it crudely, systems introduce an artificial "point" within
the unmarked, undifferentiated social reality, a point that splits the whole of reality into
two sides. This point serves as the boundary between the system and its environment
and as such not only distinguishes between the two sides (system/environment) but also
ensures that the sum of the two constitutes the totality of reality. Importantly, this basic
distinction opens up the possibility ofmaking sense of the world, by providing a starting
point for observation-, anything can be observed as belonging to the one or the other side
of the distinction. Observation is a concept that conditions all cognitive and ultimately
communicative activity and it always requires a distinction: only because something is
distinguished, it becomes possible to talk about it.26 Only in this way can meaning
emerge, because only through a system-specific basic distinction, it is possible for the
cognition of an object of observation as an object of observation to be achieved. Of course,
this opens up the possibility of plurality: as long as different points of observation
appear, different systems become established and different types of meaning follow. As a
result, meaning is always system-specific and always depends on the system's particular
mode of observation.
In a world consisting of a plurality of meaning-related systems, it must be
stressed that all of them are established through a specific boundary, namely the
particular, unique difference that they employ in distinguishing between system and
environment. This claim has a twofold implication. First, it implies that the distinction
between system and environment is controlled by the system and therefore there are as
many such distinctions as there are systems. Accordingly, the environment should not be
understood as an ever-present state that constantly surrounds all social systems. The
notion of "environment" is relative to the emergence of a concrete system and is always
26
Although this basic distinction controls the very possibility of observing, it cannot simultaneously be used and
be observed; as a starting point it has to be a blind spot, otherwise it could not provide the basis for a particular
observation. Of course it can be observed, but only as an object and therefore only through a different distinction
that establishes another kind of observation, namely a "second-order" observation. For this point, see N. Luhmann,
2004, pp. 182, 191. However, this does not mean that the system is unaware of its blind spot; on the contrary,
because of the existence of redundancy (a concept to which I will focus later on the discussion) the system realises
that it observes reality in a particular way, although it is unable to observe its mode of observation. See, in details,
S.C. Smith, "The Redundancy of Reasoning" in Z. Bankowski, I. White and U. Hahn (eds.), Informatics and the
Foundations ofLegal Reasoning (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), pp. 191-204, at p. 198.
128
attached to it, since it constitutes the other side of the distinction that conditions the
emergence of the system in the first place. System and environment are constructed
simultaneously, they both assume each other and the difference between the two is
always system-specific.27 Secondly, the drawing of the boundary embodies the unique
character of the system and it is based on the particular way that the system employs, in
making sense of the world. This means that the boundary that designates the difference
between system and environment is itself shaped as the outcome of a particular
distinction, namely the one that the system is using in order to observe.28 So, through the
system-specific boundary the whole of reality is split in two sides, the one that observes
according to a particular distinction (the system) and the other that does not do that (the
environment). 29 This elementary distinction is in essence the formative precondition for
the existence of any system, because it sustains its system-specific observation, it
establishes its difference with its environment and it is assumed in all its operations.30
Ultimately, it is the major prerequisite of the reduction achievement, because through its
constant application, the system stabilises its particular meaning and fixes a
communicative context.
In system-theoretical terms, this basic distinction is called a "guiding
distinction".31 All kinds of systems employ such a distinction in order to become
differentiated from the environment. As far as social systems are concerned and
especially functionally differentiated social systems,32 the guiding distinction takes the
form of a binary code, namely a code that integrates a positive and a negative meaning-
related attribution. All social systems communicate about reality by employing their
binary code and by applying in any particular instance the one or the other side of its
basic polarity.
27
This being the case and against the open systems approach, it must be stressed that systems do not expand or re¬
assess their boundaries within an over-compassing environment. The environment is always a system-specific
environment.
28
So, whenever an external observer attempts to identify a social system, what is necessary is to identify the
distinction that the system is using in observing the world. This process can again be described as second-order
observation; for further details, see W.T. Murphy, "Systems of Systems: Some Issues in the Relationship Between
Law and Autopoiesis" (1994) 5(2) Law and Critique 241, p. 250. Of course, since this is a process of observation
it belongs itself to a particular system, namely the system from within which this particular observation originates.
For this crucial epistemological point and more generally for the complicated repercussions of a theory that
establishes its epistemology on the possibility of observing systems as being observers themselves, see N.
Luhmann, 1995a, pp. 478.
29 That is why there exists an inherent link between system-specific observation and the distinction between
system/environment. For this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 86.
30 That is why all the operations of any system replicate the difference between system and environment and this is
why I previously argued that the particular reduction that any system achieves is constantly present in all the
operations of the system. For this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 78.
31 See in details, E. Cristodoulidis, 1998, pp. 88ff.
321 will go back to the idea of functional differentiation when discussing the function of the legal system.
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Let me elaborate on this so far abstract discussion, by taking the legal system as
an example. The code of the legal system, namely the guiding difference that establishes
its uniqueness is the distinction legal!illegal. This means that the law perceives everything
(rather, communicates about everything) by using this distinction: for the legal system,
something makes sense only as legal or illegal. Other possibilities of meaning are simply
non-existing for the legal system, which, by applying this fundamental distinction,
constitutes legal meaning as a particular type of meaning and manages to reduce the
communicative complexity of the world in this specific way. Through its unique code,
the law sharply differentiates itself from its environment (namely, whatever does not use
the distinction legal/illegal — the non legal world!) and it acquires its special identity (it is
the only system that observes the world using this distinction).33 It is through the
application of the legal code that legal communications emerge, namely communications
that are intended to have legal effects and to change legal expectations.34 Ultimately, its
code guarantees that the law becomes a stable system, unified as such in time: as legal
communications take shape through the constant usage of the legal code and as these
communications are linked together, the law is no longer a spontaneous order, but
rather, like any other system, a structured constellation of code application. The legal
system constitutes the unfolding of the legal code in time and occurs (as a stable system)
as the sum of all the instances of the application of the legal code. Legal communications
are not one-off exercises. Even a particular legal communication should be perceived as
taking place within the constant production of a series of communications, each of them
linked with the previous one, and each anticipating the next.35 In essence, the legal
system operates by constantly observing the world, and therefore by constantly producing
legal communications based on legal communications. That is why Luhmann claims that
the most elementary operations of the legal system are self-reproduction
(communications furnish new communications)36 and observation (the attaching of legal
meaning to reality).37
So, the code controls the identity and the unity of the system in time and
establishes the boundary between system and environment. Does this mean that the
environment is irrelevant for the system? The answer is positively negative. The
33 For the link between the code and the identity of the system, see W.T. Murphy, 1994, p. 253.
34 For this short "definition" of legal communications, see N. Luhmann, "The Unity of the Legal System" in G.
Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 19.
35 For this point, see N. Luhmann, 1988, p. 19 and E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 76-77; also, although from a
different theoretical perspective, G.J. Postema, "Melody and Law's Mindfulness of Time" (2004) 17 (2) Ratio
Juris 203.
36 For an analysis of the concept of self-reproduction, see G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 20-24.
37 See N. Luhmann, 1988, p. 13.
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environment is indispensable for the system, in a twofold way. To begin with, its
existence is necessary for the existence of the system itself: only by realising that
something else exists, is it possible for systems to perceive themselves as distinct entities.
Thus, systems are constantly aware of the existence of the distinction between system
and environment; in theoretical terms, this distinction constantly "re-enters" the system
and it remains as a lingering background for all its operations.38 The law needs to be
aware that there exists a non-legal world. Otherwise it would be meaningless to perceive
itself as law. This is not as paradoxical as it sounds: only through re-entry the law
becomes able to observe itself as belonging to an environment39 and deal with the need
of not only observing the world, but also of observing itself as an observer.4" It follows
that whenever the law refers to itself, it has to refer to itself as something distinct from
its environment and, thus, it tacitly refers also to its environment. Only this combination
of internal and external reference can sustain the identity of the legal system, or generally
of any system.41
At a further level, the communicative character of social systems necessitates
another link between the system and its environment. Communication must be triggered
and although systems control how communications are processed, they cannot
themselves provide the triggers of communication.42 It is the environment that provides
these triggers and stimulates communicative system-specific responses. Of course, since
systems are plateaus of reduction, they completely control environmental stimuli and in
all their operations they constantly refer back to their internal horizon. They select what
counts as relevant according to their own criteria, they classify the information value of
these stimuli internally and they decide themselves whether they prefer to be indifferent.
In this respect, social systems are usually understood to be closed systems: they rely only
on their own network of operations and only through them they continue to produce
new operations,43 always according to their particular mode of observation, established at
the level of their unique code.44 However, this only means that they internally control the
handling of the environment; it does not mean that the environment does not provide
stimuli or that systems exist in isolation. Without the environmental stimuli,
38 For the concept of re-entry see G. Spencer-Brown, 1972.
39 For this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 87.
40 See E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 82-83 with further references.
41 For this point see N. Luhmann, Risk: a Sociological Theory (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 224-225.
42 In this respect, social systems must show a high degree of "irritability". See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 322.
43 This is exactly why social systems are autopoietic systems. For this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 80.
44 This point exemplifies the very close link between observation and operation. For further analysis, see N.
Luhmann, "Legal Argumentation: an Analysis of its Form" (1995b) 58(3) Modern Law Review 285, at p. 287, note
6.
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communication would not happen and communicative systems would wither away.
Accordingly, environmental openness45 is essential for the very existence of systems,
which of course must be combined with the essentially closed nature of their coding. To
summarise, systems are simultaneously closed and open systems,46 distinguished from but
also aware of their environment.
In the example of the law, this assertion means that the law is open to its
environment, in the sense that legal communications require a certain environmental
trigger. Something must happen in the non-legal world, which must be classified as a
legally relevant "event" for legal communications to emerge. This can be clarified by
providing a metaphor: a legal communication is nothing but the system's way of
"talking" about its environment and in this respect the law is open. Simultaneously,
however, the legal system is a closed system: it defines internally what stimuli are
significant, what selections are mobilised in attributing information value to external
events, etc. In any case, it constantly perceives these stimuli as legally significant or not
and it is only then that it processes them as legal or illegal. So, the legal system is
simultaneously a closed and open system.
The elaboration of this "dual" nature of systems is probably one of the most
fruitful insights of systems theory, especially as far as the relationship between system
and environment is concerned. Since the understanding of this relationship is of core
significance for the very concept of regulation it requires further analysis. I am going to
pursue this, in the following section by exploring the mechanisms that control this
duality within the legal system.
b) The level of programming.
Although the binary code legal/illegal ensures the distinct identity of the legal system, its
mere identification is insufficient when one attempts to understand the operative reality
of the system. Indeed, legal communications occur as particular applications of the code,
but how is it possible to know what counts as legal and what as illegal in a given case?
The code alone does not answer and it does not even provide any guidance —
furthermore, it does not have to. The code simply guarantees through its polarity that
legal meaning is conceivable and, therefore, communicatively possible. As far as the code
45 For further analysis of this openness, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 112.
46
Although this is a notoriously paradoxical assertion of the discourse of autopoiesis, it must be kept in mind that
it is not in itself a radical innovation of systems theory. In truth, it is quite old and originates from cybernetics. The
original source is probably W.R Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Methuen, 1956).
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is concerned, it does not matter whether something is legal or illegal. What does matter is
only the possibility of observing reality in these terms; the particularisation of the code is,
at this level, irrelevant and as such contingent.47 Accordingly, the distinction between
legal and illegal is here simply a distinction between a positive and a negative value. To
push this point further, one could argue that at the level of coding, this distinction is
structurally tautological: the legal can always be illegal and vice versa, without this being
problematic for the code and ultimately for the identity of the system. It follows that for
the concrete attribution of the values legal/illegal further elaboration is necessary and
further distinctions must be drawn.
The unfolding of this tautology is achieved at the level of "programming".48 At
this level, the legal system provides particular criteria in terms of which the difference
between legal and illegal is given content and the ascription of the two values is
concretely defined. These criteria usually appear as conditional programmesV) and they
provide particular prerequisites, the fulfilment or disappointment of which generates the
concrete attribution of one or the other side of the code. Conditional programmes
further ensure that the legal system is open to its environment because they force it to
internalise (in the form of criteria) external values in order to sustain a concrete
legal/illegal attribution — it goes without saying that this internalisation is determined
exclusively by the system which therefore is once again limited by its closed nature.50 By
using conditional programs, the legal system determines how its code is going to be
applied and by doing this it performs a kind of internal self-observation.51 Through self-
observation the law achieves internal constancy, because it questions how its code has
been applied in previous instances and approaches this past in a controlled way. To put it
in more abstract terms, what happens here is the re-entry of the distinction legal/illegal in
a particular previous application of the same distinction (and not on the code itself,
because this would result in an irresolvable paradox), so that the legal system can keep
47
The indifference of the code regarding which of its sides is going to be activated in a particular instance ensures
the unity of the code, namely its ability to guarantee a constant interplay between the two values. See, in details, N.
Luhmann, 2004, p. 186, where he exemplifies this by arguing that any decision in favour of one of the sides must
always take into account the possibility of preferring the other side.
48 For an introduction to the relevant debate, see E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 91 ff.
49 Luhmann (in 2004, p. 196) argues that legal programmes should always be understood as conditional and not as
purposive programmes; yet, this is not necessarily the case. Purposive (namely goal-oriented) programmes can
also be part of the legal system.
50 For a detailed analysis of this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 192-3; for a similar point, according to which
principles serve as conditional external references during adjudication, see S.C. Smith, 1995, pp. 198-199.
51 For the concept of self-observation, see G. Teubner, 1993, p. 19.
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evolving in a dynamic, but ordered manner.52 This is necessary, since the exact
substantiation of the balance between legality and illegality is at the outset contingent
and, therefore, it must be managed.
What renders the self-observation of the law, through conditional programmes,
crucial, is the existence of the legal system in time. As it was argued in the previous
section, legal communications generate further legal communications53 and in that way
the system carries the application of the code forward into the future.54 Therefore, it is
necessary for the legal system to develop a sophisticated internal mechanism to control
this temporal linkage and to stabilise both its present and its future criteria of
attribution.55 Otherwise, it would not be able to exist as a unified system in time. As legal
communications constantly reappear with the passing of time, conditional programmes,
which provide selections on the proper links between legal communications, become
structures; these structures appear as norms and through them it becomes possible to
know in advance how a particular scenario will be assessed in the future.56 In this way, at
any given point in time, decisions about the attribution of the values of the code are
made or are about to be made according to past decisions. It is exacdy through norms,
generated at the level of programming, that the law becomes able to manage time: norms
integrate the past into the present and norms project the present into the future.57 Of
course, these normative structures may change, but the very possibility of change is itself
conditioned on particular programmes.
To summarise, through programming the legal system acquires an elaborate
internal structure and starts to operate in a complex, but highly controlled manner. It
develops the ability to organise its own dynamics of change and it manages to perceive
itself as a complex system and to provide self-descriptions compatible with this complexity.
Here, the term "self-description" denotes a particular mode of self-observation that
fosters the identity of the system and that is embedded on the particular programs that
52 This implies that for the operative survival of the system both values (legal and illegal) are equally significant
and that the binary structuring of the legal code should be understood as a "nested opposition". For further analysis
of this concept, see M. Balkin, "Nested Oppositions" (1990) Yale Law Journal 99, pp. 1669-1705.
53 They do so, because as soon as a legal communication is exhausted it becomes part of the existing matrix of the
system, in terms of which new selections will be made and new communications will occur. For this point, see N.
Luhmann, 2004, p. 184.
54 SeeN. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 179-180.
55 For the crucial significance of this linkage, see, in details, H.G. Deggau, "The Communicative Autonomy of the
Legal System" in G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1988), pp. 128-151, at pp. 138-139.
56 This possibility is usually depicted as "technicalisation", which refers to the likelihood of anticipating how the
code is going to be applied in a concrete future case. See N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 187-188; it is at this level that
more familiar notions, like "judicial rationality" and "error" start to make sense!
57 See, in details, N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 197-198.
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the system employs.58 Additionally, it achieves an internal differentiation between
structures, elements59 and processes, it defines sharply these categories and reproduces its
unity through all of them;6" it establishes its own selections and it defines how the
elements generate new elements;61 ultimately, it is at this level that the legal system
succeeds in controlling its internal, self-referential reproduction, by providing an internal
rationalisation ofwhy the coding is actually applied in a certain way and not otherwise. In
other words, the constant negotiation of the balance between the unchangeable coding
and the flexible programming ensures the autopoiesis of the legal system.
By introducing the level of programming, it becomes possible to explain the
internal sophistication of the legal system and to contrast the certainty of the coding with
the flexibility of legal reality.62 Also, it becomes possible to discard the critical voices
against the rigidity of the code, by arguing that they underestimate the significance of
programming.63 Nevertheless, what this concept cannot depict is the exact link between
the internal refinement it signifies and the elementary distinction between system and
environment. This connection requires us to shift the focus on another conceptual pair.
c) Redundancy and variation.
Functional social systems, like law, are differentiated as unique because of the special
code they use as their constitutive guiding difference.64 At the level of programming, they
elaborate on their internal sophistication and they provide internal controls for the
application of their code. However, it is only with reference to the code that the systems
generate their particular communication and they manage to make sense of their
environment. As more and more social systems become differentiated, by the emergence
and the employment of new guiding differences, the complexity of the world increases.
From the point of view of the legal system, this means that the legal environment
becomes more complex.
58 For further discussion of the concept of self-description, see G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 19-20.
59 For a very sophisticated analysis of what should be understood as the "element" of the legal system, see H.G.
Deggau, 1988, pp. 131ff. and G. Teubner, 1993, p. 31; more generally, for the components of the legal system, see
G. Teubner, 1988, p. 222 and 1993, p. 9.
60 For this point, see N. Luhmann, 1988, p. 14.
61 Without pursuing this point further it can be said that elements of the system produce new elements in an
autopoietic way, when they manage to "recursively regenerate, maintain and recover the same complex of
processes that produced them", through their interactions. See, in details, M. Zeleny, "Autopoiesis: A paradigm
Lost?" in M. Zeleny (ed.), Autopoiesis, Dissipative Structures, and Spontaneous Social Orders (Westview:
Boulder, 1980), p. 4 and also the definition of autopoiesis in G. Teubner, 1993, p. 22.
62 For this difference, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 195-196.
63 For a brief summary of this debate, see E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 89-90.
64
Also, because of their unique function as it will be shown in the course of the discussion.
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As the legal system is by necessity linked with its environment, it cannot be
indifferent to this intensification of the environmental complexity. To put it simply, since
the law communicates about its environment, the very possibility of this communication
is rendered more difficult against an environment that gradually becomes more complex.
The law needs to mobilise counter-measures to deal with that complexity; otherwise, it
would not be able to keep up with environment complexity and progressively it would
stagnate. The very survival of the legal system necessitates an internal reaction.
What the legal system does in order to counter this problem is to intensify its
internal complexity, in an attempt to become more able to accommodate external
complexity.65 As one would expect, this happens at the level of programming. The law
elaborates its internal structures, by providing new distinctions, new concepts and new
norms and by constandy reassessing the selections that control particular linkages
between communications. It is only through this internal process that the law tries to
deal with the intensification of external complexity and to ensure that it will keep
communicating about its environment.
What this process implies is that a variety of modes of dependence or
independence between the system and the environment exists, since it is never the case
that internal complexity totally mirrors external complexity. This is because the potential
for the intensification of internal complexity is inherendy limited. Whatever happens
within the system is ultimately oriented to the founding and unchallenged guiding
difference; as this is the corner stone of the identity of the system, it designs the outer
limits of what the system can do. Therefore, even if at the level of programming the legal
system can be flexible, keep changing and become more and more complex, this
flexibility cannot overcome the outer limits that the coding itself defines. No matter how
internally complex it may be, the law will keep observing the world as law, only by
employing the distinction between legal and illegal. If it would attempt to overcome this
basic distinction it would simply cease to be law and from the point of view of the legal
system this would be inconceivable. Accordingly, the elaboration of its internal
complexity can never exceed the limitations that its code poses, because that would
amount to a loss of the system's identity.
It follows that a problem of equilibrium is always present, namely a problem of
balancing the ability of the legal system to cope with its complex environment, while
ensuring the continuation of its distinct identity. In system-theoretical terms, this
65 For the indispensable unity between internal and external complexity, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 113.
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problem has been recast as the need to find a balance between redundanty and variation.66
Through variation, the system constandy adapts to the complexity of its environment; it
perceives new stimuli, it organises new selections of what counts as relevant and it uses
new externalities as triggers for its internal structuring. In other words, it becomes more
sensitive to constant environmental surprises and deals with them. On the contrary,
through redundancy, namely through reducing the element of environmental surprise by
replicating what is already known and assessed by the system,67 the system keeps limiting
what can be selected as new information. In effect, redundancy is a mechanism that
tends to eliminate the need for further information and filters out surprises;68
simultaneously, it is presumed whenever something ends up as new information because
only as a drift against redundancy can information exist — in this sense, redundancy is
constantly present in all the operations of the system in a "shadow" form. In doing this,
redundancy limits the diversity of operations that a system can identify as its own
(variation). As a result, it ensures the continuation of the system's identity by building up
a kind of internal "memory" that serves as an internal horizon of reference for the
accepted new selections. This horizon stabilises the accepted degree of the sensitivity of
the system. In law, this is crystallised in the use of legal concepts, legal principles and legal
rules,;69 in all these "historical loci" the law invests previous experience, enables access to
previously tested and used distinctions and simultaneously condenses and generalises
information for future use.70 Through the establishment of a memory, it is ensured that
the legal system is always bound to the legal coding and that the amount of surprise and
environmental complexity that it can absorb through variation although wide is
ultimately limited. Another notion for describing the same thing is consistency, whatever
the amount of variation, the internal memory of the system is constantly referred to and
always determines what and how will be processed.71
66 For an introduction to the systems-theoretical use of these concepts, see N. Luhmann, 1995b, pp. 291fF.; also,
more generally H. Atlan, "Noise, Complexity and Meaning in Cognitive Systems" (1989) 3 Revue Internationale
de Systemique 237.
67 For this point, see S.C. Smith, p. 198; also N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 320, where he argues that redundancy
essentially "involves the information that is available for the processing of information, and variety is the
information that is as yet missing".
68 Indeed, through redundancy the law manages to filter out a wide range of environmental information as totally
irrelevant.
69 It has to be stressed that these loci of legal memory develop primarily in the process of legal argumentation. For
further analysis, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 328 and pp. 340ff.
70 For the notion of "condensations", see S.C. Smith, 1995, p. 196 and also N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 340-341.
71 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 183, with the caveat that consistency is used here in a technical sense and not in
accordance with its use in mainstream legal theorising.
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An illuminating example of the interplay between redundancy and variation
within the legal system is the process of judicial argumentation.72 The judiciary has to
decide the exact application of the code on a case-by-case basis, as social conflicts that
originate from the environment of the law are litigated and thus enter the legal system.71
In dealing with them in their uniqueness, the judiciary is forced to distinguish between
similarities and dissimilarities,74 between what should count as new and what simply
replicates what already exists.75 As a result, the judiciary constantly draws distinctions and
argues accordingly.76 In order to do so redundancy is needed;77 only a negotiation with
the memory of the system allows for the possibility of establishing particular connections
between cases, of articulating the dissimilar cases as such and of considering whether
their being different justifies a departure from previously established rulings. In the case
of adjudication, this negotiation takes the form of a quest for reasons that, instead of
providing a "right" answer,78 are used to justify insistence or departure from a previous
decision.79 Once this departure is established, however, the variation of the legal system
intensifies and the system is forced to change and to become more sensitive to the
possibility of creating an exception to pre-existing rules.80 Of course this is an inherently
contingent process, which is nonetheless non-arbitrary. This is because a certain amount
of consistency is present in the process, primarily because of the need to guarantee that
the legal system appears as a unity in time and not as the random sum of unrelated
decisions.81 In any case, as soon as a particular change becomes (through repetition in
future decisions) stabilised, it grows to be part of the memory of the system and what
72 Let me stress, here, that for Luhmann judicial decision-making is an organized, decision-making subsystem of
the legal system. See, in details, 2004, pp. 158ff.
73 For further analysis of the notion of conflict and its relation to law, see E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 96ff., with
further references and also, G. Teubner, "Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions" in G. Teubner
(ed.), Juridification ofSocial Spheres (Berlind: de Gruyter, 1987), pp. 3-48, at pp. 7-8.
74 Another way to describe the same think is through the judicial use of the symbol of equality. For this point, see
N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 134-135.
75 This is achieved as a second-order observation, namely as an observation of the possible ways of applying the
code (therefore of observing the world at the first level); in this respect, decision-making and argumentation are
processes for the self-observation of the legal system, through the elaboration of the differences between cases.
See, in details, N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 305ff.
76 See S.C. Smith, 1995, p. 192, where he argues that the development of the common law is based on the constant
drawing of distinctions.
77 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 318.
78 It has been argued that this is simply an adjudicative pretence, in terms of which legal reasons are employed to
provide authoritative, right outcomes. For this point, see S.C. Smith, 1995, p. 192.
79 This thesis implies a particular systems-theoretical theory of legal reasoning. A complete analysis of such a
theory, which perceives argumentation as a preparatory process and insists that legal rationality is a local
rationality that cannot guarantee abstractly right solutions can be found in N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 313ff and
1995 b, passim.
80 Accordingly, the exceptions are crucial for the modification of the law, as explicitly stated in N. Luhmann, 2004,
p. 328.
81 So the need for consistency may be seen as an additional condition of the unity of the legal system. For this
point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 319.
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was once an instance of variation is (for the future) part of the system's redundancy.82 An
interesting side effect of this is that even decisions that at the point of deciding may be
perceived as errors (namely as disruptions of the legal selections that have been —until
then- established through redundancy)83 become part of the matrix of the system and
therefore can determine future decisions.84
Consequently, redundancy and variation are in essence the two sides of the same
distinction and the one presupposes the other.85 At the same time, their interplay is a
constant source for internal instability, since it opens up the contingent possibility of
something to be considered as a new piece of information. This contingency is necessary:
it is the price that systems have to pay in order to remain operational against an
increasingly complex environment. That is why in highly complex systems, like the legal
system, the need to ensure both variation and redundancy is reflected in the institutional
structure of the system,86 namely in the formation of a particular institution (the judiciary)
with the power to decide about the application of the code against a constant flow of
environmental stimuli.
Let me summarise: the systems absorb environmental complexity by intensifying
(at the level of programming) their own, internal complexity. This is essentially a limited
process, which ultimately depends on the unchangeable nature of the legal code and
which becomes substantiated as the outcome of the balance between redundancy and
variation. According to this scheme, the legal system becomes operational, generates
communication and combines its essential closure with a certain environmental
openness. Nevertheless, this edifice assumes that somehow the system —and especially a
closed system- is able to perceive its environment, at least as an under-defined "entity"
beyond itself. The analysis so far has insisted that this is necessary for the system, but it
has not shown how this can actually be happening. The next section is going to tackle
exactly this problem.
82 For an excellent presentation of this process, although not from a systems theoretical perspective, see E.H. Levi,
"An Introduction to Legal Reasoning" (1948) 15 The University ofChicago Law Review 501. Levi uses the notion
of "danger" as an example of change and stability in terms of common law reasoning.
83 It is in this context that logic has a special function in adjudication: it organizes redundancy by rendering
possible the identification of errors, since otherwise all errors would enter the matrix of the system. See N.
Luhmann, 2004, p. 352.
84 This happens because it is impossible to achieve an absolute consistency between decisions and therefore a
space for tolerating mistakes must be allowed. See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 91 and for a very similar point (regarding
judicial mistakes), R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 118-123.
85 That is why they can increase simultaneously and also why it is their combination that deepens the internal
complexity of the system. See, in details, N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 321-322 and p. 333.
86 See S.C. Smith, 1995, p. 200.
139
d) Interrelation of systems through interference and structural coupling.
So, social systems need to perceive their environment. How is this likely to happen? The
answer must be given at two distinct levels: the first level is fundamental and it refers to
the very possibility of the existence of differentiated communication within the general
communicative universe.87 The second level is more concrete and refers to the possibility
of the interaction between particular social systems,88 but still presupposes the more
fundamental level. This is where one has to start.
Social systems are sensitive to their societal environment because both they and
their environment consist of communications, which are all meaning-related. The "stuff' of
the societal universe is communication and although differentiated systemic
communications generate a particular type of meaning, all social systems utilise essentially
the same medium. One could say that at the background of each meaning-related system
there exists as a constantly lingering structure, the pool of general meaning. Meaning is
diffused at the societal level. All differentiated systems "participate" in this underlying
structure and through this participation they become constantly aware of the existence of
something beyond their concrete boundaries. A possibility to describe this underlying
common structure is through the involvement of language as structure: all meaning-
related systems are "mirrored" in general language. In effect, they participate in it and
because of that they share the medium of meaning with other systems. Even if this
tentative linguistic proposition can be seen only as a metaphor, the crucial point remains
the commonality of the medium. This ensures that a fundamental interference between all
types of meaning and accordingly of all social systems is indeed possible.89 In the social
world, meaning as a medium is over-pervasive, even though outside the tight grip of
systems it remains under-determined. This over-pervasive presence generates a general
communicating network (in essence, society), only within which can distinct social
systems evolve.90 Law as a social system takes part in the network of general social
communication and therefore, shares the medium of meaning with the other social
systems.
So, it is meaning as an underlying structure that ensures that social systems can
be aware of their environment through interference. But does this mean that they can
87 Accordingly, 1 am going to discuss only how systems perceive society and other societal systems as
environment and not how they perceive the world of living and psychic systems.
88 From the point of view of any system this is always an interaction between system and environment and not
between systems. Systems cannot perceive other systems as such, but only as environment.
89 For the notion of interference see in details G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 65ff. and 86ff.
90 See N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 89-90.
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perceive their environment as something distinct and even more, can they receive signals
from the environment and then produce relevant responses? This is a question that not
only grasps the core of the relationship between system and environment, but is also
crucial for understanding regulation, which, at least according to the open systems
approach, should be seen as a systemic operation that relates directly the system with the
environment.
The situation here is indeed complicated. Social systems are closed systems and
they perceive everything according to their binary code. True, they are aware of their
environment because of interference; however, they can make sense of it only by
applying their code and by doing so they refer back to themselves. This is a kind of a
vicious circle, which seems to exclude the possibility of interaction. But then again,
systems have to take into account their environment otherwise they would cease to exist.
Once again, the question comes to the surface: how is this possible?
The answer can be found only if one totally abandons the open systems paradigm
and in its place employs a set of concepts that are suitable for analysing the interaction
between self-referential systems. So, instead of concepts like input and output, it is
indispensable to use noise, irritation and perturbation; and against the possibility of direct
interaction, one should consider the possibility of structural coupling. Let me explain what
these concepts entail and how they can help us to re-assess the interaction between
system and environment.
According to systems theory the environment cannot provide signals that any
social system can readily integrate. This would contradict the closed nature of the
system's code. Rather, and especially as far as the law is concerned, the environment can
be perceived as such only as noise, namely as the undifferentiated "something" which
rests beyond the boundaries of the legal system. It follows that this noise can only
stimulate the system in the form of irritation and not as a distinct, meaningful signal. It
goes without saying that it is the system and only the system that determines what even
counts as an irritation.91 Given that some irritation is registered, this may generate a kind
of perturbation92 within the legal system, which forces the system to respond. The only
possibility for such a response is, of course, the production of system-specific
communication, namely a legal communication based on the application of the code.
Therefore, the legal system responds to the environmental noise, by generating legal
91 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 383, where he argues further that systems must show a kind of internal preparadness
to be irritated.
92 For this concept, see in details G. Teubner, 1993, p. 35.
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communications and thus it is (once again) simultaneously open to its environment
(because it reacts to the noise) and closed to it (because it processes it according to its
code). This is how the law achieves system-specific order from noise93 and manages to
register environmental stimuli.94
Of course, the system needs to be able to perceive the environment even as
noise. Even this minimal perception may be still problematic, given the indispensably
closed nature of the code. However, this difficulty is overcome because systems are able
to develop internal structures, which are compatible with structures of other systems
belonging to the environment. This potential compatibility of structures opens up the
possibility of what is usually depicted under the term "structural coupling'. The notion
indicates that within the general social system (and this is linked with interference),
several systems may be engaged in a parallel processing of information against a concrete
social "event", which is shaped as such exactly because of the multiplicity of systems that
take part in this processing.95 Of course, the very identification of such an event is a
matter of observation that again is system-specific. Yet, what is crucial is that what is
treated as relevant information by one system, is simultaneously understood as
environmental noise by another. This is likely to happen especially when the latter system
has integrated into its structures the need to rely on some environmental features on an
ongoing basis.96 Of course this need depends on system-specific, internal selection.
However, and especially when systems functionally aim at providing triggers towards
other systems or at receiving triggers from them, they tend to construct "opportunity"
structures compatible with each other, in a patterned and time-enduring manner. When
this is the case, a processing of information happens in parallel within systems: in
systems-theoretical terms, a structural coupling is occurring and an indirect inter-systemic
link is achieved.
Let me clarify this by providing an example from the sphere of medicine. Let's
assume that a failed medical operation can be attributed to a mistake of the doctor in
charge. Both the legal system and the system of the medical profession have structures
that can deal with this as relevant information: the law deals with it as an instance of
medical negligence and the professional system (possibly) as an instance of serious
professional misconduct that results in disciplinary measures. These structures are very
93 This phrase originates from H. von Forster's, "On Self-Organising Systems and their Environments" in M.C.
Yovits and S. Cameron (eds.), Self-Organising Systems: Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Conference 5 and 6
May 1959 (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 31-50.
94 For a detailed presentation of this process, see W.T. Murphy, 1994, p. 258.
95 For this possibility, see G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 62-63.
96 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 382.
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much compatible: the same "event" can be simultaneously processed by both systems
and thus to count (from the perspective of a given system) not only as a system-specific
information but also as environmental noise that can be registered.
The obvious consequence of this formulation is that the more constant the
establishment of common structures, the easier the possibility of interaction between the
systems. On the contrary, if systems do not develop compatible structures for processing
information, the possibility of registering that another system is processing information,
even as noise, is much more problematic. This means that structural couplings facilitate
the interaction between systems, but by doing this, they simultaneously reduce the range
of it: only what the structural couplings allow is actually allowed. Everything else is
excluded and cannot be registered at all.
Through the combination of interference and structural coupling social systems
can perceive environmental stimuli and, therefore, can remain open to their
environment. From then on, of course, closure re-appears and the legal system internally
selects how it is going to react and what it will filter out.97 Systemic communication is
always system-specific communication. In the legal system, this results in a tautology:
legal communication is always legal communication.98
2) The function of law.
The long previous section provided an account of some of the main concepts that
systems theory is using in describing law as a social system. In this section, I will discuss
another aspect of the systems-theoretical approach, to law, namely the function of the
legal system. It is a basic tenet of systems theory that social systems emerge in order to
carry out a unique function within society. The insistence on this functional uniqueness is
justified by a vision of modern society as a functionally differentiated society.99 For systems
theory, the distinct mode of the organisation of modern society is the emergence of a
plurality of social systems that are differentiated as autonomous systems, exactly because
they carry out a societal function that no other system does. The uniqueness of this
function, in combination with the uniqueness of the code, gives to each social system its
distinct identity. More importantly, it is exactly because of the uniqueness of their
97 For further details, especially in terms of the structural coupling between the legal and the scientific system, see
N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 116.
98 A tautology that is of course unfolded at the level of programming!
99 For this idea, see in details, N. Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), pp.
30-31.
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function that the emergence of social systems can be seen as an achievement, since the
function establishes the identify of systems, it is on the basis of their function that
systems manage to reduce the complexity of the world in their own particular manner.
To go back to the discussion in Part (B), this systemic functional differentiation is in
itself a reduction achievement.
By defining the function of the system as unique one must be careful in
distinguishing between function and performance. The former refers to the link between the
system and society in general, while the latter to the relationship between social
systems.10" In other words, the term "function" designates what the system does towards
society, whereas "performance" what it does towards other systems. Keeping this
distinction in mind, one may observe several different tasks that systems execute;101 some
of them overlap, some do not. As far as performances are concerned systemic overlap is
not problematic. On the contrary, functions never overlap: they are unique and as such,
determine the identity of social systems.1"2
As far as the legal system is concerned, the distinction between function and
performance is itself operative within the system in many ways. Yet, what is crucial is that
the distinction enables us to abandon a wide range of proposals regarding the function of
law,103 as belonging to the domain of performance. For instance, dispute resolution,
social control, social integration etc. are all important achievements towards which the
law undoubtedly contributes, but these are in effect legal performances, since they merely
designate possibilities for the orientation of law towards other systems and since other
systems are also mobilised in achieving the same aims. The existence of systemic
"equivalents" undermines the plausibility of considering these "functions" as uniquely
legal. For instance, if the function of law were to increase social control, one would have
to consider that the same assertion is equally plausible as a description of the political
system. If this was the function of the law and given that the function, within a
functionally differentiated society, must be unique then this assertion would only make
sense as advocating the unity of the legal and the political system into one social system.
Nevertheless, this is an erroneous conclusion: the law and the political system are two
100 For this distinction, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 167ff.
101 For a definition of what may be understood as "task", see N. Luhmann, p. 85.
102 The idea of the uniqueness of the function differentiates significantly systems theory from traditional
functionalist theories that insist on a kind of functional "pluralism". For a very sophisticated model of the latter,
see R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Function (New York: Free Press, 1968), especially his very detailed
discussion regarding manifest and latent functions, dysfunction etc. It goes without saying that we are dealing here
with two totally different perspectives on what the concept of function entails.
103 For a detailed presentation of such proposals, see J. Raz, "On the Functions of Law" in A.W.B. Simpson (ed.),
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (2n Series, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 278-304 and R.
Cotterrell, 1992, pp. 7Iff.
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distinct social systems. However, this problem is solved if one considers social control as
a performance that may be rooted either at the legal or the political system. Similar
examples are countiess.
The unique function that the legal system performs in society is a particular
generalisation of stable normative expectations. Through the constant production of legal
communications, what the law does is to stabilise normative expectations, namely
behavioural expectations that do not cease to exist even in the case of disappointment. In
this respect, normative expectations are different from cognitive expectations.104 The
latter are forced to change, when their content is countered by factual experiences:
cognitive expectations learn from disappointment. This is not the case with normative
expectations. Even when things do not go according to what is normatively expected, the
relevant expectations remain valid. The disappointment does not have any impact on the
content of normative expectations, which are able to resist counter-factuality. It is this
feature of normative expectations that allows them to integrate dissent and disagreement
and also to stabilise what should be expected as a normal course of future events. This
does not mean that normative expectations cannot change (whenever the legal system
deems this to be useful), only that they are not forced to change when their content is
not actually met.
The law not only generates normative expectations; it also stabilises them. This
means that the legal system ensures that some sets of normative expectations will be
certainly sustained, at the expense of others.105 The law achieves that by generating legal
norms that take the place of loose societal norms. In that way it counters the
proliferation of disorganised and inconsistent norms and it stabilises a dense network of
institutionalised normative expectations, controlled as normative from within the system.
The law stabilises normative expectations in three distinct dimensions, namely
the temporal, the social and the material dimension. It does that in a congruent manner,
simultaneously in all these dimensions; it is their combination that guarantees the
uniqueness of the legal function and that is why these dimensions require further
attention.
The stabilisation of expectations in the temporal dimension is inherendy linked
with the normative nature of legal expectations. What this means is that legal normativity
is transferred into the future, by reappearing in future legal communications. To provide
104 For this difference, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 149 and E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 121-122; for the origin of
the idea, see J. Galtung, "Expectation and Interaction Processes" (1959) 2 Inquiry 213.
105 This statement implies that in society there exist countless normative expectations, without them necessarily
being legal. For further analysis, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 151.
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an example: a present legal expectation produces a legal claim that will be tested in the
future. Then, it may be fulfilled or disappointed, but in both cases the normative
expectation will remain unchallenged and will provide a new legal claim relevant to
whether the expectation will have been fulfilled or disappointed.1"6 In this respect, legal
normativity has been transferred between two points in time and the legal system
succeeds in binding the future by providing presendy normative expectations.1"7 It
follows that all legal communications are future oriented communications that
communicate not only about what is now legally approved, but also about what will be
approved. As legal communications integrate normative expectations, they link the
present with the future and they determine in advance the state of the system that the
next communication will face. In a sense, this is the main reason why the law employs
normative expectations: only their ability to ignore the possibility of counter-factuality is
able to achieve the present binding of the future.1"8 Of course, since every systemic
operation is constructed internally, the very perception of the temporal dimension is just
a perception of time constructed by the legal system. The distinction between present
and future is itself a legal distinction and it is against this distinction that it makes sense
to talk about normativity.
In the social dimension, the legal system stabilises expectations by breaking up
the individual context of concrete social interactions and by providing abstract
generalised expectations, which are normatively valid no matter the identity of the
individuals involved in an actual interaction. The law does that by involving abstract third
parties into concrete interactions, namely by making sure that even non-participants
would normatively expect exacdy the same thing that the actual participants in an
interaction would expect. To provide an example: whenever a legal sale is involved, it is
expected by the parties involved that an amount of money will be paid. However,
through the law this expectation can be socially generalised. Anyone, by simply observing
this transaction will have exacdy the same expectation ofmoney exchange.
Finally, the law generalises expectations in the material dimension, in the sense
that it manages to provide expectations for a plurality of concrete interactions. It
achieves that by being a highly complex system, which is simultaneously closed but also
very sensitive to its environment. This sensitivity is exemplified through a constant
106 For further analysis of this example, see E. Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 121-122.
107 This is what is meant, by the rather abstract statement that the law achieves to bind time through normative
expectations. For further analysis of this point, which is inherently linked with the possibility of meaning itself to
bind time, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 144ff.
108 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 146.
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sophistication of its internal apparatus. The law becomes more and more complex, by
generating further secondary distinctions, new themes and concepts, new and more
detailed norms and structures etc. This process can be depicted as a process of
"thematisation", since this internal sophistication of the normative horizon of the law
ultimately determines the themes or the subjects, in reference to which law generates
normative expectations. This ability for thematisation is essentially linked with the notion
of variation and is achieved at the level of programming, which I have already discussed.
What is crucial is that through a constant elaboration of its internal complexity, the law
becomes more able to deal with external complexity and as a result to provide
expectations for a very wide range of interactions. It is this ability that ensures the
potential of the law to (legally) communicate about the world.
An additional point is necessary, though: the legal system generalises normative
expectations but in order to do so a precondition must be met. Notably, what must
constantly be ensured is that it is normatively expected that the expectations of the legal
system are normative; in other words, a prerequisite of the normativity of law is that it is
itself normatively expected. Only this second-order normativity achieves the
institutionalisation of law and its high ability of stabilising normative expectations, not as
ad hoc phenomena but as constant sources of resistance to disappointment. Without
second-order normativity, it would not make sense to have expectations based on law;
law itself cannot guarantee that the expectations that it generates will be met, but still it
must somehow guarantee the continuity of its function.109 This is achieved in a reflexive
manner, through a general normative expectation of law's normative nature.110
Consequently, and as a final point about the function of law, in can be claimed that the
legal system as a whole "operates on normative expectations of normative expectations
as its secure base".111
Let me conclude this section by linking the notion of function with the
discussion regarding redundancy and variation. There, I argued that a balancing exercise
is always at play between the two, so that the law can become more compatible with its
complex environment without losing its identity as a distinct social system. What this
statement leaves concealed is precisely how this balancing exercise can be achieved and
especially what is the criterion that reveals when variation has gone too far. Through the
notion of function this omission can now be repaired. The law can increase its variation
109 SeeN. Luhmann, 2004, p. 157.
110 For this point, see in details E. Christodoulidis, 1998, p. 118.
111 See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 159.
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only asjar as its ability to perform itsfunction remains intact. If this ability becomes undermined,
for instance because the variation of the law has reached a level where very particular
legal pronouncements are constantiy produced that cannot be normatively generalised,
then the very function of the law (and thus also the autonomous nature of the legal
system) is in peril. In such a scenario, mechanisms of redundancy become operational in
order to counter the threat. This does not mean that redundancy will always achieve this
task. However, further analysis must be postponed for the next part of this chapter.
3) Interim conclusions.
With the presentation of the function of law, I have concluded my long exploration of
the nature of law as a social system that reduces complexity. Against this theoretical
background, an interim conclusion can already been reached, a conclusion that comes as
the necessary consequence of the main tenet of this theorising that law is an autopoietic,
self-referential system. Any delineation of medical law as a distinct discipline constituted
in accordance with a subject matter that belongs to the sphere of medicine, namely to an
externalpoint of reference that as such organises the discipline, underestimates the internal nature
of everything that the law does. Indeed, these delineations fail because they direcdy
project an externality into the law. This is an important failure, which lies at the root of
the problems that I have identified regarding the doctrinal propositions. Essentially, it is
their failure to take on board the self-referential nature of the law that is ultimately
"responsible" for their unconvincing conceptualisation of medical law; this would
similarly apply to any other proposition that would attempt to perceive medical law in
terms of external organising principles.
Once again, this is not to say that the relevant environment, in our case medicine,
is insignificant for the law; nor does it mean that the constitution of medical law is not
ultimately linked with the regulatory orientation of law towards medicine. I still insist that
the constitution of medical law is the result of this orientation. What this conclusion
reveals is that the law controls exclusively internally this regulatory orientation112 and,
therefore, that it is necessary to assess anew how this influences what is happening within
the internal horizon of the law. Therefore, it is necessary to enrich our theoretical
analysis by taking on board how regulation can be perceived in systems-theoretical terms.
112 I must stress here that the exclusively internal nature of social systems advanced by systems theory, does not
exclude the possibility of doing empirical research on legal regulation. Although such a criticism exists, it has been
successfully rebutted in J. Paterson and G. Teubner, "Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis" (1998) 7(4)
Social & Legal Studies 451, passim.
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D. On regulation.
1) Regulation in the political system.
During the course of my thesis, whenever I referred to regulation, I have used the
concept in accordance with a "traditional" understanding of it. In summary, this is based
on the idea of direct causality: a regulatory aim is identified, a means is employed in order
to achieve the aim and the ultimate success of the regulatory intervention is judged on
whether the aim is achieved. If it is not, then an assessment ofwhat went wrong can take
place, on the basis of which new means are going to be employed.113 When one takes on
board the conceptual apparatus of systems theory, it becomes necessary to reassess the
concept in a very different light. From the point of view of systems theory, the most
fruitful starting point from which to discuss regulation is to make sense of it as an
operation ofpolitics. Taking this to be the fundamental premise, a set of issues comes to the
surface all of which are oriented to a core question: how exactly can political regulation
be conceptualised in systems-theoretical terms?
In order to answer this, one must start from an analysis of the political domain
itself. Politics constitutes a just distinct social subsystem114 within the general social
system, namely the political system,115 As such, it manifests all these features that ensure the
self-referential character of any social system: it has its own basic binary code, namely the
distinction between government and opposition;116 it performs a particular societal
function, namely the production of collectively binding decisions;117 it is organised
according to its own, internally constructed structures and elements, namely political
decisions;118 it builds internal complexity by generating further distinctions;119 finally, it is
a communicative system that constantly generates political communications according to
its own linkage processes. Within such a framework, regulation is an aspect of
113 For further analysis of this causal scheme, see R. Mayntz, "The Conditions of Effective Public Policy: A New
Challenge for Policy Analysis" (1983) 2(1) Policy and Politics 123.
114 This "just" implies that politics should not be understood as the center of modern society. Since the premise is
that this is a functionally differentiated society it should be understood as center-less. For this point, see N.
Luhmann, 1990, p. 31.
115 For a detailed presentation of the political system as a social system, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 357ff.
116 For this distinction as the code of the political system, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 378. Another possibility is to
employ the familiar distinction between friend and enemy as analysed by C. Schmitt in The Concept of the
Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
117 SeeN. Luhmann, 1990, pp. 73-74.
118 SeeN. Luhmann, 1990, p. 40.
119 To provide an example, it often employs the distinction between progressive and conservative.
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"performance" by which Luhmann designates the relationship between social systems.
To put it more accurately, the concept of regulation captures how political
communications at the operational level orient the political system to the other social
systems, with the aim of affecting them in a particular way.120
Such a formulation of the issue inclines one to ask why this is the case and what
are the reasons for such an operationahsation of the political system. Of course this is a
very significant question; however, an attempt to answer it necessitates a thorough
investigation of the internal complexity of the political system and this goes beyond the
purposes of my argument. Going back to my discussion on juridification in the general
introduction of the thesis, let us remember that it is the political aspirations of the
"welfare state" that explain the regulatory orientation of the political system. Given the
compensatory and claims-related nature of the welfare state,121 the (at least rhetorical)
realisation of the political inclusion of the populace122 and the relevant inherent tendency
to increase the themes that count as politically relevant, regulation appears as a dominant
trend within the modern political system.
Leaving this explanatory task aside let me insist on the repercussions of
perceiving regulation as an operation of the political system. The most important one is
that regulation is determined internally, from within the horizon of the political system. It
is only the political system and only through its own communications that defines the
(political) goals that it deems necessary to pursue, the strategies that it is going to employ
and the kind of results that it will classify as success or failure; this is so even if regulation
is externalised and affects other systems. As far as the political system is concerned, the
efficiency of its regulatory attempts is part of its communicative network: it deals with it
by producing further (political) communications, which manage in a (political) way the
reaction of the political system to the result that has been produced.123
This analysis already shows that it is mistaken to perceive regulation as a kind of
direct, political steering of some areas of society as it is often assumed. In systems-
theoretical terms the only steering that social systems can achieve directly is self-steering.124
This is because the very concept of steering implies the minimisation of a difference
120 In this respect, political performances are triggered whenever another system requires collectively binding
decisions; this is a usual feature of the welfare state, where progress is measured by the increase in the quantity of
performance. See, in details, N. Luhmann, 1990, pp. 74-76.
121 For this point, see N. Luhmann, 1990, p. 23.
122 See N. Luhmann, 1990, p. 34.
123 According to such an understanding one could reach unexpected conclusions as to what counts as efficiency
from an internal political point of view; for instance it can be the case that political efficiency simply means the
elimination of external noise!
124 See in details N. Luhmann, "Limits of Steering" (1997) 14(1) Theory, Culture & Society 41, p. 48.
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between two different states of affairs.125 Both what counts as a difference and what
measures are taken for its minimisation can only be defined according to internal
mechanisms; thus, the political system can only "steer" itself by defining the politically
relevant state of affairs that has to be achieved and the strategies that it will employ to do
that.126 For instance, the welfare state creates such differences by considering basic values
and by trying to eliminate the distance between what one has and what one desires in
terms of these values.127 It is of course highly probable and of course desirable that the
self-steering of the political system will have an impact on other social systems; after all,
regulation is a performance of the political system that attempts to orient the system
towards the other sub-systems. Nevertheless, it is not the political system itself that
determines what will happen within the other systems, but only these systems according
to their own internal mechanisms. So, self-steering of the political system can have an
external impact, but this ultimately depends on the self-steering mechanisms of the
"receiving" systems.
Does all this mean that one cannot talk about regulation by simply considering
what is happening in the regulated area? The answer is negative. It is possible to discuss
regulation in this way. Yet, this can only be based on an observation that rests outside the
domain of the political system and belongs to the system of social science. Such an
external observation could investigate whether a regulatory attempt had actually an
impact on the regulated field. Based on such an observation one can "objectify" the
impact of regulation as a kind of congruence between the political desideratum (as this
has been defined from the political system) and its contingent actualisation within the
regulated field.128 What is important, here, is that no causal scheme can explain this
congruence. Only system-specific, internal mechanisms can determine whether this is
indeed what is happening.
2) The notion of the regulatory trilemma.
So, where does this conceptualisation of regulation leave us regarding the constitution of
medical law? Well, it represents the first step in understanding exactly how the law
becomes oriented to medicine, an orientation that underlies the constitution of the
125 See N. Luhmann, 1997, p. 42.
126 For further analysis of the idea that this is the only aim that the political system can define as aim, see J.
Paterson and G. Teubner, 1998, p. 457.
127 SeeN. Luhmann, 1990, p. 105.
128 Of course, this is not to say that the political system cannot itself observe this congruence; however, when
doing so it will do it politically, in other words according to the range of alternatives that it internally generates.
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discipline. In order to further this understanding more steps are necessary. The first is to
identify the conditions of regulatory efficiency;129 the second is to see exacdy how the law
fits into this perception of regulation.
Let me start by identifying the necessary condition for any attempt to regulate
with any chance of success. It must be obvious by now that the answer lies in the logic of
structural coupling. As I have already discussed, the only possible way for social systems
to interconnect and have any impact on each other is through structural coupling, namely
through a parallel processing of information facilitated by the existence of common
structures. For any political decision to have any impact on any area of society, structural
coupling is therefore indispensable. To provide an example, the efficiency of a political
reform on education depends on the structural coupling between the political system and
the education system.
However, this is an oversimplification of the picture. The political system never
orients to the other subsystems in a "pure" manner; rather, its orientation is always
mediated by the legal system. This means that although the political system originates
regulation, it attempts to carry its impact into the regulated field through the involvement
of the law. The law becomes a "medium" used by the political system.130 Accordingly,
regulation takes the form of legal prescriptions, which in turn are supposed to have the
desired impact on the regulated field.131 It is crucial here to stress that any legal
prescription carries with it regulatory potential and is related to political goals. This is
obviously the case with legislation, the passing of which can be seen as an "event" that
exists simultaneously in both the legal and the political systems.132 However, even judicial
decisions and more generally the institution of adjudication co-operates in the process of
regulation: they "complete" political regulation by dealing ex post with situations that the
political system regulates ex ante. Additionally, when novel situations are adjudicated for
the first time, then the (judicially generated) legal norms on the basis of which a decision
is reached are indeed very significant from the perspective of regulation.133
By identifying regulation as legal regulation, the question of efficiency becomes
more complicated. This is contingent not only on the coupling between the political
system and the regulated field, but on a number of couplings that all must be successful.
129 From then on, whenever I use the term "efficiency" this will mean the contingent congruence between the
political desideratum and its actual impact on the regulated field.
130 For this point, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 363 and 370.
131 SeeN. Luhmann, 1990, p. 82.
132 Of course, this does not mean that these systems are not distinct, only that at the level of performance the two
reciprocally cooperate quite often. For this intense cooperation, see N. Luhmann, 2003, pp. 403-412.
133 It goes without saying that this a very important characteristic of legal systems based on case law.
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One can at least identify two additional couplings, namely the coupling of the political
system with the legal system and, crucially, the coupling between the legal system and the
regulated area. Now, the very close interconnection between law and politics establishes
very solid structural couplings between the two and thus, what becomes crucial is the
coupling between the law and the regulated field. Still, what must always be kept in mind
is that if any of these couplings is unsuccessful, the "chain" of systemic interconnection
is broken and the possibility of a regulatory impact is shaken.
In any case, structural coupling is the crucial concept here, even as a fundamental
prerequisite for any regulatory attempt. The question, then, is how to integrate this
concept into a theory of regulation on the basis of which the possibility of a successful
regulatory impact can be secured.
The most fruitful attempt to theorise this has been provided by Gunther
Teubner, in the analysis of the "regulatory trilemma".134 According to Teubner, when the
law attempts to regulate three detrimental possibilities open up, each one of which can
have a harmful effect on the actual impact of regulation. As Teubner puts it:
"Every regulatory intervention which goes beyond these limits is either irrelevant orproduces disintegrating
effects on the social area oflife or else disintegrating effects on regulatory law itself"135
In essence, what Teubner does is to identify two distinct problems.136 The first is
indifference, which can be equated with the lack of stable structural coupling between
the systems. If no coupling is achieved nothing can happen: nothing is registered from
the outside, no noise is perceived, and therefore the systems involved simply remain
indifferent, being unaware of each other. It goes without saying that regulation cannot
have an impact in the case of such indifference. However, even when indifference is
overcome, a second problem may be present, namely that of disintegration. This term
denotes the possibility that a successful inter-systemic interaction can have detrimental
effects for the identity of the systems that participate in the interaction. For instance, if
the legal system is successfully coupled with the educational system and keeps
bombarding this system with legal prescriptions it is possible that the education system
will lose its distinct character and in a sense become "colonised" by the legal system.
Conversely, if the legal system provides prescriptions that are essentially determined by
the rationality of the system under regulation, then it is the legal system that will be itself
"colonised". In the same example, if the relevant legal prescriptions are determined by
134 See, in details, G. Teubner, 1987, pp. 19ff.
135 See G. Teubner, 1987, p. 21.
136 As far as the kind of problems that he identifies is concerned, it seems to me that he refers to a twofold
distinction.
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the concepts, the necessities and the rationality of the educational system the legal system
can no longer sustain its distinct identity but only regulates as a replica of the educational
system.137 Having identified the problem in such a way, Teubner goes on to propose
"solutions" to the trilemma that can guarantee that indifference is overcome and that the
problematic disintegration is countered, notably the idea of "reflexive" law.138
What is very interesting about the notion of the "regulatory trilemma" is that it
highlights the possibility of regulation having disintegrating effects. This means that
when the law regulates a social domain, it becomes exposed to this domain and as a result
it may suffer disintegrative effects. By logical necessity, the more the law becomes
exposed the more possible it is for these disintegrative effects to materialise. In other
words, the more the law is used instrumentally —and the concept of juridification is
crucial here- the more it becomes susceptible to the peril of losing its distinct identity.
Admittedly, a paradox exists here. On the one hand, the law is the main means
through which regulation is effected. On the other hand, as it becomes more and more
instrumentalised and its regulatory range increases, its autonomous character is
endangered. Still, the law does regulate and quite often the regulatory aims are achieved
and the character of the law remains intact. This means that this paradox is somehow
countered.
This is indeed the case, mainly because the law —like any other system- always
strives to survive, in other terms to sustain its distinct character as a social system. This
means that exactly because of the possibility of disintegration, the law has mobilised
particular "mechanisms" to counter this effect. These mechanisms are structurally
embedded in the legal system and we have already encountered them in the general
discussion of systems theory: they are the combination of redundancy and variation that
determine exactly how much the law will intensify its internal complexity, and the unique
function of the law according to which it stabilises normative expectations. They
constitute the law's "defences" to the danger of disintegration, because they determine
exactly how the legal system will tolerate its regulatory exposition to the non-legal world. This is not to
say that this defence is always successful and that it is never the case that disintegration
137 For further analysis of this "colonisation" problem see also G. Teubner, "Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the
Collision of Discourses" in R. Rawlings (ed.), Law and Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.
149-176, especially pp. 156ff. The discussion there relates the problem of disintegration with the so-called
materialisation of law and the gradual penetration of substantive rationality into the formal legal rationality. In
chapter 2, I already indicated that the empirical reality of medical law can be seen as exhibiting a surplus of
substantive rationality - therefore, I will take up this issue again in the next chapter, where I will apply the
theoretical ideas presented here directly to medical law.
1381 will come back to these solutions at the penultimate part of this chapter.
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happens. Rather, what these mechanisms guarantee is that quite often the law does
manage to avoid disintegration.
The notion of the regulatory trilemma is designed with a specific aim in mind,
namely to explore the problems that legal regulation entails and to push forward
proposals on the basis of which legal efficiency can be enhanced. From this point of
view, the mechanisms that I have just identified can be seen as limitations on what the law
can achieve: by ensuring that disintegration is avoided they raise a barrier to the
regulatory potential of the law. The law is not always doing what it is supposed to do: if
the opposite were the case, then it would be impossible to avoid disintegrative effects.
Accordingly, any attempt to enhance the efficiency of legal regulation has to take into
account these limitations.
From the point of view of the main aim of my thesis, the realisation that the law
reacts to disintegrative effects pushes forwards a different implication. Let me recall here
that I am focusing on reassessing the constitution of medical law as a discipline and that
I concede that this emerges in the process of the regulatory orientation of law to
medicine. The underlying assumption here is that within the internal horizon of the legal
system new disciplines emerge whenever the law attempts to regulate with some
constancy a social domain previously unregulated. In this process the law filters out the
possibility of disintegrative effects. In doing so, it determines exactly its internal reaction to the
environment under regulation. Consequently, the mechanisms that control the manner of
law's exposition to its environment, simultaneously determine how new disciplines will
be structured. Essentially, a tautology is present in the last statement: whatever limits
what the law can do in terms of a particular regulated field also determines how the law
becomes internally structured in terms of a new discipline that emerges because of this
new regulatory orientation. In the case of medical law, this means that the constraints
that redundancy and variation and the function of law impose on what the law can
achieve when regulating medicine also determine exactly how medical law is constituted.
In the next two sections, I will further explore my proposed link between the
constitution of a discipline and the existence of limitations on the regulatory potential of
the law.
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3) Redundancy and variation revisited.
I have already argued, with Luhmann and Teubner, that the combination of redundancy
and variation manages the internal complexity of the legal system, as the environmental
complexity increases. In essence, any call for regulation is itself an instance of such an
increase and as such it necessitates an internal legal response. Through variation the law
attempts to accommodate as much as possible the regulatory demands of the political
system and crucially the complexity of the regulated area. However, this attempt is
constantly checked in terms of redundancy, which can be seen as performing an
"immunisation" task. It counters the extreme intensification of variation, by ensuring
that some environmental signals will be left out and will not generate new information
registered as such by the law. It is exactly in this respect that redundancy limits the
regulatory potential of the law.
As far as the constitution of new disciplines is concerned the interplay of the two
takes the following form. Through variation, elements of the legal system are linked
together in such a way as to accommodate the new environmental stimuli (that emanate
from the new regulated area). Then, new themes are added as legally relevant and new
norms are produced that are more "compatible" (although this compatibility is defined
internally) with the domain under regulation. This process indeed carries with it the
danger of law being overburdened by the particular character of the regulated area. This
burden is checked out through redundancy that links new information with old concepts,
and distinguishes between accepted and not-accepted new themes. Through redundancy
the novelty that a new regulated area brings into the law is tamed: instead of radical
internal changes (that would be possible if variation was the only force in play), only
moderate shifts take place. In a sense, redundancy represents the conservative aspect of
the legal system, whereas variation is its progressive counterpart. Yet, it is only the
combination of the two that establishes exactly how new branches of the law are
organised.
4) The stabilisation of expectations in the temporal dimension.
A second structural limitation refers to the function of law and in particular to the
stabilisation of expectations in the temporal dimension. Once again this structural
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limitation also determines how new disciplines are constituted because it defines the
exact way of law's orientation to its environment.
The function of law is to stabilise normative expectations. It does so by binding
time, namely by projecting presently constructed expectations into the future in such a
way that future disappointments are to be resisted. In doing so, the law is based on its
particular construction of time: not only does it define internally the distinction between
present and future, but it also manages the so-called "double modality" of time. This
term denotes the difference between how the present defines the way that the future will
evaluate the present and how the future will actually define the present.139 The law solves
that in favour of the present; that is what the stabilisation of normative, counterfactual
expectations achieves. My point, here, is that the particular temporality of the law
presents two time-related limitations for regulation. These are inherently linked and can
be seen as the two sides of the same coin; yet, for analytical purposes I will discuss them
as distinct.
The first difficulty refers to the possible incompatibility between the law's
temporality and the temporality of the other systems involved in regulation. By
incompatibility I mean not only a possible difference between how systems define the
distinction between present and future, but also a difference in the way that they manage
the double modality of their internally defined time. As far as regulation is concerned,
this is a particularly intense problem, because the political system is primarily a goal-
oriented system, which is organised primarily on the basis of purposive programs.140 In
terms of the problem of double modality, this means that the political regulatory claim
assumes a solution of the temporal difference in favour of the future. This contradicts
the legal system's solution, which is significantly oriented to the present.141 This problem
is further intensified if the system under regulation (which has provided the original
regulatory stimulus) also solves the double modality of time in favour of the future.
Probably, the easiest way to identify this problem empirically is by taking into account
the use of procedural delays by the legal system. Procedurally speaking, the legal system
delays the final decision about particular disputes. In this respect, it allows for a very
careful consideration of the exact way in terms of which its present state will bind the
future. Through such delays, the "distance" between present and future is in a sense
expanded and it is further guaranteed that it is the present that will define the future. In
139 For this admittedly abstract distinction, see N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 199.
140 SeeN. Luhmann, 2004, p. 198.
141 One must remember that the law is not primarily a goal-oriented system, although it undoubtedly incorporates
such features. See N. Luhmann, 2004, p. 184.
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any case, what has to be kept in mind is that all the possible differences in time-
perception cannot be totally accommodated by the legal system if it has to consider them
seriously. Once again, the legal system is a closed system that obeys its own temporal
logic. Therefore, it is possible that differences in the management of time will be filtered
out by the law and in this respect will be neglected in the process of legal regulation and
in the constitution of the discipline that emerges during this process. The new disciplines
will be characterised by the legal dimension of time not by that of the area they regulate.
For the second problem, I have to turn back to the generalisation of normative
expectations and especially to the element of stability that these expectations generate.
The law achieves its function when it provides stable sets of normative expectations, in
terms of which stable behavioural patterns can be established. Accordingly, even if
normative structures can change (and this can indeed happen within the level of
programming), the need for stability counters the degree of the frequency of change.
What regulation necessitates, however, is exactly a change of some normative structures
of the law. Because of the need for stability, one could expect a certain legal reluctance
against change. Once again a balance is necessary between stability and change, between
flexibility in responding to environmental stimuli and rigidity in the production of
stabilised expectations. In a way this balance corresponds to the need of the legal system
to be internally efficient, namely to be able to continue to carry about its unique function.
Consequently, the law can accommodate the normative changes that regulation entails,
but only when regulation does not stretch to an intolerable degree its potential to provide
stable sets of normative expectations. This is particularly problematic in areas that evolve
at a very fast pace (modern science is an obvious example), and in cases where the
political system is under severe pressure to regulate instantly.142 Because of this "speed",
constant calls for new regulation emerge that cannot be easily managed by the legal
system, as this amounts to a constant reshaping of normative expectations. Accordingly,
even when new legal disciplines emerge, it is not necessary that they will integrate the fast
changes that occur in the areas that they are supposed to regulate. Even their novel
character cannot escape the fact that the law will always lag behind the rapid pace of
change exactly because of its task of stabilising expectations.
142 For this problem, see in details N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 371-3, where he argues that the enactment of legislation
is the devised used by the political system when immediate regulation is necessary.
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5) The notion of reflexive law.
In this penultimate section, I want to include an additional dimension to the factors that
determine the constitution of new disciplines within the law. This is a dimension of a
different "type", because although it is once again rooted in Teubner's regulatory
trilemma, it is not linked with the possibility of disintegration but with the crucial notion
of structural coupling. This dimension is revealed through a tentative theoretical
suggestion that has been developed with a particular aim in mind143 This is to counter the
pessimism that is usually associated with the systems-theoretical analysis of legal
regulation and especially with the view that the systemic interaction between self-
referential systems that regulation entails is more likely to be improbable than not.
The tentative suggestion to which I refer here is that this improbability can be
overcome, by ensuring that constant patterns of structural coupling between the law and
the system under regulation are stabilised. In order for this to be achieved, especially in a
functionally differentiated society, a gradual emergence of a different "type" of law
would be very promising. More precisely, the proposition is that the law has to become
gradually reflexive, namely a regulatory agent that takes into account both its own
boundaries and —crucially - the self-referential nature of the areas that it attempts to
regulate. If this can be achieved then the possibility of a constant structural coupling
between the law and the regulated system can be much more easily sustained.144
Essentially, this idea of reflexivity acknowledges that the law can have only an indirect
impact, which must be understood simply as the potential to open up the internal self-
steering of the regulated area. So, against purely formal understandings, the law can hope
to achieve regulatory aims; simultaneously, against substantive claims, the law cannot
hope to achieve too much: it cannot dispense with its own structural limitations as to
what it can itself process, nor can it neglect the autonomous character of the regulated
area. Regulatory impact lies in the middle: the law can simply trigger self-regulation of
society by self-steering. In other words it can regulate society, only by regulating itself.145
If this proposition holds —and indeed there exists a very intense theoretical
debate within systems theory whether such reflexivity is possible—146 then, the
143 And in this respect, it has a very strong normative element.
144 See G. Teubner, 1987, p. 121 and 1988, p. 218.
145 SeeG. Teubner, 1993, p. 69.
146 Against the view that this is the case, see N. Luhmann, "Some Problems with "Reflexive Law"", in G. Teubner
and A. Febbrajo (eds.), State, Law and Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New
Perspective (Milan: Giuffre, 1992), pp. 389-415, passim. For an excellent presentation of the arguments in favour
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constitution of new disciplines within the law will be further dependent on this concept
of reflexivity. Essentially, it will be necessary to identify the reflexive elements that are
present in these disciplines and through them to further investigate how exactly they take
on board the self-referential nature of the domain that they regulate.
Starting from this general concept of reflexivity, the main proponents of reflexive
law, like G. Teubner147 and H. Wilke,148 have further substantiated their claim by
proposing particular models according to which legal reflexivity can be understood and
used politically. All these models or types of reflexive law, aim at enhancing the
possibility of stable structural couplings as a permanent achievement. If this possibility
collapses, the successful interconnection between systems becomes precarious and even
the modest aspiration of reflexivity would be in vain.
In essence, five modes of systemic interaction have been proposed in order to
sustain the idea of reflexive law: tangential response, mutual observation, coupling through
interference, communication through organisation and synchronising difference reduction.149 All of these
modes make use of the idea of reflexivity and attempt to enhance legal regulation, by
ensuring that the law takes into account the self-referential character of the regulated
area.
The mode of tangential response indicates that the law can attempt to regulate on
a trial and error basis. Namely, the law should simply send out regulatory "signals" and
then let the regulated system process these signals according to its own matrix of
operations. It goes without saying that what will eventually happen is highly contingent.
Yet, it is hoped that exactly through the contingent character of this trial and error
process, it will eventually be realised what signals are registered successfully by the
regulated system. On the basis of this realisation the legal system can then build
enhanced structures focusing on these particular signals and therefore can stabilise
systemic interrelationships through these structures.
The idea ofmutual observation proposes that the legal system adopts a stance of
second-order observation, according to which "it reconstructs the self-reference of the
observed system".150 In doing so, the law attempts to integrate the self-reference of the
regulated system into its own horizon and then to regulate accordingly. Of course, once
of reflexive law, see J. Paterson, "Reflecting on Reflexive Law" in M. King and C. Thornhill (eds.), Luhmann on
Law andPolitics: Critical Appraisals and Applications (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 13-35.
147 See especially his 1993, pp. 64ff.
148 For example see his "Political Intervention: Operational Conditions for Generalized Political Exchange" in B.
Marin (ed.), Governance and Generalized Exchange: Self-Organizing Policy Networks in Action (Frankfurt:
Bulder, 1990), pp. 235-254.
149 I borrow this categorisation, from J. Paterson, 2006, pp. 25ff.
150 For this idea, see G. Teubner, 1993, p. 80.
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again it ultimately does so internally: what the law is able to perceive as the self-reference
of the regulated system is necessarily based on the legal understanding of this self-
reference. There is no guarantee that these two will coincide. Again then, an element of
contingency is present. However, if such a coincidence is achieved, the possibility of
structural coupling is ensured and the chance for regulatory success enhanced.
I have already analysed the concept of interference during my discussion in
chapter 3. For theorists of reflexive law, interference is not simply a basic precondition of
systemic interconnection, but rather an active "facilitator" of regulation. This is because
it may highlight sensitive intervention points, in terms of which the regulated system can
possibly attain a certain degree of compatibility with the regulatory aims embedded into
the law.151 Within this line of thinking, the example that is usually analysed is the so-called
option policy: the only thing that the legal system can do is to provide options that
through interference appear as intervention points against which the regulated area
potentially reacts.152
The concept of communication through organisation implies that it would be
possible for reflexive law to operate if at the boundaries between the law and the
regulated area a kind of "binding" organisation could be formed. Such an organisation
would aim at guaranteeing the parallel processing of information and ultimately the
stabilisation of the conditions for systemic interaction.153 An example of this kind of
organisation is the so-called "intra-organisational juridification", in terms of which
"organisational processes are legally reconstructed in such a way that they themselves
become sources of law".154
Finally, a last possibility is to try to synchronise the difference reduction. This
idea is related to the concept of steering and aims at ensuring compatibility on the way
that the law and the regulated system minimise differences in their own way of achieving
self-steering. If such compatibility can be achieved, the law and the regulated system can
become enriched by common structures; in turn, these structures can ensure a very stable
pattern of structural coupling and therefore of successful inter-systemic interaction.
Now, these are the proposed options for the operationalisation of the idea of
reflexive law. While it still remains an open question whether these proposals are indeed
plausible, they show a way out of the "crippling" closure of social systems. In the final
chapter, I will explore some of these suggestions in the context of medical law.
151 For this idea, see in detail J. Paterson and G. Teubner, 1998, p. 457.
152 For this example see G. Teubner, 1993, pp. 93-95.




Let me end my discussion in this chapter, by providing a summary of what the
theoretical endeavour attempted here brings forward. The constitution of medical law as
a field has to take into account the self-referential nature of the law itself. As long as this
is conceded, two inferences become inevitable. The first is that the doctrinal propositions
regarding the subject matter of medical law are at the outset problematic because they are
based on a set of assumptions that are not compatible with this self-referentialy. The
second inference is that the conclusions reached in chapter 2 regarding the empirical
complexity of medical law indeed signify something important about the constitution of
the discipline.
Within these lines, my aim here was not to proceed to the substantial discussion
of how medical law is constituted, but rather to provide a "platform" of conceptual tools
on the basis of which this reassessment can occur. The backbone of this platform takes
the following form: the regulatory orientation of law towards social domains that have so
far been unregulated necessitates an internal re-arrangement of elements of the legal
system that in effect results in the constitution of new branches (disciplines) within the
law. The constitution of these disciplines is very much determined by the mode of the
orientation of law to its environment. In turn, because this orientation exposes the legal
system to its environment in a way that is potentially dangerous for the law because of
the possibility of disintegrative effects, it is always determined by the mechanisms that
are employed to counter these effects. Accordingly, it is exactly the same mechanisms,
and namely the combination of redundancy/variation and the function of law, that
ultimately determine how disciplines are constituted. Of course, the necessary
presupposition only in terms of which new disciplines emerge is that a "sustainable"
structural coupling between the law and the regulated area is achieved. In this respect,
theories of reflexive law that expand our understanding of how this sustainability can
further be achieved are also significant in the understanding of how new disciplines come
into existence.
In the next chapter, I will apply this theoretical platform to medical law and I will
show what conclusions can be reached regarding the constitution of this new legal
discipline. Since all the theoretical work for this application is included in this chapter, I
will conclude by providing an inventory of the key concepts that will be used in the
discussion that follows. Naturally, this is only a very brief definition of some crucial
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notions; for further analysis the reader is referred to the relevant sections in the body of
this chapter.
Basic distinction: the binary conceptual scheme, on the basis of which systems generate
system-specific meaning. This scheme constitutes the code of the system. In the case of
the law this takes the form legal - illegal.
Conditional programs: the criteria on the basis of which the two sides of the basic
distinction are concretely allocated. In law, these criteria are conditional, namely they are
based on the fulfilment or disappointment of prerequisites; they can be constructed with
purposive programmes, which are based on the achievement of particular aims.
Function: the notion that defines the unique "task" that any system performs within
society. To be contrasted with performance, which denotes the link between systems.
Normative expectations: expectations that do not learn from disappointment.
Observation: the process in terms of which any system makes sense of the world
through the application of its basic distinction.
Operation: anything that a system "does" in accordance with its mode of observation.
Redundancy: the mechanism on the basis of which systems build up their internal
memory by constandy replicating what they already know. To be contrasted with
variation.
Reflexivity: a notion that denotes either a) the ability of the law to be aware of its own
limits or b) the possibility of the law being aware of the self-referential nature of the
systems it attempts to regulate.
Regulatory trilemma: a notion that denotes the possibility that regulatory attempts can
result in systemic indifference or in pathological (disintegrative) effects for the law or for
the regulated area.
Self-description: a specific type of operation on the basis of which a system makes
sense of itself.
Structural coupling: the necessary precondition of inter-systemic interaction. It replaces
the input-output model advocated by the opens systems approach.
Thematisation: the mechanism on the basis of which systems enrich their internal
apparatus so that they can connect in a more complicated manner with their external
environment.
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Variation: the opposite of redundancy, namely the mechanism that guarantees that




In Search Of Its Object
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A. Introduction.
My aim in this final chapter of the thesis is quite straightforward. What I intend to do is
to go back to the discipline of medical law and to provide my own view on how this is
constituted. I will do that on the basis of the theoretical platform provided by systems
theory as presented in the previous chapter. According to the perspective I adopt, two
theses emerge as the "building blocks" of the reassessment of medical law that I propose
here. The first thesis is that it is the self-referential nature of the law that ultimately
determines how medical law is constituted; thus, it is necessary to abandon propositions
that define the object of an already constituted field and to investigate how medical law
becomes projected as an autonomous branch of the law internally. Medicine cannot be
used as a direct external reference, because from the point of view of the law it is simply
part of its environment. It cannot be direcdy grasped as such, but only as external noise
that triggers legal operations and ultimately legal communications. The second thesis is
that medical law occurs as a result of the regulatory orientation of law towards medicine
and therefore it depends on the particular systemic interaction between the system of law
and the system of medicine. This remark necessitates an investigation of medicine as a
social system and implies that the only plausible "definition" of a subject matter for
medical law is exactly the link between law and medicine and nothing more.
Before starting the substantial analysis, let me clarify a point about a possible
methodological objection. Because of the self-referential nature of all communication,
even my own discussion regarding medical law does not take place from a privileged
Archimedean point. Rather, it is just another system-specific observation based on the
particular mode of observation innate to the system of science, on the basis of which
"knowledge" about phenomena is produced. This sociological observation is external
both to law and to medicine. In a sense this is a second-order observation,1 since what is
at stake is exactly to observe the way according to which the legal system observes
reality,2 in our case medicine. Accordingly, whatever I say here is just an external
1
For the concept of second-order observation see W.T. Murphy, "Systems of Systems: Some Issues in the
Relationship Between Law and Autopoiesis" (1994) 5(2) Law and Critique 241, pp. 250-251.
2 It is interesting to note here that the legal system cannot observe how it observes the world, since none of its
distinctions can perform this task. If the opposite were the case, the same distinctions would be used both as means
and as objects of observation and this would be paradoxical; in effect this "how" constitutes a "blind spot" for any
system, a spot that cannot be internally observed. For further analysis of the idea of a "blind spot" that is assumed
in any kind of observation see N. Luhmann, Law As A Social System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.
182 and M. Merlau-Ponty, Le Visible et I'Invisible (Paris, 1964), p. 172.
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conclusion on what medical law is about. To replicate completely the legal or the medical
point of view is indeed impossible given the sociological orientation ofmy discussion.
As far as the structure of this chapter is concerned, this follows the logical
repercussions of the theoretical analysis in chapter 3. So, in the next part I will identify
medicine as a social system, in order to clarify the nature of the inter-systemic interaction
that triggers the emergence of medical law. Then, in part (C), I will discuss the general
preconditions of the structural coupling between law and medicine that ensures that
some interaction between the two can indeed take place. This is important, because if
structural coupling cannot be achieved then law and medicine would be in a state of
mutual indifference and thus, medical law would not exist. Having established the
possibility of structural coupling, I will examine in some detail exactly how medical law
becomes organised in the process of the legal regulation of medicine. This is going to be
the subject matter of part (D), which will be based on my analysis of the interplay
between redundancy/variation and the function of law and which will reassess both the
doctrinal analysis and the empirical material of medical law. In this same part, a brief
discussion on the significance of the suggestion of reflexive law for medical law will also
be included. Through the synthesis of all these steps, my conclusion regarding the
constitution of medical law will then be clearly stated.
B. Medicine from a systems-theoretical point of view.
To begin to understand the domain of medicine as a social system I will refer the reader
back to my introductory discussion in chapter 2, where I identified what legal norms are
relevant for my investigation and presented a theory of how medicine should be
understood. I argued that we should make sense of it as the "jurisdiction" of the medical
profession, namely as that area of practice that members of the medical profession define
as pertaining to their expertise. Although this definition refers to the notion of practice,
equally important is its discursive element: it is of crucial significance how doctors
perceive what they are doing. In further elaborating the idea, I insisted that medicine,
understood as jurisdiction, could be further refined as integrating two distinct aspects.
The first aspect, which I called the "technical" dimension of medicine, refers to the
provision of care to patients and includes everything that requires technical expertise and
medical knowledge; essentially, it refers to the tasks that doctors perform under their
professional capacity. The second aspect, which I depicted as the "institutional"
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dimension of medicine, is related to the particular institutional arrangements that underlie
the availability of medical care and refers to the financial and administrative side of the
everyday provision of medical services.
In revisiting this initial idea from a systems-theoretical point of view, I am
suggesting that this differentiation of medicine as jurisdiction into two aspects is not
simply an analytical distinction that can be useful for descriptive purposes only (even
though this is exactly how I used the distinction in chapter 2). Rather, this distinction has
further significance, since it shows that what we can ostensibly identify as a unified social
phenomenon involves at least two distinct social systems. The technical aspect of
medicine belongs to the system of science, whereas the institutional aspect is closely tied
with the economic system. This proposed disaggregation into two different systems does
not entail that the two aspects of medicine are totally isolated or that only through this
distinction it makes sense to speak about medicine. The technical and the institutional
aspects of medicine are not two completely separate structural blocks within the edifice
of medicine; rather they are intimately interwoven, being simultaneously relevant
whenever a particular instance of the practice takes place. For instance, whenever a
medical operation is performed (technical aspect of medicine), it is co-determined by the
administrative arrangements of the hospital or the private clinic where it takes place
(institutional aspect of medicine). Yet, it remains important to keep in mind that we are
dealing here with two different social systems, because this realisation reveals that the
conditions of their coexistence are complicated and actual questions are problems
emanating from the interaction between those two systems. For example, the proposed
understanding makes it much easier to take on board the question of how institutional
constraints are both imposed and resisted by practitioners, by showing that
misunderstandings between doctors and health care managers are rooted in systemic
differences.
For the purposes of my thesis, this differentiation shows that the regulatory
orientation of law to medicine (and ultimately the constitution of medical law) should be
recast in a twofold way: when the law orients itself to medicine, two distinct orientations
take place. The law interacts both with the system of the economy and with the system
of science.3 So, in order to see exactiy how medical law is constituted as a result of the
primary orientation it is important to discuss both these interactions further.
3 In effect, the situation is more complicated. If one takes into account the link between the legal and the political
system that the very idea of regulation entails, then it can be argued that in the legal regulation of medicine at least
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1) The institutional dimension ofmedicine: the economic system.
The argument that the institutional dimension of medicine should be understood as
emanating from the economic system is based on a rather straightforward syllogism. The
very notion that medical care (which is the core of the technical aspect of medicine) can
only be provided on the basis of a systematic organisation of the conditions of its
provision transforms it into a particular kind of service. Consequently, the precise
institutionalised mode of its provision becomes a significant question that requires
relevant decisions to be made. Naturally, the need to take such decisions becomes acute
mainly because of the problem of scarce resources: it is the scarcity of the material
resources necessary for the actual provision of medical care that renders the problem
worth investigating.4 In a Utopian society characterised by infinite resources, the problem
of deciding on the conditions of the provision of medical care would be almost totally
minimised. Since this is not the case in the real world, the issue of scarce resources
comes to the forefront and as soon as this happens we are plainly within the domain of
economics.5 To support this claim let me just say that the relevant debate is almost
exclusively determined by economic reasoning. For instance, the history of the
organisation of health care provision in the UK is almost completely shaped by
economic arguments,6 which are dominant whatever the "level" of the allocation of
resources.7 Even when different political agendas underlie the relevant decisions and
when conflicting economic perspectives are in play, it remains the case that it is
economic rationality that very much determines how the provision of medical care is
actually organised.
From a systems-theoretical perspective, this directly suggests that the problem of
the legal regulation of the institutional dimension of medicine must be couched in terms
four systems are simultaneously at play (namely the political, the legal, the economic and the scientific system)
and accordingly that a plurality of systemic interactions should be considered.
4 Let me stress here that the problem of the scarcity of resources is indeed very much present in the actuality of
medical law: recall my analysis of R v. Cambridge District Health Authority, ex p B in the penultimate section of
chapter 2.
5 For the well-established claim that the management of scarce resources is the fundamental problem of economics
see the general discussion in D. Begg et al., Economics (8th edition, London: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp. 6ff.
6 See the analysis in R. Baggott, Health and Health Care in Britain (3rd edition, New York: Palgrave, MacMillan,
2004), chapters 4,5 and 6.
71 use, here, the term "level" to indicate that that the problem of scarcity of resources appears in different contexts,
which have to be taken into account by the relevant economic decision-making. For instance, different decisions
have to be taken if the question of allocation appears at the national or the regional level, as a problem of choosing
between particular services, or even as "choosing" between different patients. This differentiation indicates further
that a strong ethical dimension is present here. For the relevant debate, see J. Harris, "Unprincipled QALYs"
(1991) 17 JMed Ethics 185 and A. Williams, "Cost-effectiveness Analysis: Is It Ethical?" (1992) 18 JMed Ethics
7.
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of the interaction between the legal and the economic system. Accordingly, the
autopoietic, self-referential character of the economic system must be taken into account
whenever the legal regulation of the economy is attempted. Just to provide the shortest
of introductions,8 the identity of the economy as an autonomous system is determined by
using "payments" as its distinct elements, by using "prices" as its particular structures
and by elaborating on concepts like "profit" and "efficiency". Additionally, it integrates
its own mechanisms of self-description that take the form of economic theory and
economic policy. It is exactly the significance of the latter that allows a range of different
options to be employed by the economic system that may vary considerably.
It is precisely the conclusion that the regulation of the institutional dimension of
medicine ultimately refers to the relationship between the law and the economy that
justifies why from now on I will discuss exclusively the technical dimension of medicine.
The reason for this choice is that the interaction between the legal and the economic
system is in itself a distinct subject that necessitates a very systematic and complicated
analysis that has already been thoroughly explored.9 On the contrary, the interaction of
law with the technical dimension of medicine is so far significantly under-theorised. In
addition, I have earlier depicted the technical aspect of medicine as the core of medicine
as jurisdiction, while the institutional aspect is only as a complementary facet of the
problem. As far as the constitution of medical law is concerned this means that it is
primarily the interaction of law with the technical aspect of medicine that mainly
determines the constitution of the discipline. The simultaneous orientation to the
economic system remains, of course, significant but —to provide a metaphor- it exercises
a more "shadowy" influence for the constitution of the discipline. This influence
becomes more obvious when explicit decisions that have to do with the allocation of
recourses are judicially challenged and when this is the case, again the economic
rationality prevails.
Consequently, in the following sections I will focus my attention only on the
technical dimension of medicine: I will identify it as a social system, I will explore the
relevant structural coupling, and I will discuss the constitution of medical law only in
terms of the interaction of the law with this system.
8 For further analysis of the economic system, see G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford: Blackwell,
1993), p. 75 and his case study on corporate governance in pp. 123ff.
9 For instance, see amongst others N. Luhmann, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1990a).
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2) The technical dimension of medicine: medicine as a subsystem of science.
Let me begin by restating what has probably been obvious in the course of the thesis.
From a systems-theoretical perspective, medicine should be perceived as a subsystem
within the social system of science. This should not come as a surprise. The general
sociological theorising about medicine has been consistendy arguing that its most
important transformation in the course of modernity is its gradual integration into the
realm of science.10 This being the case, any attempt to make sense of medicine in terms
of systems theory must be based on an initial exploration of the system of science.
This is not necessarily an easy task. Indeed, it has plausibly been argued that there
exists an extreme plurality of accounts of what science is about, namely as many as there
are philosophers of science.11 However, and especially from the point of view of systems
theory, two features of the system of science can be identified quite safely. The first is
that science acquires its identity as an autonomous social system through its particular
binary code: this takes the form of the guiding distinction between true and false.
Communications emanating from the scientific system make sense of the world on the
basis of this distinction: speaking scientifically, something can only be true or false. This
basic distinction is also responsible for the second particular characteristic of the system
of science, namely that it operates in terms of cognitive expectations. As I have already
argued previously, these are expectations that learn from disappointment: whenever a
scientific thesis about what is true is proven mistaken, the content of the expectations
that have been shaped in accordance with the original thesis changes.
Medicine, being a subsystem within the system of science,12 shares these basic
features. Therefore it fundamentally employs the same basic distinction (code) and is
characterised by cognitive expectations. However, this does not mean that this is all that
can be said about medicine as a social system. The argument that I want to pursue here is
that although it is a subsystem of science, it still retains some particular characteristics
that render it quite an exceptional case. This does not mean that medicine —at least at the
current moment in time- is a totally autonomous system. On the contrary, since all its
operations are ultimately determined by the binary code of the system of science,
medicine remains embedded in science. However, within social systems subsystems can
10 For this discussion, the reader is referred to the relevant sections of chapter 1.
11 See G. Edmond, "Judicial Representation of Scientific Evidence" (2000) 63 Modern Law Review 216, p. 251.
12 For a very detailed analysis of the system of science, see N. Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft
(Frankfurt: 1990b). Also the short but informing discussion in J. Paterson's, "Trans-science, Trans-law and
Proceduralization" (2003) 12(4) Social & Legal Studies 525, pp. 531 -532.
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be identified, which feature a variable degree of what can be called quasi-autonomy.
These subsystems acquire this autonomy by their unique use of particular secondary
distinctions and by their ability to construct through them internal environments within
the general system to which they belong.11 My claim is that medicine is exactly such a
subsystem.
Drawing again on the sociological discussion in chapter 1, the particularity of
medicine as a subsystem can be traced to its gradual transformation from art into science.
It has been suggested there that even if this transformation is essentially complete, some
elements from the pre-scientific era of medicine still linger in the background. The
relevant literature insists on a number of such elements, notably on the (sometimes)
intuitive character of medical diagnosis, on the possibility of trust between doctors and
patients etc. For my purposes, the most significant of the elements that can be attributed
to the period when medicine was indeed an art is its essentially task-oriented nature. It is
very much embedded in the societal perception of what medicine is about, that not only
is medicine a particular, specialised type of scientific knowledge, but also that the bearer
of this knowledge, the doctor, is to apply this knowledge when performing particular
tasks, the stereotypical one being the provision of medical care to a patient. This is not to
say that the distinction between "knowledge" and its "application" is a clear one, not
even that this distinction necessarily holds.14 My point is only that medicine belongs to
the realm of "applied science" and that this perception is justified to a significant degree
on the basis of a pre-scientific understanding of what medicine is about.
From the point of view of systems theory, what I have just said ostensibly
appears to generate a problem. If medicine is itself a social system, namely a system that
consists of communications, the idea of task-orientation that implies an orientation to
action must somehow be accommodated. Yet this is not a problematic situation. This
lingering task-orientation constitutes simply the "subject" of the system of medicine, in
other terms the field in reference to which the system of medicine generates
communications through its particular mode of observation. Of course, how exactly this
field is constituted is itself defined by the communications of the system, which in this
sense (like any other system) creates its own field internally. Along these lines, it is
unproblematic to assert that the system of medicine defines its field in terms of tasks as
an action system.
13 This possibility can be described as second-order autopoiesis. For an introductory analysis, see E.
Christodoulidis, 1998, pp. 86-87 with many further references.
14 For further discussion of this complicated issue, see M. David, Science in Society (New York: Palgrave,
MacMillan, 2005), pp. 35-38.
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Another way of understanding how medicine integrates this task-orientation is
through the concept of self-description. I have already discussed how mechanisms of
self-description guarantee the continuation of the identity of any system by allowing the
system to make sense of itself in particular ways. Through self-description, any system
can define a particular domain of action as its own field of reference. In the case of the
legal system this idea has already been further elaborated. Both Luhmann15 and Deggau16
have argued that legal communications, especially those originating from the doctrine,
often describe the law itself as an action system, usually with the aim to justify more
easily the dynamic character of legal change. My argument here is that the subsystem of
medicine does essentially the same thing: it allows self-descriptions, the content of which
is that medicine is oriented to particular tasks (actions), so that it can easily accommodate
the perception of it as a task-oriented enterprise.
In line with this task-orientation, a set of additional elements further attaches to
medicine its unique character as a special subsystem within science. To begin with, its
communications are essentially particularistic in nature: they are constantly oriented to
what the system has identified as the task to be performed.17 To go a step further, this
intense particularism has a very specific impact on the way that the subsystem of medicine
perceives the dimension of time. In effect, it is not time in general that matters, but only
the time dimension that is significant for the task at hand. It is easier to understand this
proposition by substituting the term "task" with the term "medical case".18 The way that
medicine perceives time is constantly mediated by the particular time frame that is
significant from the point of view of the medical case that constitutes the subject matter
of the relevant communication.19 In the time frame defined by the relevant medical case,
it is the end point that is of primary significance, because it is the desired end result
(defined as desired according to the conceptual apparatus of the medical system of
course), which determines everything that happens within its range. This particular
perception of time is further embedded in the way that the subsystem of medicine utilises
15 See N. Luhmann, "The Unity of the Legal System" in G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to
Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 17.
16 See H.G. Deggau, "The Communicative Autonomy of the Legal System" in G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law:
A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 128-151, at p. 141.
17 Another way to express the same idea is to say that the medical system is characterised by the use of short-term
purposive programs.
18 Let me remind the reader that in my discussion regarding medicine as jurisdiction I argued that the management
ofmedical cases (identified under the shorthand "medical care") represents the core ofmedicine.
19 A very useful distinction in further elaborating the idea presented in the text is that between "perspectival" and
"analytical time". The latter concept simply indicates the difference between past, present and luture; the former
insists that this difference must be integrated on the perception of what counts as time frame for a particular
situation, event, individual etc. For further discussion of this idea, see N. MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of
Law: A Theory ofLegal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 214-216.
173
a significant number of the secondary distinctions that it uses in its communications.
These distinctions are crucial for the identification of medicine as a subsystem, since they
constitute the basis on which medicine observes reality and therefore are part of any of
the system's operations. Additionally, it is on the basis of these distinctions that medicine
elaborates its internal structures and acquires the ability to generate and integrate its own
thematisations and ultimately to refine its own, particular mode of programming.
It goes without saying that medicine, as any system, utilises a wide range of
distinctions in terms of which it observes the world. However, a number of them are
especially significant, in the sense that it is they that primarily establish the autonomy of
medicine as a sub-system within science. My claim is that three sets of distinctions play
this role, namely health v. illness, doctor v. patient and success v. failure.
On the basis of the distinction between health and illness the system of medicine
acquires its particular way of observation and through that, it stabilises a set of particular
themes and concepts in terms of which reality becomes meaningful. By identifying health
and illness as two distinct states, medicine becomes able to generate the concept of
diagnosis, in terms of which the two values of the distinction are allocated in particular
instances and the concept of therapy, according to which the conditions for the transition
from the negative to the positive state are defined.
Through the distinction between doctor and patient, the system of medicine
observes the actors that it defines as relevant for its internally delineated field. It is only
in terms of the system of medicine that an individual becomes a patient, namely a carrier
of a condition that is meaningful as an instance of the negative value of the previous
distinction. Similarly, only through medicine does it make sense to identify someone as a
doctor, namely as the person responsible for ensuring the transition of the patient from a
state of illness to a state of health, on the basis of applying scientific knowledge.
Intrinsically linked with this transition is the distinction between success and
failure. According to this distinction, the system of medicine allows for a meaningful
processing of the possibility that the desired transition from illness to health is not
achieved. Using the distinction between success and failure it becomes possible for the
system to register an evaluation of the outcome of actions that aim at achieving a state of
health, as this is defined in terms of the original distinction between health and illness.
The possibility of failure is further captured by the particular thematisation of the notion
of medical risk, through this concept the system of medicine acquires the ability to
communicate about illness not as a state that will ultimately be transformed into a state
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of health, but as a state that willpossibly be so. This is crucial because through the concept
of risk the system highlights an intense degree of fluctuation between the positive and
the negative value of the initial distinction and ensures the registering of the awareness
that things may go wrong.
With these remarks regarding the distinctions and the concepts in terms of which
the system of medicine observes reality, I have concluded my proposition on how
medicine can be perceived as a social system. However, this is just the first step in
exploring its relationship with the legal system. The next problem that has to be
addressed is the question of structural coupling between the two, since only if this is
achieved as a structural possibility can the regulatory orientation of law towards medicine
have any impact at all. As Teubner has shown in his "regulatory trilemma", the lack of
structural coupling implies systemic indifference and when this happens regulation
collapses. Within these lines, the subject matter of the subsequent section of this chapter
is exacdy the structural coupling between law and medicine. Although this is a distinct
question, let me just say (in anticipating and introducing what will be said there) that the
concept of risk that I just advanced is the key to understand how this structural coupling
is achieved. Let us see how.
C. Structural coupling through medical risk.
Risk has become such a popular notion in modern sociology20 that it should come as no
surprise that in a sociological thesis such as this, it finds a place.21 Yet, in what follows I
will use the concept only as a working device to argue a particular point regarding the
structural coupling between law and medicine. In doing this, I will use some insights
provided by those theories that identify societies of the era of late capitalism as risk
societies,22 and I will insist on the link between risk and uncertainty.
For theorists like Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, risk society is characterised
by the constant increase of human intervention towards nature and by the intensification
of human control over natural eventualities. Societies of late modernity are no longer
determined by the impact that nature may have upon them, but by the impact that their
20 For a very good overview, see D. Lupton (ed.), Risk and Socio-Cultural Theory: New Directions and
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21 The notion of risk has already been utilised in interesting contributions both to medical law and to medical
ethics. For the former see D. Morgan, Issues in Medical Law and Medical Ethics (London: Cavendish, 2001) and
for the latter D. Dickenson, Risk and Luck in Medical Ethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).
22 See the seminal work by U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) and A.
Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
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control has upon nature.23 As this control increases it reaches a point of reflexivity,24 in
the sense that instead of solving problems and managing natural and social eventualities
it gradually starts itself to produce new problems, namely new risks.25 This reflexive
production of risk can be attributed to the advances in science and technology, which
simultaneously respond to a range of human problems and are responsible for the
creation of new ones.26 As a result of this reflexivity, a set of new political, economic,
ethical and institutional structures have been developed that are meant to consider and
counter risk. This transformation is supposed to be of such a degree that the "risk
society" is identified as a new form of society.
According to this theorising, the situations that exhibit risk are exactly those that
are characterised by a certain lack of control over their content. To paraphrase, a
situation is risky exactly when its outcome is uncertain because of lack of control.
Naturally, uncertainty does not entail that the participants in a situation cannot develop
expectations regarding the possible or even the desired outcome; in fact without
contingency "expectations" would not make sense. So, the participants will indeed
behave in accordance with their expectations even in risky situations.
By analysing risk in such a way, it becomes obvious that it is very much a time-
related concept. It makes sense to speak about risk, uncertainty and expectations only in
terms of two different moments in time: a present moment in which an assessment
about the possible outcome of a situation is made and a future moment when this
assessment proves to be correct or not. In this respect, the concept of risk strongly
"crystallises" the sociological importance of transitions between different moments in
time. It is on the basis of this remark that the concept of risk can be used to clarify the
possibility of structural coupling between law and medicine.
Let me revisit the social system of medicine, in relation to this conceptualisation
of risk. In discussing medicine, I argued that because of its task-oriented nature and of
the significance of the particular time frames that medical cases designate, the crucial
distinction between success and failure comes to the surface. In terms of this distinction
a concept of medical risk emerges. In effect, this concept exhibits all the characteristics
that the generalised concept of risk just presented reveals: medical risk is related to
uncertainty and expectations (for instance it is uncertain whether a patient will be healed,
23 This transformation is usually depicted as the "end of nature" and is connected with the development of science
and technology. See, in details, A. Giddens, "Risk and Responsibility" (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 1, p. 3.
24 For a detailed account of this particular use of the concept of reflexivity, see A. Giddens, 1990, pp. 36ff.
25 For further analysis of how this has happened see U. Beck, 1992, chapter 1.
26
Mainly because the application of modern science is based on short-term knowledge, whereas the potential for
future prediction is still very limited.
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although it can be expected that this will happen) and is also ultimately linked with the
actual or projected transition between two different points in time. Accordingly, the
difference between separate points in time and the need to manage this difference is
structurally embedded in the medical system through the notion of medical risk.
If we now turn to the legal system, we can see that the law is also aware of the
difference between moments in time and is actually using it in a particular and also
structurally embedded way. As the analysis of the function of the law made plain, the law
stabilises normative expectations and this necessarily presupposes its ability to use its
present decisions and norms in order to bind future behaviour. In doing this, the law also
manages the difference between two separate points in time. Accordingly, both the legal
and the medical system communicatively deal with transitions in time and -to put it in
more general terms- they both deal with the handling of risk. It is exactly this
"commonality" that ensures that the structural coupling between law and medicine is
possible at the outset. I insist that this is only a minimal structural similarity, because nothing
in my discussion should be taken as implying that the two systems handle risk in a similar
way. My moderate suggestion is just that structural coupling is possible because of this
commonality: medical risk can be seen as an opportunity structure towards which the law
can be oriented or on the basis of which communications that emanate from one of the
systems can simultaneously be processed by the other. This argument regarding the
possibility of structural coupling implies merely that the regulatory orientation of law
towards medicine can have some impact, in the sense that the possibility of systemic
indifference can be avoided through this structural coupling. Nothing more than this
moderate conclusion should be assumed here.
D. The internal constitution of medical law.
1) Preliminary remarks.
Having concluded the identification of medicine as a social system and the delineation of
a minimal structural affinity that establishes the structural coupling between law and
medicine, it is now time to proceed to the core of my reassessment of the constitution of
medical law. I will do so based on the concepts that I have developed in the previous
chapter and on the fundamental premise that medical law is constituted as a discipline as
a result of the regulatory orientation of law to medicine. In the process, I will also re-
177
assess the conclusions reached in the first two chapters of the thesis, since both what the
doctrine proposes and what the empirical material reveal are already tangible results of
the link between law and medicine. Therefore they have to be recast in accordance with
the general theoretical re-assessment that I am proposing and indeed must be considered
seriously as an existing indication of how law and medicine interrelate. In this light, what
follows is not simply a "translation" of what has already been said in systems-theoretical
terms, but a substantial reworking of arguments that are already present within the
discipline.
In the next section of this part I will focus my attention on the doctrinal
propositions regarding the subject matter of medical law. From then on, all the
subsequent discussion will be related to the empirical material that I presented in detail in
chapter 2. This should not be seen as an arbitrary and uneven distribution of the
structure of this part. This over-insistence on the empirical material is justified on the
basis of my main thesis that the constitution of medical law is primarily controlled
according to the interplay between redundancy and variation. This interplay is expressed
in the exact articulation of the norms that constitute the discipline and thus it is at this
level that the substance of my proposals must be pursued.
2) The doctrine revisited.
So, let us return to the doctrine and to its "implausible" propositions on the basis of
which medical law has been constituted as a discipline. The thrust of my critique against
these propositions is twofold: first, that even on their own terms they fail to provide an
adequate conceptualisation of the discipline, and secondly, that they are based implicitly
on the input-output model of the open systems approach and that they ultimately
attempt to organise medical law through external references. Both the idea that medical
law is about medical ethics and the view that medical law is a vehicle for the protection
of the patient in accordance with the discourse of human rights, utilise external themes as
the main organising principles of the discipline. This assertion is problematic because of
the self-referential character of the law and by necessity of all its branches. The law
operates exclusively in an internal way and thus everything that happens within the law -
including the constitution of new disciplines- is determined only in accordance with
internal references.
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Still, there are three valuable insights that these doctrinal propositions offer,
which are necessary for any attempt to make sense of the constitution of medical law as
an internal process. The first refers again to the doctrinal reliance on externalities.
Although external references cannot provide organising principles as such, they still
provide the trigger that irritates the legal system. It is only because of the interaction of
the legal system with its environment, which takes place whenever the law responds to
the external "noise", that an internal restructuring of the legal system occurs and that
medical law ultimately emerges as a distinct subject. In this respect, the doctrine correctly
highlights the importance of the link between law and medicine for medical law, although
both approaches' over-reliance on the externalities of medicine renders their
understanding of the field problematic.
The second significant insight refers to the particular task that the doctrine
performs within the legal system. Whatever the plausibility of its content, doctrinal
analysis is an internal mechanism according to which the law makes sense of itself, in
other words it is a mechanism that contributes to the self-description of the legal
system.27 This means that both the particular doctrinal identification of the discipline of
medical law and the principles on which this is based become part of the internal
memory of the legal system. This is not to say that the legal system does not control how
its memory is constructed, nor that the external references of the doctrine do not
become internalised: the opposite is the case. For instance, ethical principles like
autonomy or beneficence are transformed into the legal norms of consent to treatment
and of the "best interests" test.28 However, even under the guard of this internalisation
the doctrine shares in the conceptual matrix of the law. In this respect, the doctrine is
linked with the redundancy of the legal system since the self-descriptions to which it
contributes are used in a recurrent manner by the system: in accordance with premises
provided by the doctrine, legal norms are interpreted, relevant conclusions are reached
and the link of current legal communications with future ones is further expanded.
The third insight is very much linked with the previous one. True, the
externalities of the doctrine become internalised and the memory of the legal system is
determined in accordance with their internal transformation. Yet, the initial direct
orientation of the doctrine to externalities remains present as a kind of "echo" within the
horizon of medical law. Because of its doctrinal aspect, medical law carries with it an
27 Recall, here, the analysis of this notion in chapter 3.
28 This point is linked with the more general process, in terms of which the law uses the distinction between
external and internal reference. For a much more elaborate analysis of this issue, see N. Luhmann, 2004, pp. 346ff.
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implicit "burden": the doctrinal insistence on medical ethics and on professional power
attaches to medical law an under-defined dimension of "moralisation" and
"politicisation"29 that also shapes to some extent the discipline. In order to see how
exactly this is happening and what its repercussions are for medical law, we need to
investigate in more detail what is going on in the empirical reality of medical law through
the lenses of redundancy and variation. It is to this issue that we will now turn our
attention.
3) Redundancy and variation in action.
In my discussion in chapter 3, I insisted that the main mechanism that determines the
internal constitution of new disciplines within the law is the interplay between
redundancy and variation. Through this interplay the law determines exacdy how it copes
with environmental complexity and how it organises its internal complexity in
responding to environmental noise. Redundancy guarantees the strength of the existing
memory of the legal system, while variation pushes towards novelty by allowing
exceptions to redundancy: it tests new thematisations, it links existing norms in new ways
and it also controls the generation of new norms. In terms of medical law, this means
that variation controls the themes that medical law will deal with and the particular
norms that will become operational towards them. Simultaneously, redundancy links
these novel developments with the already existing matrix of the law, establishes how
new norms replicate older ones and ultimately what new themes are treated as new by the
legal system. During this process some medical issues are internalised; some others are
filtered out.
Through the notion of the regulatory trilemma an additional concept was added
to this scheme, namely "disintegration": the implication here is that when the law
regulates other social fields the interplay between redundancy and variation may produce
pathological effects, in the sense that the autonomous character of the law becomes
endangered. This implies that it is possible for the balance between redundancy and
variation to be overstrained and in turn, this can only be conceptualised in terms of the
unique function of the law. When variation intensifies to such a degree that the law
cannot generalise normative expectations in a stable manner, for instance because of the
constant generation of new norms and the constant integration of new themes that
29 I borrow these concepts by G. Teubner, "Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourse" in R.
Rawlings (ed.), Law and Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 149-176, at p. 152.
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cannot be accommodated by redundancy, the normativity of law is undone: whenever
the law provides norms in a very particularised manner, its unique reduction achievement
of the law is lost. In this sense, an intense increase in variation can be seen as systemic
entropy that intensifies the possibility of disintegration.
In applying this theoretical apparatus to the empirical reality of medical law, we
can acquire some very illuminating insights as to how the interplay between redundancy
and variation has so far shaped the constitution of medical law as a discipline. In order to
do so, it is necessary to refer back to the initial conclusions reached at the end of chapter
2. There, in elaborating on what I have identified as the "complexity" of medical law, I
argued that medical law is characterised by a random division between legislative
interventions and adjudicative solutions to medical problems; that from the two it is
adjudication that primarily carries the discipline forward by ensuring the involvement of
the law with novel situations, especially since judicial decisions are very much aware of
the particularities of concrete scenarios and provide solutions on a case-by-case basis;
finally, that as a result the whole edifice of medical law is characterised by a high degree
of substantive rationality, which is very much linked with the "moralisation" and
"politicisation" of the discipline rooted at the doctrinal level.
My claim here is that three "theses" represent the tangible result of how
redundancy and variation have determined the constitution of medical law and indicate
what have been the repercussions of law's exposure to the system of medicine.
Especially the very strong judicial tendency within medical law for deciding on a case-by-
case basis and for being particularly aware of the specific character of the case at hand,
with the resulting intensification of substantive rationality is not only an indication of
variation at play, but also -and more crucially- a reminder that in medical law the normativity
oflaw is under strain. An increase in variation can indeed ensure that case-by-case reasoning
and substantive rationality become the main "trend" within medical law; however — and
especially if we see this from the point of view or programming- both these features
abandon conditional programmes (which are essentially compatible with legal
normativity) in favour of purposive programs that orient the legal system towards
achieving concrete results in concrete scenarios. Given that the legal system exists in
time, a constant shift towards this type of legal pronouncements could indeed generate
"dangerous" disintegrative effects for the law. It goes without saying that the term
"dangerous" is used here in a strictly technical sense: I do not mean that medico-legal
adjudication will cease to exist, but that a shift in the nature of the process of decision-
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making will undermine the particular reduction achievement of the law. Courts will still
adjudicate in medical law: their solutions, though, will not exhibit these characteristics in
terms ofwhich law is autonomous as law through the uniqueness of its function.
Here then is an interim conclusion regarding the constitution of medical law.
This is controlled by redundancy/variation as the law is irritated by medicine in the
process of regulation. To begin with, their interplay ensures the particular way that
medical law internalises medical themes: in this process, it is not necessary that all the
signals that medicine emits will be internalised by medical law, nor that the internal
complexity of the law will totally mirror the complexity of medicine. Especially
redundancy guarantees that some signals will remain unnoticed. Simultaneously, variation
pushes medical law towards the opposite direction, namely towards the intensification of its
internal complexity; this can already be noticed in the case-by-case adjudication within
the discipline and in the density of its substantive rationality, on the basis of which novel
situations from medicine are legally countered. This increase in variation generates
disintegrative effects within medical law, in the sense that legal normativity is threatened.
In medical law, the generalisation of stable normative expectations is not necessarily an
uncontested feature of the discipline.
At this stage this is a general conclusion, still framed in abstract terms. Thus, and
in order to further clarify the argument, in the next three subsections I will pick up again
three particular "themes" of medical law (identified as themes necessarily internally) that
I presented in depth during the analysis in chapter 2 and I will investigate how my
conclusions can further be tested.
a) Medical negligence.
In discussing the social system of medicine, I argued that one of its major distinctions is
the one between success and failure. According to this distinction the medical system
communicates about the final "result" of a medical case; essentially it assesses this result
in a way that a) defines whether more has to be done about this case and b) explains the
occurrence of this particular outcome. Especially in the case of failure, the medical
system can generate further communications on the basis of which it interprets this
failure as resulting from a tripartite cluster of possibilities, namely as an unavoidable
eventually, as an accidental occurrence or as attributable to a scientific mistake on the
part of the doctor.
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In the process of the legal regulation of medicine, the law becomes irritated by
this communicative network of the medical system and responds by thematising the
concept of medical negligence. In doing so, it attaches legal significance only to the last
of the possibilities just mentioned. Already we can identify a process of legal selectivity
here: from all the possibilities that medicine attaches to the initial distinction between
success and failure, the legal system selects only one that will be dealt with as legally
significant. The exact internalisation of the initial trigger is controlled by redundancy: in
the matrix of the law, the concepts that are relevant to faulty performances revolve
around the core notion of responsibility and the relevant concept of negligence. Through
redundancy legal responsibility and negligence are replicated in response to this external
noise and medical negligence as a new — but simultaneously old- theme emerges.
If we look more closely at how exactly the law deals with medical negligence we
have to consider, further, the substantiation of the standard of care. The problem here is
that the law has to develop a criterion in terms of which what a health practitioner did
can be considered as negligent or not. This is not of course a new problem for the law,
since it is present whenever the question of negligence comes to the surface. Yet, the
assessment of the responsibility of a medical practitioner is particularly problematic
because whatever a doctor does is meaningful only in terms of the scientific system on
the basis of which she, herself, conceptualises her actions. Accordingly, the legal
assessment of this responsibility (and ultimately the legal norm that would substantiate
the relevant standard of care) has somehow to open up to the internal horizon of
meaning of the scientific system.
The problem here is that the law does not have concepts that are adequate in
themselves to "incorporate" the internal criteria of the scientific system that the
assessment of medical negligence necessitates. Accordingly, variation comes into the
picture and creates an exception to the general rules of standard of care:30 for medical
negligence the test as defined in Bolam is that " of the ordinary skilled man exercising
and professing to have that special skill".31 The exception is that through the Bolam test
the substantiation of the standard of care is thrown back to the medical system: the law,
through this formal formulation of the relevant rule invites the medical system to activate
its criteria and in doing so, it incorporates criteria it has no "control" over into the legal
30 For an analysis of the reasons that sustain the claim that professional negligence is an exceptional category
within the general law of negligence, see J. Flealy, Medical Negligence: Common Law Perspectives (London:
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), pp. 63-64.
31 Per McNair J in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118 at p. 121. Let me
remind the reader, here, that in chapter 2,1 also analysed a series of cases that further sophisticated the test.
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internal horizon. If we go back to the notion of the regulatory trilemma this is an
obvious example of disintegration, since a legal structure (the standard of care) is
colonised by the system under regulation. Furthermore, from the point of view of the
function of law, this amounts to a loss of function: the law here stabilises expectations
only in a very formal and very limited way, namely only by guaranteeing that doctors will
be held responsible for negligent actions in accordance with their own assessment of what
constitutes negligence alone. This expectation is based on a circular paradox (a doctor is
negligent when doctors think he is negligent) that does not allow for a legal criterion on
the basis of which this circularity can be solved.
More recent judicial decisions (in other words more recent legal communications)
have attempted to compensate this "loss of function" by bringing the criterion of the
standard of care, at least partially, back to law. For instance, in Bolithof the Bolam test
was recast in such a way as to allow for some legal assessment of the professional
determination of the standard, when this is essentially unreasonable. However, as the
exact impact of this decision is still unclear, it is not yet the case that the colonisation of
law by the medical system in terms of the Bolam test has been countered.
b) Consent to treatment.
In the course of this thesis, I have repeatedly referred to the importance of autonomy for
the discipline of medical law. Its importance surfaces both within the domain of medical
ethics and within arguments from the tradition of human rights and is primarily
expressed on the claim that the patient is an autonomous agent and as such she has to be
respected. This claim is ever present within the domain of medicine and co-determines
the interaction between health care professionals and patients.
From the point of view of medical law, autonomy is internalised into a legal norm
according to which the legality of medical operations depends on the consent of the
patient involved. Legal consent is the concept through which the law embraces the
notion of autonomy and is very much relevant to a wide range of scenarios that entail the
involvement of the law. This internalisation of autonomy as consent to treatment is again
determined by redundancy. The idea that the individual is worthy of respect and of legal
protection as an individual is also a fundamental conceptual achievement ofwestern legal
systems. Western law is very much oriented to the value of the individual and
32 See the reasoning in Bolitho v. City & Hackney HA [1997] 4 All ER 771.
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accordingly, the category of the legalperson is already integrated into the basic structures
of the law.33 Therefore, the legal system has only to refer to its internal memory in order
to replicate an external theme that is already crucially compatible with its own concepts.
It is here that redundancy appears: the law revisits its pre-existing matrix ofmemory and
it easily integrates what is initially an externality by linking it with internal concepts and
structures towards which the external theme exhibits a high degree of affinity. From the
point of view of the legal system, patient's autonomy is nothing new; rather, it is simply a
restatement of the pre-existing legal idea of the legal person.
Although this seems like an easy process of "internalisation", difficulties instandy
appear. The main one is that it becomes necessary to develop auxiliary legal concepts in
terms of which a patient can be defined as an autonomous agent and enjoy the
protection that the concept of consent entails. As I have discussed in detail in chapter 2,
the relevant case law stresses very much the notion of competence as the main auxiliary
concept: it is only the consent of competent individuals that matters.
It is exacdy here that the difficulty with internalising the theme of autonomy lies.
At this level, the law does not have adequate concepts to problematise autonomy, namely
to investigate exacdy the status of a patient. This is a significant issue, especially if one
considers that the patient, exactly because of her status as a patient, is often in a state of
reduced autonomy. This being the case, the law needs a sophisticated cluster of criteria to
build into and "re-contextualise", as it were its reductions. However, the only one
available is the rigid distinction between competence and incompetence. Even though it
is accepted that competence is relative to the particularities of the case at hand,34 the
relevant provisions are underdetermined and they rely very much on the assessment of
the health care professional in charge of the patient regarding her competence. Again
then, the medical system (through this professional assessment) penetrates the legal
system and again a "loss" of function is the price that medical law pays: as the legal
system cannot accommodate a substantial test for competence, case-by-case decisions
become the norm and contingent outcomes are frequent. As a result, normative
expectations regarding whether the autonomy of a patient is going to be protected
cannot be generalised.
33 Quite naturally, the relevant literature is indeed immense. Among many others, see F. Tonnies, Community and
Society (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1957) and the discussion in R. Cotterrell, The
Sociology ofLaw: an Introduction (2nd edition, London: Butterworths, 1992), pp. 118ff.
34 The reader is referred to the relevant cases in chapter 2.
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c) The best interests principle.
The last testing ground for the constitution of medical law is the "best interests"
principle. As I explored at length in the second chapter, this principle is the second major
"vehicle" (apart from consent to treatment) in terms of which the legality of a medical
operation is established. It is used when the patient involved is incompetent and it
becomes operational in the following form: a medical intervention to an incompetent
patient is legal when it is being performed in the best interests of the patient.
It should not be a surprise that this principle is present in the medical system and
that it significantly co-determines the doctor-patient relationship. There it exemplifies the
professional ethos in favour of beneficence in accordance to which the doctor must have
the interests of her patient always in mind. Once again, then, what we are dealing with
here is a process of internalisation since the law develops an internal norm by becoming
oriented to a signal belonging to the sphere of medicine. Once again, through
redundancy this signal is being processed against the pre-existing matrix of legal memory
and the legal system responds by activating a particular normative structure that is linked
with the tort of battery, namely the defence of necessity. The best interests principle
appears as a particular expression of necessity (and this is controlled in terms of
variation): a doctor that treats a patient in her best interests has a legal defence against
the tort of battery that otherwise would have been committed.
This is how the best interests principle becomes "actualised" within the horizon
of the legal system. Once again, though, this is not the end of the story for the obvious
reasons that the formulation of the legal norm is open-ended: the rule does not provide
any criteria for the substantiation of the principle. In other words, it is not registered
within the norm when the best interests principle is satisfied and when it is not. Indeed,
my presentation of the relevant case law in chapter 2 has shown that there is a wide
discrepancy in the way that courts substantiate the principle and that a number of ways
are invoked in the judicial usage of the principle. In an essential way, its exact
substantiation is determined by the particularities of the case at hand.
Ifwe consider these findings of the second chapter from the point of view of the
argument that I am developing here, it becomes obvious that this formulation of the
principle and its judicial usage has disastrous effects for the normativity of law. Since the
principle is substantiated on a case-by-case basis, we are dealing with a framework of
extreme variation that cannot be countered by any invocation of redundancy. In effect,
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the law totally opens up and totally resigns from the invocation of any legal criteria in
designating what exacdy the normative content of the principle is. In a sense this
increases the flexibility and the substantive orientation of the use of the principle, since
what is actually happening here is the substitution of conditional by purposive
programs:35 it is the particularity of the situation that defines its purpose and according to
which the best interests of the patients are defined. Again the price is too high: again the
normativity of law is lost and once again the distinct character of law is endangered. If
one considers the very wide invocation of the best interests principle, this is a very
serious situation indeed. In effect, it is exactly here that medical law as a legal discipline is
strained the most.
4) On the stabilisation of expectations (again).
One needs to return to the function of law, in order to show how this also has a direct
impact on the constitution of medical law. In a sense this is just a complementary
argument to what I have already said about redundancy/variation and their relation with
the function of law, hence the term "direct" impact that I employ here.
Given that law's function is to stabilise normative expectations, its regulatory
impact is essentially determined by the actual observance of the expectations that it
generates. If one takes a step back, what is important here is that the production of legal
norms in terms of which normative expectations are formulated is always conditioned
upon the relative complexity of law's environment at the moment of their production.
The interesting question is what happens when this state changes. The usual answer is
that the law adapts to this change by producing new norms that are again compatible
with the state of the legal environment. However, this answer cannot accommodate the
possibility of changes in the environment that happen at a faster pace than that according
to which the legal system can adapt to change. This is stereotypically the problem with
the rapid development of scientific knowledge. In this situation, legal adaptation is not
enough and what comes to the forefront is the fate of normative expectations that do
not correspond with the environmental conditions on the basis of which they came into
existence.
35 It can be argued that what we are having here are purposive programs "nested" into conditional programs. For
further analysis, see J. Paterson, "Reflecting on Reflexive Law" in M. King and C. Thornhill (eds.), Luhmann on
Law and Politics: Critical Appraisals and Applications (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 13-35, at p. 19, with
further references.
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A crucial concept in order to understand this situation is that of second-order
normativity. As I discussed in chapter 3, for the law to achieve its function it is not
enough only to generate normative expectations; it is also necessary to guarantee that the
fulfilment of these normative expectations is itself normatively expected.36 It is exactly
this second-order normativity that becomes problematic when the law cannot follow the
pace of scientific developments. As this inability is socially registered, it becomes
apparent that the normative expectations that are still in place are not compatible with
the current state of scientific knowledge. Still, these expectations are part of valid law and
since they are normative in nature they will not learn by the possibility of being
disappointed. Even if they are not fulfilled they will remain valid. However, their
incompatibility with the environmental conditions is significant at the level of second-
order normativity: this will gradually be eroded, since it will cease to be the case that it
will be normatively expected that normative expectations of the first order will be
fulfilled. In turn, this erosion of second-order normativity will have an impact on the
normativity of the first-order: it is quite probable that first-order normative expectations
will be less and less fulfilled in real terms. If this becomes a generalised stance, then the
regulatory impact of the legal system is minimised, since this requires at least some level
of observance of the currently valid normative expectations. Since the pace of scientific
development is indeed very rapid, this is a constant problem for the regulatory potential
of the legal system. Even when legal change is effected, it very soon ceases to be
compatible with some new developments and so on. The legal system permanently lags
behind. My argument here is that this "lagging behind" is very much embedded into the
constitution of medical law.
As an obvious example of this situation, one can use the legal regulation of the
scientific techniques of assisted reproduction. These techniques significantly challenged
traditional notions regarding family relationships and consequently some of the main
norms of family law. With the passing of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990 the incompatibility between the previous and sparse regulatory edifice and the then
state of scientific knowledge was eliminated. Yet, time passes and although science
progresses, the normative edifice remains the same: the 1990 Act is still valid even after
15 years of its passing and with it the normative expectations that are based on it are still
operational. Obviously, eventually the legal system will adapt to the new state of the
relevant scientific knowledge. It is no surprise that already a process of amending the
36 For further analysis, see E. Christodoulidis, 1998, p. 118.
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1990 Act has commenced.37 Still, the problem remains: in the meantime the legal
regulation is behind the current state of the area that it is supposed to regulate and even
if the Act will be eventually amended it will soon start to lose the battle of pace again. As
far as the constitution of medical law is concerned this example shows that although the
initial legal developments respond to environmental stimuli, the passing of time
constantly differentiates the state of the legal system from the state of its environment.
Therefore, the legal norms pertinent to assisted reproduction are gradually much less
compatible with the area that they are supposed to regulate: although medicine changes
fast medical law only belatedly reacts.
5) An endnote: reflexivity in medical law?
In this penultimate part, I want to consider briefly the tentative idea of legal reflexivity
that I introduced in the previous chapter. This should be seen as a coda to my general
argument, mainly because this exciting theoretical proposition is still under-developed
and because its general plausibility largely still remains to be tested empirically. However,
on the assumption that the idea of reflexivity holds the reassessment of the constitution
of medical law must consider the possibility of reflexive elements being present in the
horizon of the discipline.
Indeed, if one considers the relevant legal material it becomes apparent that a
number of institutions, established by particular statutes and regulations are very close to
the idea of reflexivity and especially to a special version of it, namely the idea of
communication through organisation. Let me remind the reader that this idea implies that it
would be possible to enhance the reflexive interaction between systems if at their
boundaries binding institutions are formed on the basis of which stable patterns of
systemic interaction emerge. This stability would be the result of the simultaneous
participation of the institution in both systems in a way such that would ensure that the
parallel processing of information would be achievable in a stable manner.
In the context of medical law, I have in mind two examples of institutional
settings that can be conceptualised in such a way. The first is the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Authority established by the HFE Act 1990. The main regulatory remit
of this Authority is to license a number of activities that are included in the Act and that
refer to medical research and to techniques of assisted reproduction. In reference to
37 For these developments, see J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith's Law and Medical Ethics (7th
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 72-73.
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these activities, the law refuses to regulate directly: instead it sets up an intermediary
institution that acquires the authority to regulate them through licensing, by
simultaneously considering both the general legal environment and the medical and
scientific considerations that characterise these activities. Furthermore, the Authority has
the ability to consider a wide range of factors (most notably ethical factors) in its
decisions and in this respect it stands at the crossroads of a number of systems.
Similarly, such a "binding" role can be read in the newly formed Council for the
Regulation of Health Care Professionals, established by the Health Care Professions Act
2002. In effect, this Council is the new authority that has to monitor the performance of
the particular regulatory bodies of health care professions, with the aim to protect the
interests of the patients. Its role, then, is essentially protective and it can substitute the
direct regulation of health care professionals by legal norms. In this respect, it may
provide an alternative way for controlling the medical profession, by operating at the
boundaries of the legal and the medical system.
These are simply two examples that seem to me to justify a claim that reflexive
elements are present in medical law. Similarly with the general idea of legal reflexivity it is
still a matter of time to see whether they will proliferate and what exactly their impact
will be for the future constitution of medical law. Like reflexivity in general, their
existence provides some hope that it is possible to increase the regulatory potential of
medical law without overburdening the distinct character of the legal system.
E. Conclusion.
I introduced the discussion in this chapter, by stating that my aim was to reassess the
constitution of medical law from the perspective of systems theory and by taking on
board conclusions developed in chapters 1 and 2. Having reached the end of this
discussion let me now sum up what this reassessment has revealed, in six distinct theses.
Thesis one: medical law is constituted as a distinct branch of the law internally, during
the regulatory orientation of law towards medicine. This process primarily involves the
interaction between two social systems, law and medicine, the latter being a subsystem
within the social system of science.
Thesis two: the interaction between law and medicine is established because a structural
affinity between the two exists. This affinity, that guarantees the possibility of structural
coupling, is related to the concept of medical risk.
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Thesis three: as far as the constitution ofmedical law is concerned the mechanisms that
determine exacdy how the law will respond to medicine is the interplay between
redundancy/variation and the function of law. As these are internal mechanisms the
doctrinal propositions that medical law is constituted as a discipline directly in
accordance with external themes collapse. Externalities are important only as triggers for
internal processes.
Thesis four: the constitution of medical law proposed here is linked with the problems
that the exposure of the law to the non-legal world brings to the forefront. The notion of
the "regulatory trilemma" captures these problems best and brings to the fore the
possibility of disintegration. In the case of the interaction between law and medicine this is
a real possibility: indeed medical law is a branch of the law where because of
disintegration, the reduction achievement of legal normativity is actually under threat.
Thesis five: the result of this threat is that the regulatory potential of medical law is
somehow limited, since there exists a tendency to counter disintegrative effects by
ignoring a number of signals that the medical system originates.
Thesis six: in accordance with the tentative suggestions of reflexive law, it is possible to
identify reflexive elements within medical law. These elements not only co-determine the
constitution of the discipline, but also indicate that it is possible to increase the regulatory
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